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Introduction
Strategically interacting individuals often lack knowledge about each others’ actions or attributes.
This may introduce incentive problems into the interaction. Economists already realized for quite
some time that it is important to analyze how incentive problems are dealt with in reality and how
one can solve or mitigate incentive problems. Incentive problems are present in many different
contexts in real life like insurance contracts, taxation, the provision of public goods, auctions,
compensation schemes, and incentive schemes for employees.
Incentive problems induce, for instance, shirking on the part of employees when their actions are
not observable or verifiable. Implications are, for example, that contracts can no longer condition
on actions if these are not observable (or not verifiable). Instead, the contract may condition on
(observable) outcomes (Chapter 2). Another alternative can be to change the compensation scheme
to some relative compensation scheme like a tournament (Chapter 1). Relative compensation
schemes can in particular be useful if individuals have to fear not to be paid as agreed upon
since indicators of performance are not verifiable. The tournament structure then commits the
organizer (principal) to pay the prize to one of the contestants. Relative compensation schemes
can be useful if the production technologies of individuals are dependent
In the first two chapters of this thesis, we consider relative compensation schemes and incentive
schemes when information asymmetries are present. In the first chapter, individuals have private
information about their abilities. In the second chapter, the actions of individuals cannot be
observed (moral hazard). In both chapters, we analyze whether and how intermediate information
changes incentives. Here, intermediate information arises endogenously in the game when we
change the timing of the game such that individuals act sequentially instead of simultaneously.
If they act sequentially, the second mover can observe the action (Chapter 1) or the outcome
(Chapter 2) of the first mover.
In Chapter 1, we consider contests, in which two players compete for an exogenously given
prize by exerting efforts. The player, who exerts an higher effort, wins the contest with a higher
probability. We do not derive the optimal prize scheme here, but focus on incentive effects caused
by intermediate information, when contestants act sequentially instead of simultaneously. We
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compare contests, in which players either move simultaneously or sequentially, under different
information settings: Contestants’ types are either publicly known or private information. Players
are ex ante symmetric, but realized types may be heterogeneous. The joint distribution of types
allows for correlation of the players’ types.
The combination of private information and sequential moves (as defined above) in contests as
well as the comparisons of sequential contests under private and complete information are novel
to the literature.
We find that the expected effort sum in sequential contests is higher than in simultaneous contests
irrespective of the information setting. Hence, incentives increase (from an ex ante perspective),
when intermediate information is available, not only under complete information but also under
private information. It is known that sequential contests Pareto dominate simultaneous contests
under complete information. We can extend this result to private information, when contestants’
types are sufficiently negatively correlated. Then, also the second mover prefers sequential
contests. This is due to an efficiency gain effect together with an ability effect. The latter effect
implies higher bids by “better” contestants, who value the prize more or are of higher ability. The
more negatively types are correlated, the higher is the probability that types differ. Given the
same probability for high and low types, it thus becomes more likely that the player, who values
the prize more, wins the contest (ability effect). In addition, the efficiency gain effect increases
expected payoffs in this situation. When this effect becomes sufficiently strong, the second mover’s
expected payoff increases enough so that he prefers sequential contests. The first mover, however,
still prefers sequential contests (ex ante) irrespective of the information setting.
It has already been shown that for simultaneous contests the information setting does not matter
from an ex ante perspective: The ex ante expected effort sum as well as ex ante expected payoffs
for the contestants do not change. Comparing the two information settings given sequential
contests, we can show, however, that the ex ante expected effort sum is higher under private
information, whereas contestants’ expected payoffs are higher under complete information. Hence,
incentives under complete and private information change when intermediate information is
available. Incentives rise (from an ex ante perspective), when there is private information. This
result is novel to the literature on contests and is due to a commitment effect for the first mover
that offsets the usual competition intensity effect. The latter effect implies that contestants exert
more effort, the more similar their types are.
In Chapter 2, we consider a model of team production under moral hazard. Again, we an-
alyze incentive effects of intermediate information. We investigate whether the principal prefers
his agents to work simultaneously or sequentially. In case agents act sequentially the second mover
can observe the quality of the first mover’s contribution to the joint (team) project. This means
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that the second mover receives intermediate information, on which he can condition his action.
Irrespective of the timing structure, the principal only observes the value of the joint project in
the end.
In contrast to the first chapter, agents no longer compete against each other, but jointly work on
a project. We derive the optimal wage scheme for both structures of the game, in which wages
condition on the value of the joint project. The optimal structure for the principal depends on
whether the agents’ contributions are complements or substitutes in his production function: A
sequential structure is optimal when the agents’ contributions are perfect complements, whereas a
simultaneous structure is optimal when they are perfect substitutes.
So far, the literature on teams only considered effort complementarities and two possible values of
the joint project: The project either fails or succeeds. We introduce output complementarities and
an intermediate value of the project. In contrast to findings in the literature on teams, we find
that intermediate information does not necessarily increase incentives and is thus not necessarily
favorable to the principal.
While we deal with an exogenously fixed wage scheme in the first chapter, we derive optimal wage
schemes in the second chapter. We find that results in the second chapter hinge on a change in
the feasible wage scheme between both timing structures and as well between contributions being
either substitutes or complements. In the first chapter, however, results depend on four “strategic
effects” that we identify.
Both Chapters 1 and 2 aim at studying the interaction between intermediate information
and incentives. We believe that this is an important issue in many economic situations, and we
hope to provide some new insights into the interplay of intermediate information and incentives
when information asymmetries are present.
In the third chapter of this thesis, we deal with a different topic. Nevertheless, the topic is
related to the first two chapters as we explain below. In the third chapter, we experimentally
investigate what people know about the bias of other people. We focus on people’s self-assessment
of their abilities. We consider a situation, in which people do not know the ability (or type) of
others and in addition, they do not even know their own ability (type) for sure. We can say that
people have private information on their belief about their own type. If people interact with each
other in such a situation, people have to form beliefs about other people’s self-assessment. We do
not consider the interaction itself, but we elicit beliefs people hold about the own ability. This
issue is, for example, considered in experiments on overconfidence.1 Moreover, we go one step
1For an overview on overconfidence see Englmaier (forthcoming).
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further, which is novel to the literature in this context: We elicit beliefs people have about the
beliefs of others.
If we think of the issues considered in the first two chapters, this new issue seems to be an
important extension. If we do not know the attributes or actions of people with whom we interact,
we form beliefs about it. People’s actions usually depend on their type (or attributes). If people
do not perfectly know their type, actions will depend on their perceived type. Hence, if we interact
with them, we have to form beliefs about their perceived type to be able to infer their behavior
and act optimally. We do, however, not consider how optimal behavior or contracts change when
such higher order beliefs are important, but analyze whether people are aware that other people’s
self-assessment might be biased and what they think about the others’ true ability. Thus, we
investigate how accurate beliefs about other people’s attributes and about their beliefs are.
More precisely, we consider people’s self-assessment about their number of correct answers when
answering a set of multiple choice questions. While different types of individuals exist (they
either underestimate, correctly estimate or overestimate their ability), our results confirm that
people tend to overestimate their ability, i.e. the population – on average – is biased. We then
test whether individuals are aware of other people’s bias and what they think about the relation
between their own and other people’s bias. We find that most individuals do not think that
other people have a bias. The more information subjects receive about the task, which the other
group handles, the more subjects realize that others are on average biased. Moreover, people
tend to think that their own self-assessment is better (they make less likely a mistake) than the
self-assessment of others. They believe this, even if “the others” are a group of people such that
(random) mistakes cancel out. We observe, however, that subjects partly revise this judgement if
they receive more information about the task or are incited to reason about mistakes or biases in
people’s self-assessment.
Hence, in the third chapter, we again observe effects of information: Information helps subjects to
make better judgements.
4
Chapter 1
Sequential versus Simultaneous
Contests
1.1 Introduction
Contests are situations in which agents spend resources (they make a bid or exert an effort) in
order to win a prize. This expenditure influences an agent’s probability of winning the prize.
The bid is irreversible and contestants bear the costs of their action independent of whether they
win a prize or not. A contestant’s reward in this competitive scheme depends on his relative
performance. The contestant with the highest performance, however, does not necessarily win the
contest. Only in a perfectly discriminating contest the contestant with the highest performance
wins for sure. A perfectly discriminating contest is known as an all-pay auction.
In this paper, we consider imperfectly discriminating contests, which means that the winner of the
contest is determined probabilistically and needs not be the one with the highest performance.
These contest models capture essential features of rent-seeking competition, patent races, job
promotion or sports contests. They are also used to model incentive schemes in organizations.1
Tullock (1980) proposed the traditional contest-framework: He considered imperfectly discrimi-
nating contests with symmetric contestants who move simultaneously and in which no agent is
able to commit to an expenditure level. This standard framework has been extended in many
ways. For an overview on rent-seeking competition see, for example, Nitzan (1994) or Nti (1999).
For a review of the literature on sports contests see Szymanski (2002). Even if there are various
extensions of the standard framework, the main focus of the literature is on simultaneous (i.e.
Cournot-type) contests and on symmetric contestants or at least the agents’ types are publicly
known. In the following, we refer to the case in which the realizations of types are publicly known
1For tournaments as incentive schemes in organizations see, e.g., Lazear and Rosen (1981) or – for a review of the
literature – see Prendergast (1999).
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as the “public information” setting. This means that not only the contestants but also the designer
of the contests know the types.
Compared to contests in reality, the assumptions of simultaneity and symmetry seem very
strict. A first observation is that in most sports contests (e.g. skiing championships), contestants
move one after the other such that contestants who move later can observe the action(s) of their
predecessor(s) before it is their own turn. In other contests – for instance, the Tour de France or
triathlon competitions – each contestant can observe his opponent(s) during the ongoing contest
and react to his (their) action(s). Purely simultaneous contests are rare in sports. In weight
lifting or high jump championships, for example, contestants act “in turns”. Here, one can observe
that actions are often adjusted to the action of the predecessor or that athletes try to preempt
their competitors. Other examples for sequential structures include rent-seeking payments in
case institutions announce the contributions publicly during the ongoing process. Similarly, in
tendering procedures, it is often the case that one company has some “priority”2: Knowing the
offers of its competitors, this company is asked to make a (final) offer. Also in court proceedings
it is common that plaintiff and defense act sequentially: In general, the plaintiff first submits
evidence and then the defense reacts.
The question we are interested in, is whether the sequential order of moves in contests arises just
because of outside restrictions (e.g. a ski jump can only be used by one athlete at a time) or
whether agents can be better incentivized in this setting compared to simultaneous contests.
A second important observation is that in real life contestants not only tend to be asymmetric,
but – more importantly – they do not necessarily know their rivals’ abilities or valuations of the
prize. Like in auctions, it is realistic to assume that valuations are the agents’ private information.
Regarding an agent’s ability – which can be interpreted as the effectiveness of an agent’s effort
or lower effort costs – there are many examples showing that the relevant (actual) ability may
not be publicly known: Even in professional sports, where abilities of athletes are in principle
publicly known, athletes only have some vague belief about their opponents’ current form as
temporary fluctuations are common. One often observes that a designated favorite (e.g. because
of his pre-championship performance) in a championship does not win because he performs worse
than expected by others. Of course, there are also random factors (changing weather conditions
during a contest, pressure of being the favorite, physical injuries etc.), which influence an athlete’s
performance. The actual ability, however, is not random in the sense that it may well be known
to the athlete himself but not publicly.
Furthermore, the agents’ actual abilities may be correlated: In many disciplines athletes prefer
2In general, such prior claims may be due, for example, to close collaboration with one company.
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Figure 1.1: The Four Institutional Settings
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some venues, techniques or equipment, which is more or less helpful under certain conditions (e.g.
weather conditions). Hence, given these conditions, one contestant’s ability might be positively or
negatively correlated with his opponent’s ability.
In this paper, we take into account these two aspects, private information (where we allow
for correlation of the agents’ types) and a sequential order of moves. The combination of both
aspects is novel to the literature on contests in this form.
The sequential setting that we consider is a Stackelberg game: The second mover can perfectly
observe the first mover’s action and thus reacts to this action.3 When, in addition, contestants’
types are private knowledge (and correlated), the second mover cannot only react to the first
mover’s action, but also update his prior about the first mover’s type. Besides the combination of
these two aspects itself and the analysis of this institutional setting, we compare the four possible
institutional settings by two approaches: We compare the two timing structures, i.e. the order of
moves is sequential or simultaneous, from an ex ante perspective given the information setting,
i.e. agents’ types are either public or private information. Then, given the timing structure, we
compare the two information settings from an ex ante perspective. The four institutional settings
and the aforementioned comparisons (indicating related literature) are illustrated in Figure 1.1.
Our main results are that the risk neutral designer of the contest – when he wants to max-
3Fudenberg et al. (1983) deal with the case of imperfect observability of the rival’s action in an R&D race where
the favorite makes the first move.
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imize the expected effort sum – and the first mover prefer the sequential setting irrespective of the
information setting. For the second mover, this only holds true for the case of public information.
Whether he prefers the sequential or simultaneous contest under private information depends on
the distribution of types. When agents’ types are sufficiently negatively correlated, the second
mover prefers the sequential structure, otherwise he prefers the simultaneous one. The intuition
for this result is an efficiency gain effect together with an ability effect : The more negatively
contestants’ types are correlated, the higher is the probability that they are heterogeneous.
Moreover, the agent with the higher ability bids more than his rival (ability effect). In our model
the agent with the higher ability is the one who values the prize more.4 Hence, the probability
that the agent with the higher valuation wins the prize increases. This efficiency gain effect
increases the surplus of both agents in the sequential contest. If the effect is sufficiently strong,
expected payoffs of the second mover become larger under the sequential contest than under the
simultaneous contest. As these results suggest, we find that in the sequential contest with private
information a first-mover advantage exists.5
When comparing the information settings for simultaneous contests, an effort maximizing designer
as well as the contestants are indifferent between both informational settings. This result has
been shown by Malueg and Yates (2004). The result for sequential contests is new and different:
An effort maximizing designer prefers the private information setting, whereas contestants prefer
public information from an ex ante perspective. This result is driven by a commitment effect for
the first mover that is only present if contestants act sequentially. The high type of the first mover
commits to a higher effort level when the second mover is a low type than if the second mover
is a high type. This commitment effect thus offsets the usual competition intensity effect for the
high type of the first mover. The latter effect implies that the more similar agents are, the higher
is their effort as competition becomes more intense. Moreover, the commitment effect drives up
expected efforts and thus lowers the agents’ expected payoffs and enhances the designer’s payoff.
In case the designer only cares about a close race and not the effort sum, we find that he prefers
simultaneous to sequential contests irrespective of the information setting. Given a sequential
order of moves, he prefers private information to public information and vice versa if the order of
moves is simultaneous.
The structure of the paper is as follows. Before we compare the different settings, we deal
with all four settings separately. We begin with reviewing the two public information settings
4We show later that we can equivalently model this with agents who differ in their effort costs.
5Interestingly, in an experimental analysis of sequential tournaments by Weimann et al. (2000) with symmetric
agents – where the first mover advantage is even more pronounced – a second mover advantage is observed.
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where we make in particular use of results by Morgan (2003) and Leininger (1993). Next, we
consider private information. First, we summarize results on simultaneous contests with private
information where we rely on results by Malueg and Yates (2004). Afterwards, we introduce
sequential contests with private information. Using these results, we compare the institutional
settings from an ex ante perspective as mentioned before. The comparison for the case of sequential
contests, however, is novel to the literature. We also extend the previous literature by analysing
the effects of the timing assumption given private information on equilibrium actions and on which
structure the designer – who maximizes the ex ante expected effort sum – and the contestants,
respectively, prefer. Finally, we consider the case that the principal wants to have a “close race”
and does not maximize the expected effort sum.
Dixit (1987) was the first who analyzed the impact on incentives, when contestants can
precommit to their effort levels. He shows that the favorite (i.e. the player whose winning
probability in equilibrium is larger than one half) – when given the chance to move first –
overcommits to effort compared to the case without commitment, whereas the underdog (the one
with the lower probability of winning) undercommits to effort. While in Dixit the order of moves
is exogenously given, Baik and Shogren (1992) determine the order of moves endogenously. They
show that the underdog chooses to move first and the favorite to move second. Moreover, they find
that both players’ equilibrium efforts are lower in the sequential setting than in the simultaneous
move game. An extension to n identical players who move sequentially is numerically investigated
by Glazer and Hassin (2000). They find that the first mover makes higher profits than later movers
– independent of whether these move sequentially or simultaneously. The profit of the first mover,
however, needs not be higher than in a simultaneous n player contest. Aggregate efforts of the
contestants are at least as high as in a simultaneous n player contest, and hence their aggregate
payoffs are smaller than in the simultaneous contest (or at best equally high).
Most closely related to our paper regarding the timing structure are the studies by Yildirim (2005),
Morgan (2003), Linster (1993) and Leininger (1993). In contrast to our paper, all four studies
restrict to public information.6 Linster (1993) as well as Leininger (1993) contrast Cournot and
Stackelberg contests with two players, who can be either homogeneous or heterogeneous, which is
publicly known. In addition, Leininger endogenizes the order of moves by considering a game in
which two players can choose whether to move first or second knowing their own and the rival’s
valuation. He finds that if players are asymmetric, then equilibrium play will be in a particular
order. When players are symmetric, both a simultaneous and a sequential order of moves form
6Linster (1993) briefly addresses the case of one-sided asymmetric information but does not analyze implications
or compare different settings at all.
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an equilibrium. Morgan (2003) extends this analysis by allowing for ex ante uncertainty about
the players’ types. His main result is that the designer of the contest – who maximizes the effort
sum – and the contestants (ex ante) prefer a sequential order of moves under public information.
Morgan also endogenizes the order of moves: He shows that sequential play arises in equilibrium
when the timing decision is endogenously determined prior to the realization of valuations (when
agents decide on effort, however, types are publicly known). For the comparison under public
information, we rely on results by Morgan. We, however, extend the analysis of Morgan by
allowing for two-sided asymmetric information during the contest. We find that the result that
the principal and the first mover prefer the sequential order of moves is still true for the case of
private information. For the second mover it depends on the distribution of types, whether he
prefers the sequential or simultaneous setting. As aforementioned, he only receives a higher ex
ante expected payoff if the correlation between types is sufficiently negative.
Yildirim (2005) considers contests with multiple rounds and public information about the players’
types. Both players choose an effort in each round. His main result stands in contrast to Baik
and Shogren (1992) and Leininger (1993). They examine a game, in which agents simultaneously
commit to the period in which they want to exert an effort. Given the resulting order of moves,
either a Cournot-Nash or one of two possible Stackelberg contests is played. Baik and Shogren as
well as Leininger find that the unique equilibrium implies that first the underdog (i.e. the player
who wins the contest with a lower probability) and then the favorite moves. In Yildirim (2005),
equilibrium outcomes for heterogeneous contestants contain a notion of “leadership” of the favorite
in the sense that his effort lies on the other player’s reaction function. Hence, in settings where
contestants exert effort in multiple rounds, it cannot happen that the underdog moves first in
equilibrium. Furthermore, Yildirim finds that the total equilibrium effort is – in general – weakly
higher than in equilibrium of the simultaneous game. The latter finding is perfectly in line with
the results by Morgan (2004) for public information and our results for private information.
Jost (2001) and Jost and Kra¨kel (2005) consider sequential tournaments with symmetric and
also with asymmetric agents and public information.7 Jost (2001) studies risk neutral as well
as risk averse agents. With risk neutral contestants, equilibrium outcomes do not change when
intermediate information is available or not. When agents are risk averse, however, the designer
rather prefers a sequential order of moves. This means that risk aversion – similar to private
information in our model – makes the setting with intermediate information more favorable
compared to the setting without from the point of view of the designer. Another study that
analyzes the optimality of intermediate information within a tournament model and symmetric
7We stick here to the usual terminology that uses “tournaments” to refer to models that use a probit form contest
success function, in contrast to “contests” with a logit form contest success function.
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agents is Aoyagi (2003). Here, both agents act in each period. Aoyagi shows that the optimality of
providing intermediate information depends on the shape of the marginal cost function for effort
in the second period. If the marginal cost function is concave (convex), then it is optimal for the
principal to choose a setting where (no) intermediate information is provided.
Romano and Yildirim (2005) derive equilibrium outcomes for a very general class of games –
so-called games of accumulation – under public information about the players types. Each player
has a fixed amount of a strategic variable. After observing first period choices, a player can adjust
his strategic variable in a second period, but he can only add on the initial amount. These games
are related to this paper since contests are one possible application and accumulation games have
both sequential and simultaneous features.
All the papers mentioned so far consider either symmetric players or assume complete information
about each contestant’s type. The only exception, we are aware of, is Mu¨nster (2004). He examines
signaling issues in repeated contest, in which agents act simultaneously in both rounds. Before
the second round starts, first round effort choices are revealed. This means that in contrast to
our setting, both agents receive intermediate information and both can react in the second period.
Mu¨nster finds that high ability contestants might put in little effort in the first round to make their
opponents believe that they are of low ability. He compares expected efforts in the repeated game
to twice the expected effort in the one-shot game with asymmetric information. This corresponds
to a comparison of settings with and without intermediate information. In contrast to our result,
intermediate information leads to lower expected equilibrium efforts.
Other papers, which compare simultaneous and sequential contests, are Moldovanu and Sela (2006)
(who study an all-pay auction), Gradstein (1999) and Rosen (1986). The difference of these papers
to ours is that they focus on a different notion of ‘sequentiality’: In these papers an elimination
tournament is played where the losers of each round are eliminated. Our notion of sequentiality,
in contrast, is ‘moving one after the other’.8
Sequential games have also been studied in the industrial organization literature, examining the
behavior of oligopolists. See, for example, Saloner (1987) who solves a Cournot duopoly with two
production periods and a homogeneous product. Pal (1991) extends Saloner’s work by allowing
for cost changes over time.
Regarding asymmetric information, there is only few related work. Hurley and Shogren (1998a)
consider asymmetric information in contests. They study a simultaneous two-player contest with
one-sided asymmetric information. More precisely, one contestant is uninformed about his rival’s
valuation, whereas the other one has complete information. Results for total effort are mostly
ambiguous. If contestants’ efforts are strategic complements, unambiguous results are possible in
8Also related are the studies on racing by Harris and Vickers (1985) and (1987) that offer dynamic features.
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case the uninformed players’ beliefs change (in the sense that the variance increases or decreases).
If contestants’ efforts are strategic substitutes, unambiguous results are possible in case relative
abilities change (and induce a change in the uninformed players’ beliefs). The case of one- as well
as two-sided asymmetric information in simultaneous contests when valuations are independently
drawn is, in general, analytically intractable, but Hurley and Shogren (1998b) approach this case
numerically. Similar to the one-sided asymmetric information case, general conclusions are mostly
ambiguous. The driving forces of behavior are again perceptions of relative abilities and risk. These
forces can be related to the competition intensity effect that we identify as driving effect. Most
closely related to our analysis is the study by Malueg and Yates (2004). They derive a Bayesian
equilibrium in a simultaneous contest with private information solving the aforementioned problem
by the assumption of a distribution that allows for correlation of the valuations. We adopt this
distributional assumption for our analysis of sequential and simultaneous contests in order to be
able to derive explicit solutions. Malueg and Yates main result is that the ex ante expected effort
sum under private and public information is the same. We review their results in detail when
analyzing the simultaneous contest with private information.
As aforementioned, Mu¨nster (2004) studies repeated contests (two rounds) with asymmetric
information about the agents’ types. Agents simultaneously choose an effort each round and both
receive intermediate information before they enter the second round. In a separating equilibrium,
second round efforts are identical to efforts in the one-shot game under complete information, since
there is complete information in this case. He does, however, not compare the expected effort sum
to the complete information case for any kind of equilibrium.
Closely related is also the paper by Wa¨rneryd (2003). He deals asymmetric information in the
sense that one player knows the common value of the prize whereas the other player is uncertain
about it (he knows the prior distribution). In contrast to the current paper, he only considers
simultaneous contests. For contests with a Tullock contest success function, the effort sum in
equilibrium is lower when one agent is informed and the other one uninformed than when either
both are informed or both uninformed. Like in our simultaneous contest, the expected effort sum
is identical under public and private information (if both agents are uninformed).
The remainder of this paper is organized as follows: In Section 1.2, we present the basic model. In
Section 1.3, we review results concerning the public information settings. In Section 1.4, we turn
to private information first considering simultaneous contests. Then, we introduce the new setting
of sequential contests under private information and derive results for this setting. In Sections 1.5
and 1.6, we compare the four institutional settings. In Section 1.7, we briefly discuss other aims
of the designer than maximizing the expected effort sum and finally, we conclude in Section 1.8.
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Table 1.1: Probability distribution of valuations
V1
V2
VL VH
VL
1
2r
1
2 (1− r)
VH
1
2 (1− r) 12r
1.2 Setting
We consider two risk neutral agents i = 1, 2 who are competing for one prize by making irreversible,
non-negative bids xi. These bids can be viewed as effort levels or amounts of money. Henceforth, we
interchangeably use the terms bids or effort. We consider two different settings: Contestants either
make their bids simultaneously or sequentially.9 In the latter case, the second mover can observe
the bid of the first mover. Agent i’s valuation of the prize is Vi. We model V1 and V2 as random
variables, which take on either a low value, VL, or a high value, VH , where 0 < VL ≤ VH . We refer to
the agents’ valuations as the agents’ types. The prior probability distribution of valuations (V1,V2) is
common knowledge and is given in Table 1.1. As this distribution is symmetric, agents are identical
from an ex ante perspective. The distribution, however, allows for heterogeneity in valuations and
correlation between the valuations.10 We consider two different settings in the following: Either
agents’ types are public information or they are private information. The parameter r (see Table
1.1) is monotonically related to the correlation coefficient ρ of the valuations as ρ = 2(r − 12).
Therefore, we can use both r and ρ as a measure of correlation of the valuations: When valuations
are perfectly negative correlated (i.e. ρ = −1) r = 0, and when valuations are perfectly positive
correlated (i.e. ρ = 1) we have r = 1. r = 12 corresponds to independence (i.e. ρ = 0) of
the valuations. When addressing the degree of correlation of the valuations, we refer to ρ in the
following if not stated otherwise.
9When agents act sequentially, we abstract from discounting.
10This distribution allows us to calculate equilibrium bids explicitly. It does not allow, however, for more general
cases of independently drawn valuations since simultaneous contests with private valuations become – in general –
analytically intractable in the sense that we cannot derive explicit solutions. This is attributable to the fact that
equilibrium efforts of each type of agent depend on the best reply of each type of his opponent, and moreover, they
(indirectly) depend on the best reply of the other type of the first agent (as the opponent’s best reply depends on
it). A numerical analysis of simultaneous contests with two-sided incomplete information that also allows for more
general cases of independence is conducted by Hurley and Shogren (1998b).
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The probability that agent i wins the prize is given by Tullock’s logit form contest success function,
where x denotes an agent’s bid (or effort outlay)11
pii(x1, x2) =

xi
x1+x2
if (x1, x2) 6= (0, 0)
1
2 otherwise.
(1.1)
The contest is imperfectly discriminating. This means the winner is determined probabilistically: A
higher effort compared to the opponent makes winning more likely but does not guarantee success.
An axiomatic foundation for the contest success function having this specific form is given by
Skaperdas (1996) for symmetric contests and by Clark and Riis (1998) for asymmetric contests.
If an agent does not win the prize, he earns zero but has to pay his bid. The expected payoff of
agent i given both agents’ bids and agent i’s valuation Vi is then
Ψi(x1, x2,Vi) = xi
x1 + x2
Vi − xi. (1.2)
Note that the contest success function given in (1.1) is discontinuous at (x1, x2) = (0, 0). This
implies that the best reply of an agent to zero effort of the other agent is not well-defined
(as the first agent can win for sure by exerting any strictly positive effort  > 0 and – by
continuity – his payoff is larger: Vi −  > 12Vi − 0). We solve this problem by assuming that
there is some smallest unit of effort (e.g. a smallest unit of money if we think of monetary
investments). This means that a contestant has to exert at least some strictly positive amount
of effort,  > 0 – if he wants to exert a positive amount of effort – where  can be arbitrarily small.12
The timing of the game is as follows. First, the risk neutral designer of the contest fixes
whether agents act simultaneously or sequentially. Then, the agents’ types are drawn according to
the distribution described above and each agent learns his own type. In the public information
setting, agents learn the opponent’s type, too. Next, given a simultaneous structure, contestants
simultaneously choose their bid. In a sequential setting, first, agent 1 chooses his bid. Agent 2 can
observe the first mover’s bid before he decides on his own bid. Finally, payoffs realize.
Instead of modelling heterogeneous types by different valuations of the prize, we can also
model different abilities of the agents in terms of different effort costs. It is possible to do this
11For simplicity, we consider a discriminatory power equal to one. Regarding simultaneous contests, one could
easily generalize the analysis. Malueg and Yates (2004) consider more general levels of discriminatory power in
simultaneous contests with private information.
12An alternative approach to solve the discontinuity problem are endogenous tie-breaking (or sharing) rules in the
sense as proposed by Simon and Zame (1990) – for the case of complete information – and by Jackson et al. (2002)
for the case of incomplete information.
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in a way such that both notions are strategically equivalent: The reason is that preferences are
invariant with respect to affine transformations of the expected utility (Expected Utility Theorem).
Instead of using the expected payoff function as given in (1.2), we could consider the following
function
Ψ˜i(x1, x2, τi) =
xi
x1 + x2
V − τixi,
where heterogeneity is captured by different effort costs, with τi ∈ R+. Let Vi = Vτi . Then
Ψi(x1, x2,Vi) = 1
τi
Ψ˜i(x1, x2, τi). (1.3)
Hence, whether we model heterogeneity by different valuations or by different effort costs does not
matter for equilibrium outcomes, as long as we assume Vi = Vτi . We only scale expected payoffs by
1
τi
. For ease of presentation we restrict to the case of different valuations as described above but
call it also different abilities.
In the following, we analyze the four institutional settings, beginning with the two public informa-
tion settings.
1.3 Contests with Public Information
In this section, we review the standard contest where agents’ valuations are common knowledge
and agents move simultaneously. Equilibrium bids of this Cournot-Nash contest are well-known
and given as follows.
Proposition 1 [Morgan (2003)] In a two-player contest with public information about the contes-
tants’ types (V1,V2) and simultaneous moves the unique Nash-equilibrium in pure strategies is
x∗1 = V1
V1V2
(V1 + V2)2 =: ωV1 and x
∗
2 = V2
V1V2
(V1 + V2)2 =: ωV2. (1.4)
Obviously, both agents bid the same fraction 0 < ω = V2V1
(V1+V2)2 < 1 of their own valuation. Hence,
equilibrium bids are proportional in that x
∗
1
V1 =
x∗2
V2 ; meaning that identical agents make the same
bid in equilibrium and the agent with the higher valuation spends more than the one with the
lower valuation. Moreover, an agent’s bid is rising in his own valuation (as ∂x
∗
i
∂Vi =
2ViV2j
(Vi+Vj)2 > 0
where i, j = 1, 2 and i 6= j). We refer to the well-known effect that an agent bids more when
he is a high type than when he is a low type as ability effect. In the simultaneous contest with
public information, the only reason why one agent bids more than the other one is the ability
effect : the one who has the higher valuation bids more. Equilibrium bids are strictly increasing in
the opponent’s valuation if the opponent has a ‘lower’ type, otherwise bids decrease in the rival’s
valuation (strictly if the other’s type is strictly ‘higher’) as ∂x
∗
i
∂Vj > (≤) 0 is equivalent to Vi > (≤) Vj
where i, j = 1, 2 and i 6= j. This means, equilibrium effort increases in the opponent’s valuation
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when the contest evens out (valuations become closer) and thus, there is more competition. We
call this competition intensity effect in the following. This also explains that in a contest with
homogeneous contestants each contestant bids more than when the contest is heterogeneous.
In the second setting, the Stackelberg-contest, agents’ types are common knowledge, but
contestants make their bids sequentially. Let agent 1 denote the first mover and agent 2 the second
mover. The second mover can perfectly observe the bid of the first mover before he decides on his
bid. The following subgame perfect equilibrium bids are derived, for example, in Leininger (2003)
and also in Romano and Yildirim (2005).
Proposition 2 In the two-player contest with public information about the contestants’ types
(V1,V2) and sequential order of moves – agent 1 is the first mover and agent 2 the second mover –
the unique pure strategy subgame perfect equilibrium outcome is
x∗1 =
V1
2
( V1
2V2
)
and x∗2 =
V1
2
(
1− V1
2V2
)
if V1 ≤ 2V2, (1.5)
x∗1 = V2 and x∗2 = 0 otherwise. (1.6)
In case valuations are rather “close” (i.e. V1 ≤ 2V2) all types of players spend a positive amount of
effort, i.e. we have an interior solution, whereas in case valuations are not “close” (i.e. V1 > 2V2)
and the first mover has the higher valuation, he can preempt the second mover such that the latter
spends zero, i.e. we have a boundary solution.
It can easily be seen that the more the first mover bids, the less bids the second. The follower only
responds with a positive bid if the leader bids less than the follower’s valuation. The maximum
bid of the leader is V2 (even if his own valuation is higher): by bidding V2, the leader already wins
with certainty.13 Because of this strategic behavior, contestants no longer bid the same fraction of
their valuation as we have seen in the Cournot-Nash contest.
Comparing the agents’ bids, we see that as in the simultaneous contest, symmetric agents exert the
same effort in equilibrium and this effort is, moreover, the same as in the simultaneous contest.14
Given an equally strong opponent, no contestant is able to make a strategic gain by moving first,
which implies that Cournot-Nash and Stackelberg contests lead to identical outcomes in such a
case.15 This can be intuitively explained by considering the Nash-equilibrium of the simultaneous
contest: Departing from the Nash-equilibrium, a small change in an agent’s bid does not induce
13Since the first mover bids V2 in the boundary solution, this implies that his maximum bid cannot be higher than
VL.
14As agents are symmetric, the case V1 ≤ 2V2 is the relevant one. Hence, we only have to analyze the interior
solution.
15See also Romano and Yildirim (2005) and Morgan (2003).
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the other agent to change his bid. Therefore, although the leader can commit to a bid in the
sequential contest, this does not change the follower’s behavior.
For asymmetric contestants – like in the simultaneous contest – the first mover exerts more (less)
effort than the second mover when he has the higher (lower) valuation as this is equivalent to
V1
V2 ≥ (≤) 1.16 This means that the first mover does not preempt the follower when the latter has
the higher valuation as this becomes too costly for him given the follower’s high incentives to win
the prize. Hence, although agents are no longer completely homogeneous in the sequential contests
as they differ in the their role of being the first or second mover, we see that it is still the ability
effect that determines which agent bids more (like in the simultaneous contest): equilibrium efforts
rise in an agent’s valuation such that the agent with the higher valuation bids more aggressively
than his rival (independent of the agent’s role).17
Moreover, we can verify that an agent receives a higher expected payoff than his opponent if
and only if he has the higher valuation and, therefore, bids more aggressively: Comparing the
first mover’s expected payoff – which is given by V
2
1
4V2 – with the follower’s expected payoff –
which is given by V2 − V1 + V
2
1
4V2 – immediately gives the result. Like Morgan (2003) finds for
independently drawn valuations, it also holds true for our distributional assumption that from
an ex ante perspective, expected payoffs of the first and second mover are identical for V1 ≤ 2V2
(otherwise the expected payoff of the first mover is higher). Committing to a publicly observable
bid does not lead to a first mover advantage for the interior solution (from an ex ante perspective).
This observation can easily be verified: Symmetric agents make the same expected payoff as they
make equal bids. Given asymmetric contestants, expected payoffs of the first mover are given by
V1
4V2 and for the follower by V2 − V1 + V14V2 where V1 6= V2. Obviously, it is – in general – not the
case that the high (low) type receives the same expected payoff independent of whether he moves
first or second. The second mover, however, looses exactly as much compared to the first mover
when he is the low type as he wins when he is the high type. Since each contestant is a high or a
low type with equal probabilities, their ex ante expected payoffs are identical.
The crucial effect of the sequential order of moves is that it offsets the competition intensity effect
for the high type of the first mover: When the first mover is a high type, he invests more when
the follower is a low type than when he is a high type as well. This means that the first mover
profits from increasing the distance between himself and the follower, such that this increase
even outweighs the competition intensity effect. More precisely, for the interior solution, we see
16Regarding the boundary solution (in which the first mover necessarily has the higher valuation), the first mover
obviously bids more than the second mover.
17For the boundary solution, bids do not change with the own valuation as long as V1 > 2V2 still holds. Nevertheless,
it is the agent with the higher valuation who bids more.
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that the first mover’s effort falls in the second mover’s valuation as ∂x
∗
1
∂V2 = −
V21
4V22
< 0. As long
as V2 ≥ V1, this can be explained by less competition. For V2 < V1, however, competition rises
and nevertheless the leader’s effort decreases, which contradicts the competition intensity effect.
For the boundary solution, V1 > 2V2, the effect that the first mover’s effort rises in the second
mover’s valuation is again due to intensified competition. By the commitment of the first mover
to a publicly observable bid he can realize a first-mover advantage when he is a high type and
the competition intensity effect is offset by this commitment effect.18 The low type of the first
mover, however, cannot make use of the chance to commit to an effort level. As aforementioned,
his expected payoff is (weakly) lower than the follower’s expected payoff. For the second mover,
observations are quite similar to the simultaneous contest: His effort rises in the first mover’s
valuation if the first mover has the lower valuation19 – thus, if the contest evens out – since
∂x∗2
∂V1 =
1
2(1− V1V2 ). Otherwise, the second mover’s effort decreases in V1 (or remains equal to zero iff
V1 > 2V2).
Similar to our observation for the first mover, Jost and Kra¨kel (2005) who analyze a sequen-
tial rank-order tournament with heterogeneous agents find a first mover advantage, too. In
their setting, the first mover can have a higher expected payoff than the second mover even if
he has the lower ability (given that the prize spread between winner and loser prize is not too large).
Next, we consider contests with private information starting with the simultaneous setting and then
introducing the sequential setting. Afterwards, in Section 1.5, we analyze whether simultaneous or
sequential contests are preferred by the designer and the contestants from an ex ante perspective
conditional on the information setting and finally, in Section 1.6, we analyze which information
setting is preferred.
1.4 Contests with Private Information
Now, we vary the information regime and consider the settings, in which valuations are private
information. The aforementioned prior distribution of valuations is publicly known. At first, we
consider simultaneous contests again. We restrict attention to the analysis of symmetric pure
strategy Bayesian equilibria. The following result for a discriminatory power of one follows from
Malueg and Yates (2004) who consider more general cases of the discriminatory power. We denote
18For the boundary solution it is still the competition intensity effect that dominates as preempting the second
mover is profitable.
19 For V1 ≥ 2V2, i.e. in particular V1 > V2 , the second mover exerts zero effort and at V1 = 2V2 the second mover’s
bid decreases in the first mover’s valuation. The latter observation is intuitively plausible as competition gets less
intense.
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by x∗it (where i = 1, 2 and t = L,H) the equilibrium bids of agent i when he has type t.
Proposition 3 There exists a unique symmetric pure strategy Bayesian equilibrium of the simul-
taneous contest with private information. In this equilibrium
x∗iL =
(
r
4
+ (1− r) VHVL
(VH + VL)
2
)
VL =: λVL (1.7)
x∗iH =
(
r
4
+ (1− r) VHVL
(VH + VL)
2
)
VH =: λVH (1.8)
for i = 1, 2.
Proof.
See Malueg and Yates (2004). As existence for general levels of discriminatory power is not guaranteed,
existence for the special case considered here (discriminatory power equal to one) is shown in the appendix.
Remember that for r = 1 and r = 0 we are back to public information20 as types are perfectly
positive or negative, respectively, correlated. r = 1 implies that agents 1 and 2 have identical
valuations (V1 = V2) and r = 0 implies that they have different valuations (V1 6= V2). Additionally,
if high and low valuation are identical (VL = VH), valuations are common knowledge, too. Note
that for these three cases, equilibrium bids coincide with the public information setting.
Obviously, as in the case with public information, equilibrium bids are proportional in the sense
that x
∗
iL
VL
= x
∗
iH
VH
. Like in the contest with public information, the bid of a high type is larger than
the bid of a low type (ability effect), and agents invest a fraction, here denoted by λ, of their own
valuation, which is the same for a high and a low type. It can easily be verified that 0 < λ < 1.
Thus, like in the public information setting, agents never bid zero or exactly their valuation. If
we compare λ to the fraction ω which is invested in the public information case, we receive the
following result.21
Proposition 4 Consider simultaneous contests and let ρ ∈ (−1, 1) and VH > VL. Under public
information, the fraction invested in equilibrium (according to Propositions 1 and 3) is smaller than
under private information if the contest under public information is asymmetric (i.e. V1 6= V2) and
it is larger if the contest under public information is symmetric (i.e. V1 = V2).
20To be precise, it is not exactly public information for r = 0: The agents know each other’s valuation. An
outsider, however, only knows the realization of valuations but does not know which agent is the high or low type.
Nevertheless, we make no further differentiation here as this is not the point of the paper.
21We restrict here to r ∈ (0, 1) and VH > VL as r = 0, r = 1 and VH = VL are equivalent to public information. As
aforementioned, for these cases bids and hence the fraction λ that is invested coincide in the contests under public
and private information.
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Proof.
Suppose the contest under public information is asymmetric (i.e. V1 6= V2). We have to verify that
λ > VHVL(VH+VL)2 . This is equivalent to r(VH −VL)2 > 0 which always holds as VH > VL and ρ ∈ (−1, 1) (which
is equivalent to r ∈ (0, 1)).
Suppose now the contest under public information is symmetric (i.e. V1 = V2). We have to verify that
λ < 14 . This is equivalent to −(1 − r)(VH − VL)2 < 0 which is always fulfilled as VH > VL and ρ ∈ (−1, 1)
(which is equivalent to r ∈ (0, 1)).
Trivially, this result implies that when the fraction invested is higher (lower) under public informa-
tion, then also the bid – conditional on an agent’s type – is higher (lower) under public information.
The intuition for the result is that contestants bid more aggressively, the more ‘similar’ their types
are. This means a competition intensity effect drives the result: The “closer” the contest, the higher
the bids. To see this, we consider first the fraction ω = V2V1
(V1+V2)2 , which is invested of the own val-
uation in the public information case. When types are symmetric (i.e. V1 = V2), then ω = 14 .
For asymmetric types (i.e. V1 6= V2) the invested fraction ω is smaller than for symmetric types
(as V2V1
(V1+V2)2 ≤ 14 is equivalent to 0 ≤ (V1 − V2)2 which holds with strict inequality for V1 6= V2).
Note that this holds independent of whether two low or two high types compete against each other.
Hence, an even contest implies higher competition, which is reflected by higher bids.
Under public information contestants know for sure whether they have the same type or different
ones. Under private information, however, agents do not know for sure the type of their opponent
(as long as ρ ∈ (−1, 1) and VL < VH). Therefore, competition intensity increases relative to a public
information contest with asymmetric types and decreases relative to one with symmetric types. It
follows that the fraction that is invested under private information is higher (lower) compared to
the fraction under a public information contest with asymmetric (symmetric) types.
In order to see the effects of ‘more similar’ types on competition and bids more clearly, consider now
how the agents’ bids vary with the degree of correlation of their valuations. The invested fraction
λ in a private information contest becomes larger (smaller) the more positively (negatively) the
agents’ types are correlated. Conditional on an agent’s valuation, these results hold true for the
bids as well. A stronger positive correlation between the contestants’ types (i.e. an increase in ρ)
can be interpreted as a more even contest since – given that an agent knows his own valuation –
this corresponds to a higher probability of the opponent having the same valuation. Hence, there
is more aggressive bidding if the contest gets closer.
In the limit – for perfect positive or negative correlation, respectively – the fraction invested under
private information coincides with the corresponding bid under public information. This means
that if under private information uncertainty about the opponent’s type diminishes, bids under
private information approach the corresponding bids under public information.
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Proposition 5 Bids in the symmetric Bayesian equilibrium in pure strategies of simultaneous
contests with private information are weakly larger (smaller) than the Nash-equilibrium bids of
asymmetric (symmetric) simultaneous contests with public information. They approach the bids of
asymmetric (symmetric) contests with public information the more negatively (positively) types are
correlated and coincide for perfect negative (positive) correlation.
Proof.
As already shown, equilibrium bids in an asymmetric simultaneous contest with public information are
smaller than in the symmetric one. Moreover, from Proposition 4 we know that for ρ ∈ (−1, 1) and VH > VL
the fraction invested under public information is larger (smaller) than under private information if the
contest under public information is symmetric (asymmetric). Conditional on an agent’s type this also holds
for equilibrium bids. For ρ = 1, ρ = −1 or VH = VL invested fractions coincide under both settings. Using
ρ = 2(r − 12 ), we have ∂λ∂ρ = 18 − VHVL2(VH+VL)2 . It follows
∂λ
∂ρ ≥ 0 if and only if (VH − VL)2 ≥ 0 (with strict
inequality if VL > VH) and the result follows.
An interesting result that is intuitively appealing is that the bid of a high (low) type under private
information is the same as the expected bid of a high (low) type under public information – i.e.
the expected bid of an agent under public information conditional on this agent being a high (low)
type – as Malueg and Yates (2004) show. Therefore, also the ex ante expected effort sum of both
agents is the same under public and private information. This immediately implies that a designer
who aims at maximizing the ex ante expected effort sum is indifferent between the two settings.
We now turn to sequential contests with private information. Afterwards, in Section 1.5,
we compare the four different institutional settings from the point of view of the designer and the
contestants.
In sequential contests with private information, the second mover perfectly observes the
first mover’s action before he decides on his bid – exactly like under public information. The
agents’ types, however, are private information. We consider symmetric perfect Bayesian equilibria
in pure strategies. In a weak perfect Bayesian equilibrium, the bid of each type of the first mover,
x∗1t (t = L,H), maximizes this type’s expected payoff given his beliefs about the second mover’s
type and the best response of each type of the second mover. The conditional probabilities, which
are obtained from the prior probability distribution of the contestants’ types, determine the first
mover’s equilibrium beliefs about the second mover’s type22: With probability r the second mover
22Observe that both information sets of the first mover (and as well those of the second mover) are always reached
with positive probability.
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is of the same type as the first mover and with probability 1− r he is of a different type.
Equilibrium bids of each type of the second mover maximize this type’s expected payoff contingent
on the observed action of the first mover. We denote equilibrium bids of type k = L,H of the
second mover by xt∗2k. t = H,L indicates the type (and therefore the bid) of the first mover.
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It is important to note that the beliefs of the second mover about the type of the first mover do
not influence equilibrium outcomes. The perfectly observable action of the first mover completely
determines the optimal reaction of the second mover (irrespective of the first mover’s true type):
The second mover responds to the first mover’s action in a way that maximizes his expected
payoffs. His payoffs only depend on the first mover’s action that he observes but not on the first
mover’s true type (except that the first mover’s action may depend on the first mover’s type in
equilibrium). As the optimal action of the second mover is independent of his beliefs, they can
be arbitrary, and we do not need to specify his beliefs in the following. Moreover, because of this
independence, we can solve the game backward, starting with the second mover. In the following
derivation of equilibrium bids, we do not provide a complete proof. All missing steps are in the
appendix (see proof of Proposition 6).
The second mover maximizes his expected payoff given the action of the first mover, which he
observes, and given his own type k = H,L. First note that we do not need to consider the case
that nobody exerts a positive amount of effort as this cannot happen in equilibrium: Suppose
the first mover exerts zero effort. Then, the second mover can ensure winning the prize with an
arbitrarily small effort  > 0. This dominates exerting no effort at all and winning only with
probability one half. Furthermore, in equilibrium, as we show in the appendix, the first mover’s
bid is strictly positive for each type t = L,H. Hence, the relevant best response of the second
mover (i.e. given x1t > 0) can be derived from the following maximization problem
max
x2k≥
x2k
x2k + x1t
Vk − x2k.
It can easily be verified that the maximization problem is concave in the second mover’s bid given
the first mover’s bid. Thus, the best response function of the second mover is given by the first
order condition, as long as the first order condition results in a non-negative bid of the second
mover, otherwise the optimal bid is zero:
x2k(x1t) = max{√x1t
√
Vk − x1t, 0} for x1t > 0. (1.9)
We can see from the best response function in (1.9) that the second mover completely drops out
of the contest – i.e. both types bid zero – when the first mover bids more than the high valuation.
23Of course, the second mover actually observes the leader’s action but not his type. In equilibrium, however, the
two types of the first mover “separate” in their actions – as we show in the appendix. Hence, the second mover can
in principle infer the first mover’s type from the observed action. For ease of presentation, we therefore denote the
observed action by the first mover’s type.
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When VH > x1t ≥ VL only the low type of the second mover drops out.
Regarding the first mover, this implies two different cases: Either he faces an active second mover
(i.e. both types of the second mover make a positive bid) or he faces an (partly) inactive second
mover (i.e. at least the low type bids zero).
Knowing his own type, the first mover updates his beliefs about his rival’s type and hence his
rival’s bid. As aforementioned, the conditional probability that the second mover is a low (high)
type given that the first mover is a low (high) type – i.e. agents are homogeneous – is given by r.
(1 − r) denotes the conditional probability that the second mover is a low (high) type given that
the first mover is a high (low) type – i.e. agents are heterogeneous. The first mover maximizes
his expected payoff conditional on his own type t = L,H and on each type of the second mover
reacting according to his best response function given in (1.9).
Suppose first that both types of the second mover are active. We know from (1.9) that
this is not possible if the first mover bids the low valuation or more. Hence, both types of the first
mover have to bid less than VL, which implies that the best response of the second mover is given
by x2k(x1t) =
√
x1t
√
Vk−x1t. Moreover, we disregard here the case that the first mover in inactive.
As argued above, in this case, the second mover’s best response is to bid an arbitrarily small
amount  > 0, which ensures that he wins the prize and hence the first mover’s payoff from being
inactive is zero. In the appendix we show, that the first mover is never inactive in equilibrium as
he can insure a positive expected payoff by actively taking part in the contest. The maximization
problem of type t = L,H of the first mover for the case that both types of the follower are active
is as follows where n = L,H:
max
VL>x1t>0
(
x1t
x1t + x2t(x1t)
r +
x1t
x1t + x2n(x1t)
(1− r)
)
Vt − x1t with t 6= n.
Plugging in the relevant best response of the second mover yields
max
VL>x1t>0
(
1√
Vt
r +
1√
Vn
(1− r)
)√
x1tVt − x1t with t 6= n. (1.10)
This maximization problem is concave in x1t. Therefore, the first order condition is sufficient if
we consider the unconstrained maximization problem (neglecting the constraints on x1t for the
moment). The optimal bid, x∗1t, is given by
x∗1t =
V 2t
4
(
r
(
1√
Vt
− 1√
Vn
)
+
1√
Vn
)2
=: α2t with t 6= n. (1.11)
Obviously, x∗1t is always strictly positive. Hence, the only constraint that remains to check is
whether x∗1t < VL. Otherwise, at least the low type of the second mover exerts zero effort and –
for α2t > VL – (1.10) is no longer the corresponding maximization problem of the first mover and
α2t not the optimal bid. To check this, we consider both types of the leader separately.
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For the low type of the first mover, it can never be optimal to bid more than VL. The reason
is that if he invests more than VL his payoff is negative for sure and, for example, investing zero
– yielding zero payoff – is better. In fact, the first mover can ensure a positive expected payoff
(as is shown in the appendix) by bidding α2L, which is strictly smaller than the low valuation
(α2L < VL ⇔ (1−r)V
1
2
L < (2−r)V
1
2
H ). Thus, the low type of the first mover bids strictly less than the
low valuation in equilibrium, implying that we always have an interior solution – i.e. all contestants
spend a positive amount of effort – when the first mover is a low type. The corresponding best
responses of type k = L,H of the second mover are determined according to (1.9). Hence, his
equilibrium bids given that the first mover bids x∗iL = α
2
L are given by x
L∗
2k = αL(
√
Vk − αL).
When the first mover is a high type, however, he may bid more than the low valuation. Hence, we
have to verify for an interior solution under which condition α2H < VL. This holds if and only if
VH
(
r
(
1√
VH
− 1√
VL
)
+
1√
VL
)
< 2
√
VL. (1.12)
Intuitively, when the high and low valuation coincide (i.e. VH = VL) condition (1.12) holds, which
means that both types of the first mover bid less than the low valuation. For VH > VL we can
rewrite (1.12) as
r >
2VL − VH√
VH
(√
VL −
√
VH
) =: r˜. (1.13)
Since the denominator of r˜ is negative, r > r˜ is fulfilled in case 2VL > VH as then r˜ < 0 but
r ∈ [0, 1]. For 4VL < VH , we get r˜ > 1, implying that there cannot be an interior solution in
this case as r > r˜ is impossible. Hence, we always have an interior solution if 2VL > VH . When
2VL < VH ≤ 4VL, we have an interior solution if r > r˜. Otherwise, there is a boundary solution
in which at least one type of the second mover bids zero. The bid of type k = L,H of the
follower in an interior solution when the leader is a high type is determined according to (1.9), i.e.
xH∗2k = αH(
√
Vk − αH).
Up to now, we considered the case that both types of the second mover are active. Sup-
pose now that the second mover is (partly) inactive, i.e. we have a boundary solution. We know
from (1.9) that this happens if and only if the leader bids at least the low valuation (i.e. if VL < VH
and r ≤ r˜).
Since the low type of the follower drops out first, this implies that xt∗2L = 0 (for x1t ≥ VL) where
t denotes the type of the leader . Therefore, we only consider the high type of the follower, who
may still make a positive bid. With a similar argument as given above for the low type of the first
mover, we obtain that the leader invests less than VH when he is a high type. This means that the
second mover is never completely inactive and the relevant best response of the high type of the
second mover is given by x2H(x1t) =
√
x1t
√
VH − x1H . The reduced maximization problem of the
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first mover, when the low type of the follower is inactive, is
max
VH≥x1H≥VL
(
x1H
x1H + x2H(x1H)
r + (1− r)
)
VH − x1H . (1.14)
Plugging in the relevant best response of the high type of the second mover, we can rewrite the
maximization problem as follows
max
VH≥x1H≥VL
r
√
x1H
√
VH + (1− r)VH − x1H . (1.15)
Consider for the moment only the unconstrained maximization problem (neglecting the restrictions
VH ≥ x∗1H ≥ VL). The unconstrained problem is concave in x1H and thus the first order condition,
1
2
r
√
VH −√x1H = 0, (1.16)
is also sufficient. Solving for x1H yields x1H = r
2VH
4 . As argued above, the restriction limiting x1H
from above is always fulfilled ( r
2VH
4 < VH). Hence, the equilibrium bid of the high type of the first
mover, x∗1H , is given by (1.16) if
r2VH
4 ≥ VL. This condition is equivalent to
r > 2
√
VL√
VH
=: ˜˜r. (1.17)
If (1.17) is not satisfied (as well as if it is satisfied with equality), we have x∗1H = VL. This follows
from the concavity of the objective function, and since the first mover’s payoff from bidding VH is
zero whereas the payoff from bidding VL is strictly positive as is shown in the appendix.
As aforementioned, equilibrium bids of the high type of the second mover are determined according
to the follower’s relevant best response function. The bid is xH∗2H =
√
VL(
√
VH −
√
VL) if the high
type of the first mover bids exactly the low valuation and is xH∗2H =
rVH
2
(
1− r2
)
if the first mover
bids more than the low valuation. Thus, for a boundary solution the conditions VL < VH and
r ≤ r˜ have to be satisfied and the bids of the high types depend on whether r ≷ ˜˜r. These results
are summarized in the following proposition.
Proposition 6 The unique symmetric weak perfect Bayesian equilibrium outcome in pure strate-
gies of sequential contests with private information with belief r of the high (low) type of the first
mover that the second mover is high (low) and belief 1− r that he is low (high) and arbitrary beliefs
of the second mover is as follows (t = H,L denotes the type of the first mover and k = H,L the
type of the second mover):
Interior solution if either (i) VL = VH or if (ii) r > r˜ and VL < VH :
x∗1L = α
2
L
xt∗2L = αt
(√
Vk − αt
)
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Boundary solutions if r ≤ r˜ and VL < VH :
Boundary case (i) if r ≤ min{r˜, ˜˜r}:
x∗1L = α
2
L, x
∗
1H = VL,
x∗L2L = αL
(√
VL − αL
)
, x∗H2L = 0,
x∗L2H = αL
(√
VH − αL
)
, x∗H2H =
√
VL
(√
VH −
√
VL
)
Boundary case (ii) if ˜˜r < r ≤ r˜:
x∗1L = α
2
L, x
∗
1H =
r2VH
4 ,
x∗L2L = αL
(√
VL − αL
)
, x∗H2L = 0,
x∗L2H = αL
(√
VH − αL
)
, x∗H2H =
rVH
2
(
1− r2
)
with αL = VL2
(
r( 1√
VL
− 1√
VH
) + 1√
VH
)
, αH = VH2
(
r( 1√
VH
− 1√
VL
) + 1√
VL
)
,
r˜ = 2VL−VH√
VH(
√
VL−
√
VH)
, and ˜˜r = 2√VL√
VH
.
Proof.
See appendix.
Notice that we can easily rewrite the conditions on r for the interior and boundary solutions in
terms of the correlation coefficient ρ using the relation ρ = 2r − 1. The condition r > r˜ for an
interior solution if VL < VH becomes then
ρ >
4VL − VH −
√
VL
√
VH + VH√
VH(
√
VL −
√
VH)
=: ρ˜. (1.18)
This implies that for an interior solution valuations have to have a sufficiently “strong tendency
to positive correlation”, which does not mean that ρ˜ necessarily has to be positive. It follows that
expected valuations of the contestants have to be sufficiently close to each other for an interior
solution: Given an agent’s valuation, the expected valuation of the opponent must be sufficiently
close, which is just an extension of the condition under public information to private information.
Remember that in the sequential contest with public information the condition for an interior
solution is that valuations are rather close (V1 ≤ 2V2).
Similar to the results under public information, we know from the second mover’s best response
function that the more the first mover bids, the less bids the second. Again, the follower only
responds with a positive bid if the leader bids less than the follower’s valuation. Like before,
only the low type of the second mover can be preempted such that he drops out of the contest in
equilibrium. In contrast to the setting under public information, the maximum bid of the leader
under private information can exceed VL when he is a high type and tries to preempt the second
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mover. The reason is that the first mover faces uncertainty about the second mover’s type. With
bidding VL he can in general not be sure to win. Because of the strategic effect when contestants
move sequentially, they no longer bid the same fraction of their valuation, like we have seen for the
case of public information.
Furthermore, it is again the ability effect that drives behavior in equilibrium:
Proposition 7 Let VL < VH and r ∈ (0, 1). In the interior solution of a weak perfect Bayesian
equilibrium of the sequential contest with private information (see Proposition 6)
(i) a contestant bids strictly more when he has the high valuation than when he has the low
valuation and
(ii) the first mover bids strictly more (less) than the second mover when he is a high (low) type.
Proof.
See appendix.
We show within the proof that these results hold true for the boundary solutions as well with one
exception: It need not be true that the high type of the first mover bids more than the high type
of the second mover.
In the limit, when there is either perfect positive or negative correlation or the high and low val-
uation is identical (i.e. r = 1, r = 0 or VL = VH), i.e. there is actually complete information,
equilibrium bids coincide with the corresponding bids of the sequential contest under public infor-
mation. As long as valuations are not perfectly correlated, bids of identical types, however, differ,
which follows from Proposition 7 part (ii).
It follows from Proposition 7 that in the sequential contest with private information, the dominant
force for bidding behavior is still the ability effect independent of whether an agent is the leader
of the follower. In addition, bidding more than the rival (having the higher type) translates again
into higher expected payoffs for the interior solution.24
Moreover, the more positively valuations are correlated, the more the second mover bids in equilib-
rium. The more positively valuations are correlated, the more (less) the first mover bids when he
is a low (high) type. For the second mover, the intuition for this result is the competition intensity
effect. As we have already seen, a closer contest – in the sense that the contestants have “more
similar” valuations – leads to more aggressive bidding. A stronger positive correlation between the
contestants’ types (i.e. an increase in ρ) implies as well that the contest under private informa-
tion evens out from a contestant’s perspective: given the own type, a stronger positive correlation
corresponds to a higher probability that the opponent has the same type. For the first mover,
24See Proof E in the appendix.
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however, the result can only partly be explained by the competition intensity effect. Like in the
sequential contest with public information, only the behavior of the low type can be explained by
higher competition. The high type, in contrast, bids less when there is higher competition. The
competition intensity effect is again offset by the commitment effect. These results are summarized
in the following proposition.
Proposition 8 In a weak perfect Bayesian equilibrium of the sequential contest with private infor-
mation (see Proposition 6)
(i) the bid of the first mover is increasing (decreasing) in the correlation coefficient ρ when the
first mover is a low (high) type and
(ii) bids of the second mover are increasing in ρ.
Proof.
See appendix.
In the following section, we compare the four different institutional settings for the designer and
the contestants from an ex ante perspective.
1.5 Sequential versus Simultaneous Contests
We begin the comparison of the different institutional settings by comparing simultaneous and
sequential contests given the information setting and afterwards contrast private and public in-
formation given the order of moves. Here, and in the remainder of the paper we assume for the
sequential settings that the conditions for interior solutions are satisfied if not stated otherwise.
Moreover, we assume that in every setting, contestants make the corresponding equilibrium bids
as given in Propositions 1, 2, 3 and 6. In the following comparison of sequential and simultaneous
contests, we first refer to public information, then we turn to private information.
1.5.1 Sequential versus Simultaneous Contests given Public Information
The comparison of the oder of moves given public information leads to the following insights.
We have seen in Section 1.3 that bids of homogeneous types in the sequential and simultaneous
contest with public information are identical as the first mover’s commitment to a bid does not
affect equilibrium behavior in this case. Regarding the Stackelberg and Cournot-Nash equilibrium
outcomes when types are heterogeneous, the outcomes no longer coincide: Morgan (2003) shows
that a first mover who has a high valuation commits to a higher bid in the sequential contest than
in the simultaneous contest, whereas a first mover who has a low valuation commits to a lower bid.
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Intuitively, this can be explained as follows. The high type of the first mover anticipates that the
low type of the follower reduces his bid when he faces a higher bid of the first mover. Hence, the
leader can profit from increasing his bid as his probability of winning rises. In contrast, the low
type of the leader knows that a reduction in his bid induces the high type of the follower to reduce
his bid as well as the marginal gain in his probability of winning decreases for higher bids.25
Hence, in a heterogeneous contest, the sum of efforts is lower (in equilibrium) in the sequential
contest, when the low type moves first as both agents reduce their efforts compared to the
simultaneous contest. When the high type moves first, the sum of efforts is higher in the sequential
contest as the first mover’s increase in his effort outweighs the decrease of the follower (see Morgan
(2003)). As aforementioned, for homogeneous contests equilibrium efforts under both timing are
identical. Therefore, to conclude under which timing structure the ex ante expected effort sum is
higher, we only need to compare the expected effort sum when the first mover is a high type and
the second mover a low type and vice versa. Ex ante, both situations are equally likely as each
contestant is with provability one half a high or a low type, respectively. This property is also
satisfied for the symmetric distribution with independently drawn valuations that is considered by
Morgan. Thus, his result that the ex ante expected effort sum is higher in the sequential contest
can be extended to our distributional assumption. A designer who wants to maximize the expected
effort sum, hence prefers the sequential contest to the simultaneous one under public information.
Regarding the contestants’ payoffs, we already know that in simultaneous contests ex ante expected
payoffs of both agents are identical as well as in sequential contests (for the interior solution).
Although there is no difference between the contestant’s expected payoff given a timing structure,
ex ante expected payoffs are higher in sequential contests than in simultaneous contests.26 Taken
together, this implies that sequential contests Pareto dominate simultaneous contests from an
ex ante perspective. This may be a bit surprising since agents spend more effort from an ex
ante perspective. The intuition for the result is an efficiency gain effect : the agent with the
higher valuation wins “more often” in the sequential setting since the gap between the bid of
heterogeneous types becomes larger27. This efficiency gain effect increases the surplus of both
agents and outweighs the effect of higher expected efforts.
25It is straightforward to verify the follower’s reactions by differentiating the best response function of the follower
(that is identical to (1.9)) w.r.t. the leader’s bid and evaluating the derivative at the equilibrium bid of agent 1 in
the simultaneous contest (as given in Proposition 1).
26The proof is omitted since the result can straightforwardly be derived from Morgan (2003) by changing the
distributional assumption.
27It immediately follows from above that equilibrium bids in a heterogeneous contest are more unequal in the
sequential contest than in the simultaneous contest when the high type moves first. For the low type see the proof
of Proposition 16.
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Baik and Shogren (1992) and Leininger (1993) show that the sequential contest also arises
endogenously in the following two-stage game. In stage 1, knowing their own and the opponent’s
type, agents decide simultaneously whether to move “early” or “late”. Timing decisions are
publicly announced and afterwards, knowing the decision of the opponent, contestants choose their
bid in the period they committed to. In this game, agents move sequentially in equilibrium if types
are heterogeneous with the low type being first mover, otherwise sequential and simultaneous
order of moves form an equilibrium.28
Morgan (2003) finds that the sequential contest also arises endogenously when the timing decision
is taken before contestants know their valuations. In stage 1, agents decide simultaneously whether
to move “early” or “late” before knowing their valuations. Then valuations realize, are publicly
announced, and according to the timing decision in stage 1, effort is exerted in the period agents
committed to before. In this game, the only possible outcome of a subgame perfect equilibrium in
pure strategies is that agents act sequentially. This result also holds for the joint distribution of
valuations considered in this paper.29 Although a sequential order of moves is the only equilibrium
outcome, a drawback of this game is that it involves a coordination problem: one agent has to
move first and the other one second.
1.5.2 Sequential versus Simultaneous Contests given Private Information
In this section, we compare simultaneous and sequential contests when valuations are private in-
formation. We find that with private information – like in the public information setting – the ex
ante expected effort sum is (weakly) higher in the sequential contest than in the simultaneous one,
which implies the following result.
Proposition 9 Suppose contestants bid in each setting according to the corresponding equilibrium
outcomes in Propositions 1, 2, 3 and 6. Then the designer of the contest (weakly) prefers a se-
quential setting when he aims at maximizing the expected effort sum (strictly so if correlation is
not perfectly positive or VH > VL).
28Baik and Shogren (1992) consider “favorites” and “underdogs” where the underdog (favorite) wins with the lower
(higher) probability in equilibrium. This is equivalent to a heterogeneous contest in our setting, in which the high
type bids more than the low type and therefore, wins with a higher probability. Leininger (1993) considers both
cases, heterogeneous and homogeneous contestants.
29The proof is omitted as the result can straightforwardly derived from Morgan (2003) by replacing the distribution
with the one used here.
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Proof.
See appendix.
Moreover, if we think of the prize agents win as money the designer spends, the sequential contest
is “cheaper” for the designer. He can extract the same effort sum that he extracts under the
simultaneous contest but at a lower price. This may be crucial for the institutional choice if the
sequential contest is – in some other sense – more expensive than the simultaneous contest. For
example, it might take longer to carry out a sequential contest, which may cause higher costs.
Hence, even if one includes discounting, there will be parameter combinations in which sequential
contests dominate simultaneous ones.
Our result thus differs from Mu¨nster (2004). He considers repeated contests, in which contestants
twice choose an effort simultaneously and both receive intermediate information before they enter
the second stage. In contrast to our result that the sequential contest (in which intermediate
information is available to the second mover) leads to a higher expected effort sum, intermediate
information leads to lower expected equilibrium efforts in his setting. The main reason for this
difference is that in Mu¨nster high ability contestants might put in little effort in the first round to
make their opponents believe that they are of low ability.
The result that sequential contests Pareto dominate simultaneous ones can only partly be
extended to the case of private information. Higher expected efforts lead to higher expected effort
costs for the contestants. For the first mover, the effect of an increased probability of winning
prevails such that he nevertheless prefers the sequential contest. The second mover prefers the
sequential contest only when ρ is sufficiently “negative”. We call the correlation sufficiently
“negative” although this does not mean, that correlation needs to be actually negative. By
sufficiently negative, we mean that there is a sufficiently strong tendency to negative correlation
between both agents’ valuations, the threshold, however, can be strictly positive.
The intuition for this result is an efficiency gain effect. Suppose the first mover is a high type. We
know that he bids more than his rival because of the ability effect. Moreover, his bid is increasing
the smaller ρ (commitment effect). The bid of the second mover is decreasing the smaller ρ
(competition intensity effect) and the higher the bid of the first mover. Hence, the first mover, who
is a high type, wins with a higher probability the smaller ρ. Suppose the leader is a low type. Then
his bid is decreasing the smaller ρ and also the bid of the follower is decreasing (as ρ decreases and
as the first mover bids less). When the second mover is a high type, his bid decreases less than the
first mover’s bid and he bids more than the first mover (ability effect). Hence, the probability that
the second mover – who is the high type – wins the prize increases. Taken together, this implies
that the agent with the higher valuation is expected to win more often.
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In addition, the smaller the correlation, the higher the probability that valuations actually differ.
Note that in case contestants have the same type, it does not matter in terms of allocative
efficiency which one of them wins. Thus, the smaller the correlation (“the more negative”), the
more important the efficiency gain effect becomes. The second mover needs to be compensated
for increased effort outlays under the sequential structure to prefer the sequential structure. When
the correlation is sufficiently “negative”, and thus the efficiency gain effect is sufficiently strong,
the second mover can be compensated.
Hence, the result that the sequential contest Pareto dominates the simultaneous one under
public information still holds under private information if valuations are sufficiently “negatively”
correlated. These observations are summarized in the following proposition.
Proposition 10 Consider equilibrium outcomes of simultaneous and sequential contests as given
in Proposition 3 and 6. In the interior solution of sequential contests with private information
(i) the first mover always receives a higher ex ante expected payoff than in simultaneous contests,
(ii) the second mover receives a higher ex ante expected payoff than in simultaneous contests for
VL < VH and ρ < 1 if the correlation is sufficiently “negative”, i.e. if
ρ ≤ ρ˜c :=
(
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.
For VH = VL or ρ = 1 his ex ante expected payoffs in simultaneous and sequential contests
are identical.
Proof.
See appendix.
Comparing the numerator and denominator of ρ˜c, it is straightforward to verify |ρ˜c| < 1 (see Proof
of Proposition 10).
Note that the critical value of ρ is derived from the interior solution of equilibrium bids. Therefore,
we have to make sure that the condition for an interior solution (r ≥ r˜) is satisfied as well. The
result is illustrated in Figure 1.2 for the case that the low valuation equals 1.5. The solid line
describes the critical value of the correlation coefficient. Below this line the sequential contest leads
to higher expected payoffs for the second mover and above the simultaneous contest. The dashed
line marks the threshold for the interior solution. Unlike Mu¨nster (2004), the setting with interme-
diate information (i.e. a sequential contest) is not necessarily favorable to both contestants. This
difference is due to the fact that in Mu¨nster, agents act simultaneously. They play two stages and
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Figure 1.2: Critical Value ρ˜c for VL = 1.5
both receive intermediate information after the first stage. This means no first mover advantage
arises – which reduces the second mover’s payoff – as in our case.
Another criterion for the institutional choice is the overall (ex ante) expected payoff of the contes-
tants. Suppose contestants have the choice whether they want to play a simultaneous or sequential
contest. Moreover, they have to decide on it before they know their valuation and whether they
move first or second – because of ex ante symmetry they are assigned to the role of being the first
mover and the opponent the second mover (and vice versa) with probability one half. In this set-
ting, whether contestants prefer a simultaneous or sequential setting depends on where the overall
expected payoff is larger. Although the first mover always prefers the sequential setting, this cannot
outweigh the fact that the second mover prefers the simultaneous contest for sufficiently “positive”
correlation.
Proposition 11 Consider equilibrium outcomes of simultaneous and sequential contests under pri-
vate information (interior solution) as given in Propositions 3 and 6. The overall expected payoff
of the contestants is higher in sequential contests for VL < VH and ρ < 1 if the correlation is
sufficiently “negative”, i.e. if
ρ ≤ ρc := V 3L+V 3H+2V
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given the condition for an interior solution is satisfied, i.e. ρ > ρ˜ = 4VL−VH−
√
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√
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VH(
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.
For VH = VL of ρ = 1 the overall expected payoff is identical in simultaneous and sequential contests.
Proof.
See appendix.
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Figure 1.3: Critical Value ρc for VL = 1.5
Comparing the numerator and denominator of ρc, it can be seen that |ρc| < 1.
Again, the intuition for the result is an efficiency gain effect like for the comparison of individual
expected payoffs in Proposition 10. Evidently, the critical value for the overall expected payoff
being higher in the sequential contest is larger than the critical value for the expected payoff of the
second mover being higher (because of the influence of the expected payoff of the first mover).
Note that the critical value of ρ is derived from the interior solution of equilibrium bids. Therefore,
we have to make sure that the condition for an interior solution (r ≥ r˜) is satisfied as well. The
result is illustrated in Figure 1.3 (for the case that the low valuation equals 1.5), where we plot
the critical value of the correlation coefficient (solid line). Below this line the sequential contest
leads to higher overall expected payoffs for the contestants and above the simultaneous contest.
The dashed line marks the threshold for the interior solution.
Under public information, we have seen that sequential contests arise endogenously. For the case of
private information, we consider again the aforementioned two-stage game in which agents 1 and
2 simultaneously decide whether they want to move ‘early’ or ‘late’ in stage 1, these choices are
publicly announced and valuations realize. In stage 2, knowing the own valuation – but not the
opponent’s type – and the period choice of the opponent, contestants make their bid in the period
they committed to. This means that if both agents announce the same period, the subsequent sub-
game is the simultaneous contest with private information and if they announce different periods,
it is the corresponding sequential contest with private information.
Assuming that contestants bid in each subgame according to the corresponding equilibria in Propo-
34
Table 1.2: Ex ante expected payoffs
2
1
early late
early Ψsim,Ψsim Ψ1st,Ψ2nd
late Ψ2nd,Ψ1st Ψsim,Ψsim
sitions 1, 2, 3 and 6, we have already analyzed all possible outcomes in stage 2 and know the ex
ante expected payoffs for each timing choice, it remains to investigate the simultaneous move game
in stage 1. Table 1.2 summarizes the ex ante expected payoffs of agent 1 and 2 given their choices
whether to make their bid ‘early’ or ‘late’. Ψsim denotes the ex ante expected payoff in the simul-
taneous contest with private information, Ψ1st and Ψ2nd denote the ex ante expected payoff in the
sequential contest with private information of the first mover and the second mover, respectively.
Regarding these payoffs, the only relationship, we did not analyze up to now is whether the first
or second mover has a higher ex ante expected payoff. Intuitively appealing, it turns out that the
first mover has a higher (ex ante) expected payoff than the second mover.
Lemma 1 In the interior solution of a weak perfect Bayesian equilibrium of the sequential con-
test with private information (see Proposition 6) a first mover advantage exists from an ex ante
perspective.
Proof.
See appendix.
Using this result, we find that in the private information case the sequential contest does not
necessarily arise endogenously in the aforementioned two-stage game:
Proposition 12 Suppose contestants bid in each subgame of the proposed two-stage game according
to the corresponding equilibrium outcomes in Propositions 3 and 6, respectively. In the subgame
perfect equilibria in pure strategies of the proposed two-stage game, contestants choose a sequential
order of moves when the correlation between types is “sufficiently negative”, i.e. ρ < ρ˜c. If ρ > ρ˜c,
both agents choose to move “early” in equilibrium. If ρ = ρ˜c, both simultaneous moves at the early
stage and sequential order of moves arise in subgame perfect equilibria.
Proof.
The only step that is left to show is to solve for the (pure strategy) Nash equilibria of the simultaneous-move
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game in the first stage. Table 1.2 shows the payoff matrix of this game. To derive the Nash equilibria, the
relationship between Ψsim and Ψ2nd is crucial. If Ψ2nd < Ψsim, which holds when ρ < ρ˜c (as we have shown
for Proposition 10), the only equilibrium is that both contestants choose to move “early”. If Ψ2nd > Ψsim,
which holds when ρ > ρ˜c (as we have shown for Proposition 10), sequential play forms an equilibrium. If
Ψ2nd = Ψsim, which holds for ρ = ρ˜c, sequential order of moves as well as both contestants choosing to move
early forms an equilibrium.
1.6 Private versus Public Information
Finally, we compare the different information regimes given the order of moves. In the simultaneous
contest a high (low) type bids more (less) if he knows that the opponent is also a high type, than
when the opponent is a low type (i.e. there is public information) compared to the bid of a high
(low) type under private information. Conditional on an agent’s type, the expected bid of an agent
is the same under public and private information as we have seen in Section 1.4. Therefore, a risk
neutral designer, who wants to maximize the ex ante expected sum of efforts, is indifferent between
both information regimes. If we refer to the effort sum as the revenue of the designer, we can say
that revenue equivalence holds for the designer. Moreover, the contestants’ conditional probability
of winning the prize is equal under both regimes in the simultaneous contest. Malueg and Yates
(2004) derive these results, which we summarize in the following proposition.
Proposition 13 [Malueg and Yates (2004)] Given the corresponding equilibrium outcomes of si-
multaneous contests (see Propositions 1 and 3), contestants’ ex ante expected payoffs are identical
under public and private information and revenue equivalence holds for a risk neutral designer, who
maximizes the expected effort sum.
For simultaneous contests with a Tullock contest success function in which agents are either both
uninformed or informed about the common value of the prize, Wa¨rneryd (2003) finds as well that
the expected effort sum is identical under both settings. If, however, only one player is informed and
the other one not, expected efforts decrease. Proposition 13 implies that – from an ex ante point
of view – there is no incentive for the agents to share their private information in the simultaneous
contest.
When we compare sequential contests given private or public information, respectively, results
change: Here, the different information setting matters from an ex ante perspective. Intuitively,
private information dampens the differences between ex ante expected efforts of the first and second
mover. As under public information, the first mover exerts a higher expected effort than the second
mover. The expected effort of the first mover is, however, lower than under public information.
The second mover’s expected effort is higher than under public information. The effect on the
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second mover’s expected effort compensates for the first mover’s effort reduction given private
information.30 These results are driven by the commitment effect for the high type of the first
mover, who exerts more effort when the second mover is a low type than when he is a high type
under public information. This deters the second mover when the first mover is a high type such
that the distance in expected efforts between public and private information is larger for the second
mover. Thus, we have the following proposition.
Proposition 14 Given the corresponding equilibrium outcomes of sequential contests (see Propo-
sitions 2 and 6), a risk neutral designer, who maximizes the expected effort sum, prefers a private
information setting to a public information setting from an ex ante perspective.
Proof.
See appendix.
This means that revenue equivalence across information regimes does not hold for sequential con-
tests. When agents move simultaneously, no commitment effect – which drives up the expected
effort sum – is present.
Suppose that the designer knows the realization of types when the contest is played. We can con-
clude from Proposition 14 that the designer has no incentives to reveal his information from an ex
ante perspective (i.e. when he can commit to an order of moves and an information policy before
he knows the realization of types).
Regarding the contestants’ overall expected payoff, we can immediately conclude that it is smaller
under private information. Remarkably, this result also holds true for individually expected payoffs
of the first as well as of the second mover. This is due to the dampening effect of private informa-
tion: Ex ante expected bids of the contestants are more similar, which we can interpret as higher
competition, which reduces the agents’ payoffs. Although the first mover saves effort costs since his
expected effort is lower, his “overall expected” probability of winning decreases disproportionately
as the second mover’s expected effort is higher under private information. For the second mover,
effort costs drive up because his expected bis is higher.
Proposition 15 Given the corresponding equilibrium outcomes of sequential contests (see Propo-
sitions 2 and 6), contestants prefer public information to private information.
Proof.
See appendix.
30It is straightforward to verify these results but not necessary for the proof of Proposition 14. Therefore, we omit
the proofs.
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Thus, there is an incentive for the contestants to share the information about their types in the
sequential contest. If they could commit to information disclosure, contestants would like to do so
(ex ante). Whether contestants would like to disclose their private information at the time they
know the realization is an interesting question but we do not want to address it in this paper.
1.7 Other Aims of the Designer
1.7.1 Minimizing the Expected Effort Sum
Up to now, we assumed that the principal wants to maximize the expected effort sum. There are
of course settings in which this is not true. If we think of wasteful expenditures, like in the rent-
seeking literature, then the principal in contrast aims at minimizing the expected effort sum. From
our analysis, we can immediately conclude that in this case the principal prefers simultaneous
contests (compare Proposition 9). Regarding the contestants nothing changes to before. Given
public information, they still prefer the sequential setting as well. Given private information, the
first mover still prefers the sequential setting and for the second mover the result depends on the
correlation of valuations. This implies that it is never possible to align preferences of all three.
Regarding the information setting, nothing changes when agents move simultaneously. All parties
are indifferent between public and private information from an ex ante perspective. When agents
act sequentially, however, all three would then prefer public information (compare Propositions 14
and 15).
1.7.2 Close Race
There may be different aims of the designer of a contest than maximizing or minimizing the effort
sum. In particular, when we think of sports contests, it may be that a designer aims at having a
close race between athletes in order to attract the audience rather than to maximize the sum of
efforts.31 The gap between high and low types is larger in sequential contests under public infor-
mation than in simultaneous contests (compare Section 1.5.1). Similarly, the expected gap in the
sequential contest is also higher than in the simultaneous contest in case of private information.32
31Another aim in sports contests would be that athletes break records. In this case the designer would like to
maximize “the highest effort” in the contest. See e.g. Moldovanu and Sela (2006). Given public information, the
sequential contest would then be preferred since for homogeneous types efforts are identical but for heterogeneous
types either the high type in the sequential contest makes a higher bid than in the simultaneous contest. This result
will at least partly hold true for private information since the expected gap between low and high types is larger in
the sequential contest and also the expected effort sum can be larger.
32We assume that agents are randomly assigned to be the first or second mover. Also under public information,
the designer fixes the order of moves before he knows the realization of types. This means that when types are
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The reason is that in the sequential contest with private information there is not only a gap between
the efforts of heterogeneous types, but also between the efforts of homogeneous types as the first
and second mover do no longer exert the same effort.
For simultaneous contest, the ex ante expected gap between the efforts of the contestants is higher
under private information than under public information. Irrespective of the information setting,
homogeneous types exert the same effort in equilibrium in simultaneous contests. Thus, no gap
arises with homogeneous types. When types are heterogeneous, then the gap under private infor-
mation is larger. This is due to increased competition under private information when types are
actually heterogeneous: Under private information contestants are not sure that their types differ.
Thus, the bid of a low (high) type under private information is larger than the bid of a low (high)
type under public information who knows that his opponent is a high (low) type. This effect is
larger for the high type than for the low type. We can say that the ability effect increases the effect
of more competition when agents do not know that their types actually differ.33
For sequential contests it is the other way around. The ex ante expected gap is larger under public
information. For the sequential setting private information dampens the differences, although no
gap arises for homogeneous types under public information but a gap arises under private informa-
tion. The reason is the additional commitment effect that offsets the competition intensity effect
when the first mover is a high type. Under public information this effect is stronger than under
private information: The high type of the first mover makes a very large bid, when the second
mover is a low type and correspondingly the second mover makes a low bid in this case. Private in-
formation dampens this result as contestants do not know the type of the opponent with certainty.
This yields the following proposition.
Proposition 16 Suppose contestants bid according to the corresponding equilibrium outcomes of
simultaneous and sequential contests (see Propositions 1, 2, 3 and 6). Then a risk neutral designer
who aims at having a close race, prefers simultaneous contests to sequential contests from an ex
ante perspective. Given a simultaneous setting, he prefers public information to private information
and given a sequential setting he prefers private information to public information from an ex ante
perspective.
heterogeneous, the 1st mover in the sequential contest is with probability one half the high and the low type,
respectively. This assumption does not change the result for public information. With private information, if the
probability that the 1st mover is the high type is larger than 1/2, the result still holds, too. We can show that –
given heterogeneous types – the expected effort difference in the sequential contest is larger than in the simultaneous
contest, when the 1st mover is the high type. If the probability is lower than 1/2, however, it is possible that the
expected gap in the simultaneous contest is larger.
33These results follow from the observations in Proposition 4.
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Proof.
See appendix.
1.8 Conclusion
In this paper we compare a two-player contest under four different institutional settings: We
consider simultaneous and sequential orders of moves and public as well as private information
about the player’s types. Ex ante, sequential contests are preferred to simultaneous contests by an
effort-maximizing designer and also by the first mover irrespective of the information setting. The
second mover, however, does not necessarily prefer the sequential contest in the private information
setting. Whether he prefers the simultaneous or sequential setting depends on the distribution of
types. When correlation between types is sufficiently negative, he prefers a sequential order of
moves (ex ante), too. In the setting with public information sequential contests arise endogenously.
This result can only partly be extended to private information since there exists a first mover
advantage and therefore a strong incentive to move first.
Furthermore, an effort-maximizing designer ex ante prefers private information given a sequential
contest, whereas contestants prefer public information when the order of moves is sequential. Given
simultaneous contests, the designer as well as the contestants are indifferent between public and
private information from an ex ante perspective.
This result may no longer hold when we include considerations of time. A sequential order of moves
prolongs the contest. Depending on the type of contest, this may be a crucial feature reducing
or even offsetting the aforementioned advantage of sequential contests. It may be expensive to
organize a contest that lasts longer. Sequential contests,however, are also “cheaper” for the effort-
maximizing designer in the sense, that he can reduce the prize up to some point and his expected
revenue in the sequential contest still equals his expected revenue in the simultaneous one. This
advantage may outweigh the costs of the extra time.
Hence, we can conclude that it is not only outside restrictions that determine the timing structure
of contests we observe in reality, but the combination of both these restrictions and the differing
incentive effects of the structures.
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Chapter 2
Teams and Intermediate Information1
2.1 Introduction
This paper studies the issue of how to organize the information structure between agents who
jointly work on a project. Should the principal instruct his agents to work simultaneously (i.e. no
intermediate information is available to the agents) or is it better when they work sequentially (i.e.
intermediate information is available)? When analyzing this question, we take the team structure
as given and focus on the effect the informational change has on incentives.
In real life, we frequently observe team production or problem-solving teams. Osterman (1994,
2000) estimates in a survey that in 1992 and 1997 about 40 percent of the manufacturing
establishments (that have more than 50 employees) in the U.S. have more than half of their
employees working in teams. Hence, teams became important work practices. A recent trend
is the assignment of software development teams instead of single agents. Teasley et al. (2002)
conduct an empirical study on the performance of software development teams working either in
open space offices or private offices.
Team members are, in general, paid according to some joint performance evaluation scheme.
Therefore, team performance suffers from free-riding problems. Nevertheless, teams may be
performance enhancing in reality for other reasons like synergy effects or increased employee
satisfaction. The free-riding problem, however, may still remain. There are studies that examine
how team production can be improved by circumventing the free-riding problem. One argument
is that a sequential order of moves – where the second mover receives non-verifiable information
about the first mover’s action – reduces shirking (see Winter (2005)) and may attain efficient
production under budget-balancing (see Strausz (1999)). In line with these approaches, we
compare two settings: one in which intermediate information is available as agents act sequentially
and one in which it is not. In contrast to the literature, we allow that the joint project takes
1This chapter is based on joint work with Julia Nafziger.
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an additional intermediate value. This means that the project cannot only succeed or fail, but
can also take an intermediate value. We show that in this case it need no longer be true that
the sequential setting with intermediate information is necessarily better: The principal prefers a
simultaneous setting (i.e. no intermediate information is available) if individual contributions are
perfect substitutes rather than perfect complements regarding the joint output. If we depart from
the case of perfect complements, it is possible that the simultaneous structure becomes optimal
for complementary contributions.
The problem of how to design team production is, for instance, known from the automobile
production. On the one hand, there is the assembly line approach, where all agents act sequentially
but can observe their predecessors’ performance. On the other hand, there is the possibility that
several agents work simultaneously on the product before it passes to the next production stage.
BMW, for example, uses the latter structure, where several teams work sequentially.
Another example of team production, mentioned above, are software development teams. It is
possible that agents work simultaneously on the project but perform different tasks. Explicit
agreements on different working hours may induce a sequential setting. In the latter setting, it
might well be that the second mover can evaluate the performance of his colleague (since he is
involved in the same project), but for a third person it might be very difficult to evaluate the
performance on some program that is not yet finished. Similar issues arise with other kinds of
joint research projects.
Our setting corresponds to such projects where it is difficult or prohibitively costly (at least
compared to the projects value) to evaluate intermediate results for a person that is not directly
involved, but easy to evaluate the whole project.
We consider the question of the optimal information structure in a moral hazard model
with a risk neutral principal and two agents, who are risk neutral but protected by limited
liability. The agents jointly work on a project. Each agent’s contribution to the joint project can
be either of high or low quality. The quality of an agent’s contribution depends on this agent’s
(unobservable) effort. In the following we denote the probability that a contribution is of high
quality by success probability of an agent. As agents work in a team, the principal can only
observe the (verifiable) joint output – i.e. the value of the project – and not the quality of each
agent’s contribution. The principal can, however, instruct his agents to make their contributions
simultaneously or sequentially. This means he can specify ex ante which agent is in control. In
case agents work sequentially, the second mover (agent 2) can perfectly observe the quality of
the first mover’s (agent 1) contribution. Thus, the second mover can condition his effort on the
quality the first mover provided. Since effort is unobservable, the principal offers an incentive
scheme to each agent to implement the desired effort. We derive the optimal wage scheme for
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both information scenarios – either agents move simultaneously or they move sequentially. When
analyzing the effects of the information structure on incentives and on the principal’s expected
payoff, we find that the optimal structure depends on whether the individual contributions enter
the principal’s production function in a complementary or substitutable way. Our main result
is that the sequential structure is superior if contributions are perfect complements, while the
simultaneous structure is superior when contributions are perfect substitutes.
When contributions are complements, an agent’s contribution is more effective regarding the
value of the whole project, the higher the quality of the other agent’s contribution. We begin
by analyzing the special case of perfect complements, in which a low quality contribution of one
agent leads to a failure of the whole project. This means, the principal only observes whether both
agents’ contributions are of high quality (hence the project succeeded) or whether the project
failed, i.e. at most one agent’s contribution is of high quality. In this special case, the project is of
no value if at least one agent’s contribution is of low quality. Under the sequential structure, the
principal cannot incentivize the second mover when the first mover provided low quality. Hence,
the second mover exerts no effort when the first agent provided low quality and the principal pays
a wage of zero. The second mover only needs to be paid in case the first mover’s contribution
is of high quality. This enables the principal to better incentivize him: The principal saves
implementation costs. Moreover, his revenues do not decrease since a high quality contribution
from both agents is needed to generate revenues. This implies that expected revenues are not
influenced by the effort the second mover exerts in case the first mover provides low quality. Thus,
if contributions are perfect complements, the principal prefers the sequential structure. In an
extension, we also consider more general cases of complements. Here, it may happen that the
simultaneous structure becomes optimal.
For the case of substitutability, we assume that one agent’s contribution is equally (or less) effective
irrespective of the quality of the other agent’s contribution. When contributions are substitutes,
the principal observes three different values of the project. Either it is of high value (i.e. both
contributions are of high quality), low value (both are of low quality) or of intermediate value (one
contribution is of high, one of low quality). In the latter case, the principal does not know, whose
contribution has which quality (as agents work in a team). We find that the principal prefers the
simultaneous structure when contributions are perfect substitutes (which we define as an agent’s
contribution is equally effective irrespective of the quality of the other agent’s contribution). There
are two driving forces for this result: On the one hand, the feasible wage scheme changes between
the structures as soon as the principal implements a positive effort for the second mover in case the
first mover provided low quality. This change drives up implementation costs. On the other hand,
a negative effect on expected revenues arises if the principal conditions the second mover’s effort
to the state of the world. When the effort of the second mover differs contingent on the quality of
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the first mover’s contribution, the value of the concave expected revenue function decreases. This
implies that irrespective of whether the principal implements zero effort for the second mover after
a low quality contribution of the first mover or not, the simultaneous structure leads to higher
expected profits. The negative revenue effect of the sequential structure that is crucial for our
result has not been considered in the literature by now to the best of our knowledge. This effect
only arises when different values of the project are taken into account, which has been ignored so
far. In an extension, we also consider more general cases of substitutability.
The literature on multi-agent moral hazard problems started with Holmstro¨m (1982). In
Holmstro¨m’s partnership model, agents jointly produce and commonly share an output. The
output deterministically depends on the agents’ efforts, which are unobservable. Holmstro¨m shows
that such form of organization is inefficient if budget-balancing is required for the sharing rule.
The reason is that a team member shirks as he has to bear the cost for his effort himself, while
the marginal benefits of his effort are shared.2 For such partnerships, Rasmusen (1987) finds that
with risk-averse agents efficiency can be reached by allowing for random punishments. Legros and
Matthews (1993) show that with Leontief production functions (i.e. effort are complements) the
inefficiency resolves as well.
The literature on team production under moral hazard discusses various mechanisms to alleviate
the problem of free-riding. As a means to solve the free-riding problem in one-shot interactions,
Kandel and Lazear (1992) consider how teams generate social pressure. They analyze how the
disutility from such social pressure can be optimally exploited. This peer pressure may, for
example, arise from the possibility that team members can monitor each other. If they can do so,
the principal could also implement a mechanism that induces agents to report on their colleague’s
effort to reduce incentives to free-ride (see Marx and Squintani (2002)). Miller (1997) analyzes such
a message game in case that a single agent can observe his colleagues’ efforts and can report his
observation to the group. He shows that efficiency can be sustained by a budget-balancing sharing
rule. When teams are subject to moral hazard and adverse selection, McAfee and McMillan
(1991) show that – under some conditions – it does not matter whether the principal observes
the final output or individual contributions to the output. Hence, monitoring is not necessary to
prevent shirking in this case. In this paper, we abstract from the possibility of monitoring and
reporting but instead change the production process such that the second mover can observe the
first mover’s contribution. Che and Yoo (2001) consider repeated interactions and find that if an
agent can observe after each period whether the colleague shirked or not, free-riding decreases.
Most closely related to our paper is the paper by Winter (2005). He compares different information
2The basic model is extended by Battaglini (2004) to a multi-dimensional strategy and output space.
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structures when a sequence of agents collectively works on a project and moral hazard is present.
Winter consideres any information structure in between (and including) the following two extreme
cases. One extreme case is that agents are not able to observe effort decisions of their predecessors
(corresponding to simultaneous effort choices). The other extreme case is that each agent knows
the effort decision of all his predecessors (corresponding to sequential effort choices). More (less)
transparency then corresponds to more (less) agents being able to observe the effort of more
(less) of their predecessors. There is no mutual knowledge about effort decisions in the sense
that an agent who acts earlier does not know the effort of an agent who acts later. In contrast
to our model, Winter analyzes the case that agents are only rewarded in case of a success of the
joint project. When agents have a binary effort choice – either they exert effort or not – more
transparency is always favorable to the principal if he wants to induce all agents to exert effort.
This result holds irrespective of whether the agents’ efforts are complements or substitutes (i.e.
whether the production technology possesses decreasing or increasing returns to scale). When
more agents make their effort choice contingent on the decision of (more of) the other agents,
shirking is more harmful to the probability that the joint project succeeds. Hence, incentives
increase and implementation costs decrease. Winter’s result stands in sharp contrast to our result
that a sequential structure needs not be optimal when different values of the project are considered
(and can be rewarded). The reasons for these different results are the aforementioned change in
the feasible wage scheme and the revenue effect.
For the case that agents move sequentially and each agent can observe the effort decision of all his
predecessors, Winter (forthcoming) shows that agents who move later (i.e. their effort is observed
by less agents) should receive (weakly) higher rewards. Agents who move later, face a minor threat
that their own shirking induces their followers to shirk as well.3
Similar to our approach, Gould and Winter (2005) consider a model, in which an agent’s wage
depends on the vector of the agents’ performances. They show that positive as well as negative
peer effects may arise under team production without behavioral effects as peer pressure. A
positive peer effect means that a high (low) performance of one agent increases (decreases) the
other agent’s effort. Depending on whether agents deal with complementary or substitutable
tasks, respectively, positive or negative peer effects arise. Task complementarities are reflected
by the wage scheme. These properties of the wage scheme are imposed and are not part of the
optimal wage scheme (which they do not derive).4 In contrast to our paper, Gould and Winter do
not compare different information structures and do not include complementarities of the agents’
performances. They present empirical evidence for their theory using data on the performance of
3Winter (forthcoming) also shows that agents with a lower effort costs (i.e. a higher ability) should move later.
4The optimal wage scheme that we derive, satisfies their definition of complementary tasks.
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professional baseball players.
We do not analyze whether it is optimal to employ a team, but assume that this is an existing
relationship that cannot be changed for the project. The question of how to optimally structure
agents’ interaction, is, for instance, considered by Goldfain (2006) and Hemmer (1995). Goldfain
(2006) analyzes in an R&D setting when it is optimal to employ a team (where synergy effects
are present), two competing agents or only one agent. Regarding the team, Goldfain (2006)
distinguishes between simultaneous and sequential effort choices. She presents numerical results,
which suggest that when efforts are strategic substitutes, the performance of the team is not
increased under the sequential structure compared to the simultaneous one. This is in line with
our result when contributions are substitutes. Hemmer (1995) approaches the question how to
assign agents to a sequence of tasks. He finds that it is optimal to organize agents in a team to
deal with these subsequent tasks instead of assigning different agents to single tasks, when there
exist synergies from dealing with several tasks.
The question whether to provide intermediate information is optimal is also considered by Lizzeri et
al. (2002) and Ludwig and Nafziger (2006). Lizzeri et al. (2002) analyze the question whether the
principal should provide a single agent (who works for two periods) with intermediate information
about his output or not. In contrast to Winter (2005), they find that it is always optimal for
the principal not to provide feedback. The driving force that turns intermediate information
unfavorable, is a change in the wage scheme as it also arises in our setting: The agent has to be
rewarded after a failure in the first period, too, otherwise he does not exert any effort when he
gets the “negative” feedback.
Ludwig and Nafziger (2006) consider two agents who do not work on a joint project, but separately
produce an output. The agents’ success probabilities are allowed to be dependent. Like in the
current paper, the principal can instruct his agents to work simultaneously (i.e. no intermediate
information is available) or sequentially (i.e. intermediate information is available to the second
mover). In the latter case, the second mover can observe the output of the first mover. Which
information structure is optimal, depends on whether the colleague’s output is informative
about an agent’s effort or not. If it is uninformative, a sequential structure is optimal. If the
colleague’s output is informative, the simultaneous structure can be optimal as well. Independent
success probabilities – like we consider in the current paper – imply that the colleagues output is
uninformative and thus that a sequential structure is optimal. Similarly to the present paper, one
driving force is a (possible) change in the feasible wage scheme.
Another field that is related to our issue, is the literature on how to design jobs or allocate
tasks when moral hazard is present (see e.g Prescott and Townsend (2006), Schmitz (2005) or
Itoh (1994)). Furthermore, the literature on sequential tournaments is related to this paper. In
tournaments, agents generally compete against each other and do not form a team. Contrary to
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the current paper, in the tournament literature, the wage scheme is often exogenous (e.g. Aoyagi
(2003), Ederer (2004) or Morgan (2003)) or it is solely a strategic effect that drives the result (e.g.
Jost (2001) or Jost and Kra¨kel (2000)), which means that the first mover tries to influence the
action of the second mover.
The paper is structured as follows. In Section 2.2, we present the basic model. In Section 2.3,
we first derive the optimal wage scheme for the simultaneous and sequential structure given
that contributions are perfect complements. Then, in Section 2.4, we analyze which of the two
structures the principal prefers. In Section 2.5, we consider the case that contributions are perfect
substitutes. Again, we derive the optimal wage schemes and, in Section 2.6, we analyze which
structure the principal prefers. Afterwards, in Section 2.7, we extend the analysis to more general
cases of complementarities. In Section 2.8, we discuss our results and relate them to the literature.
We conclude in Section 2.9.
2.2 The Model
There are two agents, i ∈ {1, 2}, and a risk neutral principal. Both agents jointly work on a
project. They are risk neutral but protected by limited liability. The value of their outside option
is zero. If both agents accept to work for the principal production takes place, otherwise the
relationship terminates and the payoff of every player is zero. In the former case, each agent
makes a contribution Yi ∈ {L,H} to the joint project. The contribution is either of high quality
(H) or of low quality (L). We refer to a specific quality realization as “state of the world”. The
probability that an agent’s contribution is of high quality depends on his effort ei ∈ [0, e¯] ≡ I
where p(ei) := Pr(H|ei), p : I → (0, 1). Moreover, p ∈ C3, concave and strictly increasing in effort.
The probability that the contribution has low quality is 1− p(ei). We refer to the probability that
an agent’s contribution has high quality as this agent’s success probability.
The quality combination YiY−i realizes with probability pYiY−i(ei, e−i) := Pr(YiY−i|ei, e−i), where
pYiY−i : I × I → (0, 1) and pYiY−i ∈ C3. We consider independent individual success probabilities.
This implies that pYiY−i(ei, e−i) is equal to the product of the respective individual probabilities.
Hence, an agent’s individual success probability p(ei) = pHH(ei, e−i) + pHL(ei, e−i) depends only
on his own effort and not on the other agent’s effort.
Denoting by pHHei (ei, e−i) the derivative of p
HH(ei, e−i) with respect to agent i’s effort, it follows
that pHY−iei (ei, e−i) > 0, p
LY−i
ei (ei, e−i) < 0, p
HY−i
eiei (ei, e−i) ≤ 0, and pLY−ieiei (ei, e−i) ≥ 0.
Providing effort is costly for the agents. The cost to provide effort e is c(e), where c : R+0 → R+0 ,
c ∈ C3 with c′(·) > 0 ∀ei > 0, c′′(·) > 0 and c(0) = c′(0) = 0.
The revenue of the principal is piY(Yi, Y−i), where pi is some strictly positive constant and Y(Yi, Y−i)
is the value of the project (or the agents’ joint output), which depends on both agents’ contributions
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Yi and Y−i. We distinguish between two cases: Contributions are either complements or substitutes.
When contributions are complements, the quality of an agent’s contribution is more effective, the
higher the quality of the other agent’s contribution, i.e. Y(H,H)− Y(H,L) > Y(L,H)− Y(L,L).
When contributions are substitutes, Y(H,H) − Y(H,L) ≤ Y(L,H) − Y(L,L). In the main part
of the paper, we consider perfect complements and perfect substitutes as introduced below. In an
extension, we refer to more general cases of complements and substitutes.
First, we analyze the case that agents’ contributions are perfect complements. This means
Yc(Yi, Y−i) := Y(Yi, Y−i) = min{Yi, Y−i}. For simplicity, we assume H = 1 and L = 0. In
case agents’ contributions are perfect complements, a high quality contribution of both agents
is needed for the project to be of high quality (which we denote by H), otherwise the project
is of low quality (which we denote by L). Therefore, Yc(Yi, Y−i) ∈ {0, 1} ≡ {L,H}. Secondly,
we consider that the agents’ contributions are perfect substitutes. Again, we assume H = 1
and L = 0. Substitues imply that the value of the project can take three values: It can be of
high value when both agents contribute high quality, which we denote by H. If only one agent
contributes high quality, it takes an intermediate value (which we denote byM) and if both agents
contribute low quality, the project is of low value (which we denote by L). The value of the joint
project when individual contributions are perfect substitutes is Ys(Yi, Y−i) := Yi + Y−i. Thus,
Ys(Yi, Y−i) ∈ {0, 1, 2} ≡ {L,M,H}. We change the notation here only to not confuse both cases
later on. Hence, the set of possible values of the project differs for the case of perfect complements
and substitutes.
The timing and the information structure of the game are as follows. At date 0, the prin-
cipal decides whether agents move sequentially (we denote the first mover by agent 1 and the
second mover by agent 2) or simultaneously. At date 1, the principal offers to each agent i a wage
scheme w(O). This scheme conditions on all observable and verifiable variables (O). If agents
move simultaneously, both agents provide unobservable effort at date 2. If they move sequentially,
only agent 1 provides unobservable effort at date 2. Agent 2 can observe the realization of the
quality of the first mover’s contribution5 and then provides effort as well. The principal, however,
can neither observe the quality of the first mover’s contribution nor the agents’ efforts, but only
the value of the project Y(Yi, Y−i) (which is also verifiable). Finally, the project’s value and payoffs
realize: The principal receives his revenues and pays the wages to the agents as specified in the
wage scheme. Each agent receives his wage minus his effort costs.
5We show later that it does not matter for our results whether the second mover also observes the effort of the
first mover or not.
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2.3 Contributions are Complements
In this section, we consider the case that agents’ contributions are perfect complements in the prin-
cipal’s production function. This means that the value of the project is Yc = min{Yi, Y−i}. Hence,
the principal observes whether both agents perform well or whether at least one of them performs
poorly. Note that we stick to the case of perfect complements in the whole section. Whenever we
refer to complements, we indeed mean perfect complements in this section.
The principal maximizes his expected profit (i.e. expected revenues minus implementation costs)
with respect to wages and efforts, subject to the incentive, participation and limited liability con-
straints of the agents.6 Since agents are protected by limited liability, their expected payoff in
equilibrium is at least zero. Hence, by entering the relationship, they cannot be worse off than by
not entering it (the outside option is zero). We assume that agents accept to work for the principal
when they are indifferent between accepting or not accepting.
As usual in a moral hazard model, we can decompose the principal’s maximization problem into
two parts. In the first part, we take the efforts the principal wants to implement as given and max-
imize profits with respect to wages subject to the three constraints. As expected revenues (which
are pi times the probability that both agents provide high quality) do not depend on wages, this is
equivalent to minimizing the expected wage payment. The solution to the problem is the optimal
wage scheme. In the second part of the problem, the principal maximizes his expected revenues
minus the wages (which depend on effort) with respect to effort. We do not investigate whether
it is indeed optimal for the principal to employ both agents (by implementing zero effort/paying a
wage of zero he can ensure a payoff of zero).
2.3.1 The Wage Scheme for the Simultaneous Structure
In this section, we consider the first part of the principal’s problem and derive the optimal wage
scheme for the simultaneous structure to implement any desired effort level (eˆi, eˆ−i). Under the
simultaneous structure (as well as under the sequential one), the principal offers a wage scheme to
each agent that depends on the value of the project, which is the only observable and verifiable
variable: w(Yc) = {wLi , wHi }. In the appendix we argue that the participation constraint of each
agent is satisfied if the limited liability constraint (which requires wYci ≥ 0 ∀i, ∀Yc(Yi, Y−i)) and
the agent’s incentive constraint are satisfied. Hence, we can drop the participation constraint in
the following and consider only the incentive and limited liability constraint. Using this result, the
problem of the principal (under the simultaneous structure) is to minimize expected wage payments
6For the sequential structure we require that the ex ante participation constraint is satisfied.
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subject to the incentive and limited liability constraints.
max
wHi ,w
L
i
−
∑
i
pHH(eˆi, eˆ−i)wHi −
∑
i
[1− pHH(eˆi, eˆ−i)]wLi
s.t. eˆi ∈ argmax
ei∈I
pHH(ei, eˆ−i)wHi + (1− pHH(ei, eˆ−i))wLi − c(ei), ∀i (ICsimci )
s.t. wYci ≥ 0 ∀i, ∀Yc,
where eˆi and eˆ−i denote the Nash-equilibrium effort levels.7
From the incentive constraint (ICsimci ), we see that setting w
L
i > 0 decreases incentives as (1 −
pHH(ei, eˆ−i)) is decreasing in ei. Moreover, it lowers the principal’s profits. Hence, setting wLi = 0
is optimal. Using this result, we can derive the optimal wage when both agents provide high quality
from the agent’s incentive constraint. The solutions to the principal’s problem are summarized in
the following lemma.
Lemma 2 Suppose Y(Yi, Y−i) = Yc(Yi, Y−i) and agents move simultaneously. Then the wage for
agent i to implement effort eˆi is zero when at least one agent fails to provide high quality, i.e.
wLi = 0. If both agents perform well, the wage is non-negative: w
H
i =
c′(eˆi)
pHHei (eˆi,eˆ−i)
.
It straightforwardly follows from Lemma 2 that expected costs to implement effort eˆi for agent i –
given an effort eˆ−i of the other agent – are
Wsimci :=
pHH(eˆi, eˆ−i)
pHHei (eˆi, eˆ−i)
c′(eˆi) =
p(eˆi)
p′(eˆi)
c′(eˆi). (2.1)
2.3.2 The Wage Scheme for the Sequential Structure
In this section, we derive the wage scheme for the sequential structure, starting with the second
mover. Note that in the sequential structure, the second mover only observes the first mover’s
performance and not his effort before he decides on his own effort.8 Hence, he forms beliefs about
the first mover’s effort that have to be correct in equilibrium. The principal does neither observe
the first mover’s effort nor his performance. As the second mover learns the quality Y1 ∈ {H,L}
of the first mover’s contribution, he can update his success probabilities:
Pr[Y2|H, eˆ1, e2] = p
Hy2(eˆ1, e2)
p(eˆ1)
and Pr[Y2|L, eˆ1, e2] = p
Ly2(eˆ1, e2)
1− p(eˆ1) . (2.2)
7Note that the chosen effort needs not only be the maximizer of the agent’s profit, but also that an agent’s beliefs
have to be correct in equilibrium, i.e. the agent correctly predicts the effort level eˆ−i of his colleague. A Nash-
equilibrium in pure strategies of this game exists as the strategy space is is compact and convex and the objective
function is quasi-concave. Concerning uniqueness, we follow Mookherjee (1984) and assume that Nash-equilibrium
implementation is possible.
8We can also allow the second mover to additionally observe the effort of the first mover without changing our
results as we show in the appendix (See Proof A.).
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Moreover, the second mover can condition his effort on the observed quality. Thus, we have to
consider two incentive constraints – one for the case that the first mover’s contribution is of high
quality and one when it is of low quality:
After seeing H : eH2 ∈ argmax
e2∈I
Pr[H|H, eˆ1, e2]wH2 + Pr[L|H, eˆ1, e2]wL2 − c(e2),
After seeing L : eL2 ∈ argmax
e2∈I
wL2 − c(e2).
After observing a low quality contribution of the first mover, the second mover receives the failure
wage wL2 for sure. This implies that it is not possible to set incentives for the second mover to exert
any positive amount of effort in state L. Thus, eL2 = 0 irrespective of w
L
2 . The failure wage also
enters the incentive constraint of the second mover after having observed a high quality contribution
of the first mover. Here, we can see that setting wL2 larger than zero, decreases incentives of the
second mover in state H since Pr[L|H, eˆ1] = 1 − p(e2) decreases in e2. Taken both observations
together, we have that wL2 = 0 is optimal for the principal. Using w
L
2 = 0, the second order
conditions of the maximization problems are obviously satisfied as the cost function is strictly
convex and pHH is concave in e2. Therefore, we can derive the optimal wage for the second mover
when both agents perform well, i.e. wH2 , from the incentive constraint in state H. This yields that
wH2 =
p(eˆ1)
pHHe2 (e
H
2 ,eˆ1)
c′(eH2 ) is optimal to implement effort levels (eL2 , eH2 ), given the effort eˆ1 of the first
mover. From this we obtain the following lemma.
Lemma 3 Suppose Y(Y1, Y2) = Yc(Y1, Y2) and agents move sequentially. Then the wages for the
second mover satisfy wL2 = 0 and w
H
2 =
c′(eH2 )
p′(eH2 )
. This yields expected implementation costs for the
second mover – given an effort eˆ1 of the first mover – of Wseqc2 := p(eˆ1) p(e
H
2 )
p′(eH2 )
c′(eH2 ).
As intuition suggests, the second mover only receives a positive wage if the joint project is of high
value (like under the simultaneous structure). Compared to expected implementation costs under
the simultaneous structure (see (2.1)), however, the second agent can be easier incentivized under
the sequential structure. In order to implement the same effort for the second agent, the principal
has to pay (weakly) less under the sequential structure. This stems from the fact that the second
mover has to be incentivized only in case the first mover provided high quality. Hence, when the
second mover observes the first mover performing well, he knows that the success of the project
and thus his payment only depends on his own contribution. This means that free-riding is not
profitable for the second mover. This result is similar to the result of Winter (2005), when he
compares structures with different degrees of transparency. A more transparent structure in his
model, is a structure that allows more agents to condition their effort decision on the decision of
(more of the) other agents. He shows that it is cheaper to incentivize agents, whose decisions are
observed by (more of) the others, as it makes shirking less attractive to them. The reason for his
result is that shirking induces the later moving agents to shirk as well. Therefore, the probability
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that the project succeeds decreases even more.
The derivation of the wage scheme for the first mover is analogue to the simultaneous case. What
changes is the first mover’s belief about the second agent’s effort: He anticipates correctly that the
second mover provides effort eH2 after observing a high performance and e
L
2 = 0 after observing a
poor performance. Hence, his incentive constraint becomes
eˆ1 ∈ argmax
e1∈I
pHH(e1, eH2 )w
H
1 + (1− pHH(e1, eH2 ))wL1 − c(e1). (2.3)
It follows (analogue to the proof of Lemma 2) that the first mover’s wage if at least one agent
performs poorly is zero and if both agents perform well it is wH1 =
c′(eˆ1)
pHHe1 (eˆ1,e
H
2 )
. Hence, expected
implementation costs for the first mover are Wseqc1 = p(eˆ1)pe1 (eˆ1)c
′(eˆ1). Comparing the expected wage
payment for the first mover with the one under the simultaneous structure (see (2.1)), we see that
it is identical under both structures if the first agent’s Nash-equilibrium effort levels are identical.
Consider the first agent’s incentive constraints under both structures for fixed and equal wages: The
only difference stems from the second agent’s Nash-equilibrium effort levels eˆ2 and eH2 , respectively.
If these effort levels differ, the first agent’s effort levels differ under both structures, otherwise they
are identical. For fixed and equal wages for the second agent under both structures, eˆ2 and eH2
differ.9
2.4 Comparison of the Structures for the Case of Complements
After having derived the optimal wage scheme, the next step in solving the principal’s problem
would be to maximize the principal’s profits (expected revenues minus implementation costs) with
respect to effort – given expected implementation costs as derived in Lemma 2 and 3, respectively.
We do not derive these optimal effort levels, but compare the problems for the sequential and
simultaneous structure to make statements about the optimal information structure.
The principal’s maximization problem for the sequential structure is
max
e1∈I,eH2 ∈I
2pHH(e1, eH2 )pi −
p(e1)
p′(e1)
c′(e1)− p(e1) p(e
H
2 )
p′(eH2 )
c′(eH2 ),
and for the simultaneous structure it is
max
e1∈I,e2∈I
2pHH(e1, e2)pi − p(e1)
p′(e1)
c′(e1)− p(e2)
p′(e2)
c′(e2).
Comparing these two problems, we see that for all effort pairs (e1, e2) the expected profit function
for the sequential structure cannot lie below the one for the simultaneous structure since p(e1) ≤ 1.
Hence, the two functions never (strictly) cross and the maximum of the expected profit function
9In principle, it is possible that the principal implements eˆ2 = e
H
2 (and thus wages differ for the second agent
under both structures), but in general, as we will see in Section ??, the implemented effort levels differ.
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for the sequential structure has to lie above the one for the simultaneous structure. It follows that
– in general – the principal implements different effort levels under both structures (at least for one
of the two agents). Thus, we have the following proposition.
Proposition 17 Suppose Y(Y1, Y2) = Yc(Y1, Y2). Then the sequential structure leads to higher ex-
pected profits than the simultaneous structure given the optimal wage schemes and efforts. Expected
profits are strictly higher if (eH2 , e2) 6= (0, 0).
Intuitively, this can be explained as follows. Under the sequential structure, the principal pays a
wage of zero and the second mover exerts no effort when the first agent provided low quality. This
saves implementation costs, but does not decrease revenues since high quality contributions from
both agents are needed to generate the revenue pi. As already mentioned in Section 2.3.2, the fact
that the second mover only needs to be incentivized in case the first mover’s contribution is of high
quality, enables the principal to better incentivize him.
The only possibility that both structures do equally good is that it is optimal to implement zero
effort for the second agent under both structures, i.e. eH2 = e
L
2 = e2 = 0. This means that for
the sequential structure to do strictly better than the simultaneous one, the principal necessarily
tailors the second mover’s efforts to the quality states under the sequential structure (i.e. he sets
eH2 6= eL2 = 0) as otherwise eH2 = e2 = 0.
This result confirms the result by Winter (2005) in a model with a binary effort decision: Winter
finds that the principal always (weakly) gains from a more transparent structure (a structure that
allows more agents to observe more of their predecessors). In Winter’s model, however, the agents’
efforts are complementary and not the quality of the individual contributions to the joint project.
Hence, Winter does not consider different “values” of the joint project. When contributions are
complements in our model, our results are thus similar to Winter as the project is of no value if at
least one agent fails to contribute high quality. For a model of team production with synergy effects,
Goldfain (2006) provides numerical results that are similar: If efforts are strategic complements, a
sequential structure is beneficial for the principal. For the case of independent success probabilities
(which we consider in the current paper), the result that the sequential structure cannot be worse
than the simultaneous structure is also present in Ludwig and Nafziger (2006) with two agents,
who do not form a team. Independent success probabilities imply that the output is uninformative
in Ludwig and Nafziger.10
Moreover, we can relate this result to the literature on contests, where the reward for the winning
agent is exogenously given. Morgan (2004) compares simultaneous and sequential moves of contes-
tants in a model with complete information about the players’ types. He shows that from an ex
10In Ludwig and Nafziger (2006), we consider also dependent success probabilities. For dependent success proba-
bilites, it is possible (when output is informative) that a simultaneous structure is optimal.
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ante perspective a sequential structure even Pareto dominates a simultaneous one. With private
information about the players’ types this result can be extended if types are sufficiently negatively
correlated. The principal, however, always prefers the sequential structre (see Ludwig (2006)). In
a tournament model with risk averse agents, Jost (2001) finds that for optimal prizes, the principal
prefers a sequential structure.
Hence, the finding that a sequential structure is (weakly) beneficial for the principal seems to be
quite robust across different types of models. In the following section, we show that this is no
longer the case, when the agents’ contributions are substitutes.
2.5 Contributions are Substitutes
We now turn to the analysis for the case that agents’ contributions are perfect substitutes in the
principal’s production function. The difference to perfect complements is that a contribution of
low quality of a single agent does not necessarily lead to a value of zero of the team’s project. If
the other agent performs well, the project is still of some strictly positive value. This means that
the project can generate revenues for the principal although one agent performed poorly. This
implies that the principal can distinguish a complete failure of the team (i.e. both agents provide
low quality) from the case that only one agent fails to provide high quality. In the latter case he
cannot, however, observe which agent provides high and which one low quality, respectively: The
principal does not observe individual performances, but the joint output Ys(Yi, Y−i) =
∑
i Yi. This
change implies that the wage scheme offered differs from the case of complements as it now specifies
three wages w(Ys) = {wLi , wMi , wHi } for each agent i.
2.5.1 The Wage Scheme for the Simultaneous Structure
Like for the case of complements, we begin by considering the first part of the principal’s maximiza-
tion problem. In the following section, we derive the optimal wage scheme for the simultaneous
structure to implement any desired effort level (eˆi, eˆ−i). As before, the problem of the principal is
to minimizing the wage payments to the agents, subject to the incentive, participation and limited
liability constraints. Analogue to the analysis with complements, we can drop the participation
constraints and restrict to the limited liability and incentive constraints. Again, we can set the
failure wages equal to zero (wLi = 0 for i = 1, 2). Hence, the problem of the principal is:
max
wHi ,w
M
i
−
∑
i
pHH(eˆi, eˆ−i)wHi −
∑
i
[pHL(eˆi, eˆ−i) + pLH(eˆi, eˆ−i)]wMi
s.t. eˆi ∈ argmax
ei∈I
pHH(ei, eˆ−i, )wHi +
[
pHL(ei, eˆ−i) + pLH(ei, eˆ−i)
]
wMi − c(ei) ∀i
s.t. wYsi ≥ 0 ∀i, ∀Ys(Yi, Y−i).
In the appendix, we show that the solution to the principal’s problem is as follows.
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Lemma 4 Suppose Y(Yi, Y−i) = Ys(Yi, Y−i) and agents move simultaneously. To implement effort
level eˆi, the wage for agent i if both agents or only one of them performs poorly is equal to zero, i.e.
wLi = 0 and w
M
i = 0. The optimal wage if both agents provide high quality is w
H
i =
c′(eˆi)
pHHei (eˆi,eˆ−i)
.
In line with our result for complementary contributions in Lemma 2, only the wage if the joint
project has a high value can be positive in the simultaneous setting with substitutes. The intuition
for this result is that if agents are paid a positive wage in case only one of them performs well, each
agent will try to free-ride on the other agent’s effort as agents work in a team and the principal
cannot observe which agent performs well. Therefore, it cannot be optimal to implement some
kind of relative performance scheme by setting wMi > 0. The literature on tournaments uses
relative performance schemes to create incentives but, in general, the wage scheme is exogenously
given in this literature. In Ludwig and Nafziger (2006), with two agents, who do not work in a
team, the optimal wage scheme can be one of relative performance payment contingent upon the
informativeness of the colleague’s output about an agent’s effort.11 With two agents, who do not
form a team, the principal can observe which agent contributes high quality and hence only pay
this agent. This counteracts free-riding and can make relative performance schemes profitable.
It follows from Lemma 4 that the expected wage payment for agent i is
Wsimsi =
p(eˆi)
p′(eˆi)
c′(eˆi). (2.4)
The expected wage equals the expected wage Wsimci when contributions are complements and
agents move simultaneously. Hence, contribution complementarities make no difference for the
wage scheme when agents move simultaneously. Winter (2005), in contrast, finds that with effort
instead of performance complementarities, the optimal wage scheme differs. This is due to the fact
that with complementary efforts implicit incentives are more effective in his model compared to the
case of substitutes. This change in incentives is not present in our model. Irrespective of whether
contributions are substitutes or complements, the agents’ efforts are complements in Winter’s sense.
In Winter’s model, efforts are complements when an agent’s effort is more effective, the more of
his colleagues exert effort.12 In our model this means that the cross derivative of pHH(ei, e−i) is
positive, which is satisfied by assumption.
11As mentioned earlier, the case of independent success probabilities, we consider in the current paper, implies
that output is uninformative in Ludwig and Nafziger (2006). For this case, the optimal wage scheme can be one of
relative performance payment.
12Winter (2005) considers a binary effort choice and multiple agents.
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2.5.2 The Wage Scheme for the Sequential Structure
In the sequential setting, the second mover again learns the quality Y1 ∈ {H,L} of the first mover
(like in Section 2.3.2).13 He updates his success probabilities as given in (2.2) and can condition his
effort on the observed quality. By an analogue argument as for complements, it is optimal to set
an agent’s wage equal to zero in case both agents fail (i.e. wLi = 0). Thus, the incentive constraints
for the second mover are as follows (where we already used wLi = 0):
After seeing H : eH2 ∈ argmax
e2∈I
Pr[H|H, eˆ1, e2]wH2 + Pr[L|H, eˆ1, e2]wM2 − c(e2),
After seeing L : eL2 ∈ argmax
e2∈I
Pr[H|L, eˆ1, e2]wM2 − c(e2).
The crucial change compared to the case of complements is that the principal can set incentives for
the second mover in state L. By setting wM2 > 0, he can implement a positive effort for the second
mover. Note that this decreases incentives in state H: The probability that the second mover fails
to provide high quality given that the first mover succeeded decreases in the second mover’s effort.
Later, we also ask when it is optimal to implement eL2 > 0.
As the second mover’s maximization problem in state L is strictly concave in e2, the first order
condition – wM2 =
c′(eL2 )
p′(eL2 )
– yields a global maximum. One can easily check (by plugging in the
conditional probabilities) that the first order condition of the agent’s maximization problem in state
H is also sufficient when wH2 ≥ wM2 . We show below that this holds in equilibrium. Plugging in
the optimal wage that is derived from state L into the latter first order condition yields the optimal
wage when the value of the project is high.
Regarding the wage scheme of the first mover, the same argument applies as for the sequential
structure in Section 2.3.2. Hence, the first mover’s wages are as for the simultaneous structure (see
Lemma 4) but with the Nash-equilibrium effort level eˆ2 of the second mover replaced by eL2 and
eH2 , respectively. In the appendix, we derive the optimal wages as follows.
Lemma 5 Suppose Y(Y1, Y2) = Ys(Y1, Y2) and agents move sequentially.
(i) For the first mover, wages if at least one agent contributes low quality are zero: wM1 = wL1 = 0.
When the value of the joint project is high, the wage satisfies wH1 =
c′(eˆ1)
pHHe1 (eˆ1,e
H
2 )
.
(ii) For the second mover, the wage if the joint project fails is equal to zero wL2 = 0. If only one
agent contributes low quality, his wage is positive if the principal implements eL2 > 0 and is
then wM2 =
c′(eL2 )
p′(eL2 )
. The wage when both agents provide high quality is wH2 =
c′(eH2 )
p′(eH2 )
+ c
′(eL2 )
p′(eL2 )
.
Obviously, the second mover’s wage when the project has a high value is at least as large than the
wage when the project has an intermediate value, as we claimed above. This result is also intuitive
13Like for the case of complements in Section 2.3.2, it does not matter for our results if the second mover also
observes the first mover’s effort besides his performance. See Proof B in the appendix.
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since two high quality contributions are more valuable for the principal than only one (at least if
we abstract from implementation costs).
Note that only the second mover’s effort in state H, eH2 , influences the first mover’s incentives
since the principal sets wM1 = wL1 = 0. If also the effort in state L entered, we would have a
strategic effect in the sense of the first mover attempting to influence the action of the follower:
When deciding on his effort, the first mover takes into account that if he exerted more effort,
it would be more likely that he produces high quality and therefore, the second mover provides
effort eH2 (instead of e
L
2 if he performs poorly).
14 The optimal wage scheme, however, is such
that no strategic effect arises. This stands in contrast to the literature on sequential tournaments
– for example, Aoyagi (2003) or Ederer (2004) – where agents compete against each other (and
do not form a team). In this literature the relative performance scheme (which is comparable
to wMi > 0 in this model) is mostly exogenously given and (only) a strategic effect drives the results.
Comparing the wage scheme for the second mover under the sequential structure to the
one under the simultaneous structure, we find that the wage scheme changes: Firstly, under the
simultaneous structure (compare Lemma 4), the principal does not want to set incentives for the
case that only one agent performs well. Under the sequential structure with substitutes, however,
if he wants to implement a positive effort for the second mover in state L, he can (and has to)
set incentives in this state. Hence, the question arises whether it is optimal for the principal
to implement a strictly positive effort after a poor performance by setting wM2 > 0. In the
appendix15, we show that if the revenue parameter pi is sufficiently large (Condition Z), it is
indeed optimal to implement a strictly positive effort for agent 2 after a low quality contribution.
The second change arises irrespective of whether eL2 = 0 or not. Suppose that e
L
2 = 0, then
under the simultaneous structure, the wage for the second agent is wH2 =
c′(eˆ2)
pHHe2 (eˆ1,eˆ2)
and under the
sequential structure it is wH2 =
c′(eH2 )
pe2 (e
H
2 )
. The wage under the simultaneous structure is larger, when
the same effort for the second agent is implemented (i.e. eˆ2 = eH2 ). Intuitively, agent 2 can be
easier incentivized under the sequential structure given the first mover provided high quality since
his action is conditional on the high performance of agent 1. This ignores, however, the low state
of the world. To implement the same expected effort for agent 2 under both structures needs not
be less expensive under the sequential structure. We show this in the following section, when we
compare both information structures in more detail.
Note the difference to Winter (2005): When efforts instead of contributions are substitutes, there
is no change in the optimal wage scheme between the different information structures. We analyze
14Of course, this strategic effect does only play a role if eH2 6= eL2 .
15See Condition Z in the appendix.
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the implications of this change in the wage scheme on the optimal information structure in Section
2.6.
Moreover, we can compare the optimal wage scheme for the sequential structure with sub-
stitutes to the setting with complements. In the latter case, we have seen that the principal
cannot set incentives for the second mover when the second mover sees the first mover failing
(compare Section 2.3.2). Consequently, the second mover exerts zero effort in this state. The
optimal wage scheme for the case of complements is wH2 =
c′(eH2 )
pe2 (e
H
2 )
if the project is of high value
and otherwise zero. This scheme is identical to the one with substitutes (see Lemma 5) if and only
if the effort for the second mover after a poor performance of agent 1 is zero. Thus, when agents
move sequentially and Condition Z is satisfied, the optimal wage schemes for complements and
substitutes differ as well. In the following, we will also see how this change in the optimal wage
scheme drives the optimality of the information structures.16
2.6 Comparison of the Structures for the Case of Substitutes
As the wage schemes differ between the sequential and simultaneous structure, deriving the optimal
structure is more complicated for the case of substitutes than for the case where contributions are
complements. In particular, we cannot immediately see from the two maximization problems which
structure does better.
One way to determine the optimal structure would be to proceed with the next step of the principal’s
problem and derive the optimal effort levels. Given these values we could then compare total
profits. This comparison would yield necessary and sufficient conditions for the optimal structure.
As usual in a moral hazard problem, we skip this step and take the effort vector the principal wants
to implement – denoted by (e?1, e
?
2) for the simultaneous structure and by the triple (e
?
1, e
L?
2 , e
H?
2 )
for the sequential structure – as given. As long as we do not restrict the effort choice, these effort
levels can also involve the optimal ones.
To compare the two information scenarios, we restrict, however, the choice for one structure. More
specifically, we assume that the principal implements the same expected effort for both structures.
This means, we assume that he implements e?1 for the first mover and an expected effort of e
?
2 =
p(e?1)e
H?
2 + (1− p(e?1))eL?2 for the second mover (i.e. under the sequential structure, he implements
eH?2 after a high quality contribution and e
L?
2 after a low quality one). Thus, for example, (e
?
1, e
?
2) can
be any effort vector under the simultaneous structure (which includes the optimal one). This effort
vector determines the effort triple under the sequential structure. Since efforts under the sequential
structure are restricted by this assumption, the optimal efforts may be excluded. Therefore, the
16Remember that the wage scheme for the first agent does not change from the case of complements to substitutes.
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following analysis gives us sufficient conditions for one structure to be optimal.
When eH?2 = e
L?
2 , then not only expected efforts for the second mover, but also the effort in each
state is identical to the one under the simultaneous structure. Some of our results will depend
on whether efforts of the second mover are state-contingent or not. Therefore, we first consider
whether the principal tailors the effort of the second mover to the state of the world under the
sequential structure.
Then, we proceed as follows. We analyze for the “fixed” effort levels under which structure expected
revenues of the principal are larger. Afterwards, we examine under which structure expected wages
are lower for the first and second agent. Finally, we calculate overall profits to make statements
about the optimal structure.
2.6.1 Tailoring of Efforts
Before we compare revenues and implementation costs of the two information structures, we con-
sider an important issue regarding the sequential structure: Does the principal tailor the effort of
the second mover to the state of the world? Tailoring implies that eH2 and e
L
2 are set differently.
Concerning the case of complements, we have already seen that the principal cannot set incentives
for the second mover after a poor performance of the first mover. Hence, the second mover exerts
zero effort and the principal necessarily tailors the efforts to the state of the world as soon as he
implements any positive level of effort for the second mover. When contributions are substitutes,
the result is not obvious. For the analysis of this question when contributions are substitutes, we
make the following assumption, which is sufficient for the principal’s maximization problem to be
concave in effort:
Assumption C c′(e)p′(e) is convex in e.
Using this assumption, we show the subsequent result in the appendix.
Lemma 6 Suppose the principal wants to implement an effort of e?1 for the first mover and an
expected effort of e?2 = p(e
?
1)e
H?
2 +(1− p(e?1))eL?2 for the second mover. Let in addition Assumption
C be satisfied. Then the optimal wage scheme induces the second mover to exert more effort after
having observed a high performance of the first mover than after having observed a poor one.
Hence, the principal optimally tailors the efforts of the second mover to the state of the world
and does not set them equally given the assumptions of Lemma 6. More precisely, he induces the
second mover to work harder after a high quality contribution in the first period than after a low
quality contribution. If additionally Condition Z holds, the ranking of efforts of the second mover
is eH2 > e
L
2 > 0.
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2.6.2 Expected Revenue
When agents’ contributions are substitutes, the principal’s expected revenue under the sequential
structure – if he implements (e?1, e
L?
2 , e
H?
2 ) – is pi(2p
HH(e?1, e
H?
2 )+ p
HL(e?1, e
H?
2 )+ p
LH(e?1, e
L?
2 )). For
the simultaneous structure, we only have to replace eL?2 and e
H?
2 by e
?
2 = p(e
?
1)e
H?
2 +(1− p(e?1))eL?2 .
Using that the effort that is implemented for the first agent is the same under both structures (e?1),
the difference in expected revenues (denoted by ∆R) between the simultaneous and the sequential
structure becomes
∆R =
[
p(e?2)−
(
p(e?1)p(e
H?
2 ) + (1− p(e?1))p(eL?2 )
)]
pi.
The sign of this difference depends on the curvature of the success probability p as the following
lemma summarizes. The proof is in the appendix.
Lemma 7 Suppose Y(Y1, Y2) = Ys(Y1, Y2) and the principal wants to implement effort levels e?1
and e?2 = p(e
?
1)e
H?
2 + (1 − p(e?1))eL?2 . Then expected revenues for the simultaneous structure are
higher, strictly so if p is strictly concave and eH?2 6= eL?2 .
The first agent’s contribution is with probability p(e?1) = p(e
?
1)p(e˜2)+p(e
?
1)(1−p(e˜2)) of high quality,
where e˜2 equals eH?2 for the sequential structure and equals e
?
2 for the simultaneous structure. Hence,
we can say that agent 1 generates revenue pi for the principal when performing high. Since the
effort that is implemented for the first agent is the same under both structures (e?1), he performs
well with the same probability. Thus, expected revenues “from the first agent” are the same under
both structures. The difference in expected revenues is, therefore, exactly the difference in expected
revenues generated by the second agent. He contributes high quality with probability p(e?2) under
the simultaneous structure and with probability p(e?1)p(e
H?
2 )+(1−p(e?1))p(eL?2 ) under the sequential
structure.
The main difference between the two information settings is that under the sequential structure
efforts can be made state-contingent (by allowing eH?2 to differ from e
L?
2 ). There is no difference
in expected revenues if efforts are not tailored to the state of the world. Tailoring is, however,
optimal for the principal under Assumption C (compare Lemma 6). Lemma 7 shows that for state-
contingent efforts (eH?2 6= eL?2 ) under the sequential structure, the simultaneous structure leads to
higher expected revenues since the probability of success function is concave (strictly higher for
strict concavity and eH2 6= eL2 ). Why is this the case? Conditioning effort on the state of the
world implies that expected revenue is uncertain in effort from an ex ante perspective . Since
the individual probability of success function is concave in an agent’s effort, Jensen’s Inequality
implies that the value of the convex combination of expected revenues (having with probability
p(e?1) revenues arising from e
H
2 and with probability 1 − p(e?1) from eL2 ) is smaller than the value
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expected revenue that arises from the convex combination of efforts – i.e. e∗2.17
When the probability of success function is linear in effort, then revenues for both structures are
the same as linearity implies that the convex combination of the values is equal to the value of the
convex effort combination. Hence, conditioning effort on the state of the world does not influence
expected revenues in this case.
2.6.3 Implementation Costs for Agent 1
We now consider the implementation costs for agent 1. As we have shown in Sections 2.5.1 and
2.5.2, the expected wage payment for each structure (e?1 is implemented for the first agent under
both structures) is
W1 := pHH(e?1, e
?
2)w
H
1 =
p(e?1)
p′(e?1)
c′(e?1). (2.5)
This means that for agent 1 implementation costs are identical under both information structures
as the same effort is implemented. This result is in line with Winter (2005), who finds no difference
in wages under both structures when efforts are substitutes. Furthermore, we see from (2.5) that
the expected wage is independent of the second agent’s effort. This establishes the following lemma.
Lemma 8 Suppose Y(Y1, Y2) = Ys(Y1, Y2) and the principal implements for both structures the
same effort e?1 for the first agent. Then expected implementation costs for the first agent are equal
under both structures.
2.6.4 Implementation Costs for Agent 2
Next, we turn to the comparison of expected implementation costs for agent 2. These are under
the simultaneous structure
W sims2 := p
HH(e?2, e
?
1)w2 =
p(e?2)
p′(e?2)
c′(e?2). (2.6)
The expected wage payment for agent 2 under the sequential structure is18
W seqs2 := p(e
?
1)
p(eH?2 )
p′(eH?2 )
c′(eH?2 ) + (1− p(e?1))
(
p(eL?2 )
p′(eL?2 )
+
p(e?1)
p′(eL?2 )(1− p(e?1))
)
c′(eL?2 ). (2.7)
For the comparison of expected implementation costs for agent 2, we again use Assumption C.
Under this assumption, expected implementation costs for agent 1 and 2 are convex as we show in
17For dependent success probabilities this “uncertainty effect” may be outweighed by an informational effect the
sequential structure provides as is shown in Ludwig and Nafziger (2006): It might pay in terms of expected revenues
to condition the second agent’s effort on the state of the world (the quality of the first agent) since this state of the
world contains information about the second agent’s success probability conditional on this state.
18Note that wM2 is paid if exactly one agent provides high quality and the other one low quality.
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the appendix (see Proof C).19
Comparing expected implementation costs for agent 2, we can derive the following lemma. The
proof is in the appendix.
Lemma 9 Suppose Y(Y1, Y2) = Ys(Y1, Y2) and the principal implements e?1 and e?2 = p(e?1)eH?2 +
(1 − p(e?1))eL?2 . Let Assumption C be satisfied, then the simultaneous structure has lower expected
implementation costs for agent 2. 20 They are strictly lower if
(i) efforts for the second mover are state-dependent: eL?2 6= eH?2 ,
(ii) the effort implemented in state L is strictly positive: eL?2 > 0.
Regarding part (i), recall that we have shown (Lemma 6) that state dependent efforts are optimal
when agents move sequentially, Assumption C holds, and the principal implements the same
expected effort for agent 2 under both information structures. Concerning part (ii), we have seen
before, that the principal optimally implements a strictly positive effort for the second mover in
the low state of the world if condition Z is satisfied.
Furthermore, note that any effort vector (e?1, e
L?
2 , e
H?
2 ) implemented under the sequen-
tial structure (including the optimal one), can be implemented in expectation (e?1 and
e?2 = p(e
?
1)e
L?
2 + (1 − p(e?1))eL?2 ) at (strictly) lower expected implementation costs under the
simultaneous structure. These efforts need, however, not be optimal for the simultaneous
structure. Regarding optimal effort levels (i.e. profit-maximizing efforts), we cannot conclude
here, which structure leads to lower implementation costs without knowing the optimal efforts.
There are two driving forces behind the result that the simultaneous structure leads to
strictly lower expected implementation costs: state-dependent efforts for the second mover (part
(i) of Lemma 9) and – more importantly – a change in the feasible wage scheme when a strictly
positive effort is implemented for the second mover in state L (part (ii) of Lemma 9). The latter
effect is due to the change in incentives for the second agent under the sequential structure. The
principal has to pay agent 2 a positive wage in both states of the world (to induce a positive effort
in both states), whereas under the simultaneous structure he only pays a positive wage if the value
of the joint project is high.
Under the simultaneous structure, expected implementation costs are the costs to implement the
convex effort combination e?2 = p(e
?
1)e
H?
2 + (1 − p(e?1))eL?2 . In order to compare these costs to the
ones under the sequential structure, let first eL?2 = e
H?
2 = e
?
2, i.e. efforts are not state-contingent.
19We could rewrite our results for concave expected implementation costs. We believe, however, that convex
implementation costs are the most relevant case and restrict to this case in the following.
20In the appendix, we show that Assumption C implies that p(e)
p′(e) c
′(e) is strictly convex (see Proof C).
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Comparing (2.6) and (2.7) for this case, we see that costs under the sequential structure equal the
costs under the simultaneous structure plus an additional non-negative cost term p(e
?
1)
p′(eL?2 )
c′(eL?2 ).
This additional term results from the change in the wage scheme: As soon as the principal
implements a positive effort for the second mover after a poor performance of the first mover,
implementation costs for agent 2 are strictly higher under the sequential structure if the principal
does not tailor the efforts.
Suppose now, the principal tailors the second mover’s effort to the (ex ante uncertain) state of the
world, i.e. eL?2 6= eH?2 (compare Lemma 6). The expected effort of agent 2 is, however, the same
as under the simultaneous structure. Can tailoring reduce expected implementation costs? With
tailoring, expected implementation costs under the sequential structure (compare (2.7)) consist
of two parts again: One part is again the additional cost term p(e
?
1)
p′(eL?2 )
c′(eL?2 ). The other part is
the convex combination of the costs that would arise if eH?2 and e
L?
2 had been implemented under
the simultaneous structure. Dropping the additional term – but noting that this additional term
is non-negative and therefore, cannot decrease costs – Jensen’s Inequality implies that expected
implementation costs under the simultaneous structure are strictly lower (given strict convexity
of p(e)p′(e)c
′(e), which follows from Assumption C). Hence, convex implementation costs cannot be
reduced by tailoring the effort to the state of the world, but are even further increased.
It is important to note that our result of lower implementation costs for the simultaneous structure
does not only hinge on this “convexity effect”. The crucial difference between the simultaneous
and sequential structure that drives our result, stems from the change in the feasible wage
scheme (paying a positive wage in state L) as we have seen above: Irrespective of whether the
principal tailors or does not tailor the second mover’s effort to the state of the world, expected
implementation costs are higher under the sequential structure because of the change in the
feasible wage scheme (as long as eL?2 > 0).
Ludwig and Nafziger (2006) find for two agents, who do not work in a team, that even if success
probabilities are dependent – which leads to an informational gain under the sequential structure
– the negative effect of the change in the feasible wage scheme (paying a positive wage after a low
quality contribution) under the sequential structure prevails.
2.6.5 Overall Effect
From the analysis in the previous sections, we can derive the following general result for the overall
effect of the information setting on expected profits by combining Lemma 7, 8 and 9.
Proposition 18 Suppose Y(Y1, Y2) = Ys(Y1, Y2) and p(e)p′(e)c′(e) is convex. Then any effort vector
(e1, eL2 , e
H
2 ) implemented under the sequential structure (including the optimal effort vector) yields
higher expected profits when implemented in expectation under the simultaneous structure. Expected
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profits are strictly higher if
(i) p(e)p′(e)c
′(e) is strictly convex and eL2 6= eH2
(ii) p is strictly concave and eL2 6= eH2
(iii) eL2 > 0.
This implies that any effort vector (e1, eL2 , e
H
2 ) implemented under the sequential structure (includ-
ing the optimal effort vector) leads to higher expected profits when implemented in expectation (i.e.
e1, e2 = p(e1)eH2 + (1 − p(e1))eL2 ) under the simultaneous structure (if Assumption C is satisfied).
The latter efforts need, however, not be optimal under the simultaneous structure. With optimal
efforts, the simultaneous structure can only do better but not worse. Therefore, the result also
holds true for optimal efforts.
Using the results of the previous sections, the finding can be explained as follows. On the one hand,
if the principal implements eL2 = 0, then there is no difference in the feasible wage schemes of both
information structures. The principal pays each agent only a positive wage if the value of the team
project is high. Hence, it is not the wage scheme effect that drives the result but the revenue effect.
If eL2 = 0, and a positive effort is implemented for the second mover after a high performance of
the first mover, the principal tailors the efforts to the state of the world. This reduces revenues
compared to the simultaneous structure since the probability of success function is concave. On
the other hand, if the principal implements eL2 > 0, then the change in the wage scheme makes the
sequential structure less attractive. The principal has to reward the second agent also after a low
quality contribution in the first stage, whereas under the simultaneous structure he only pays him if
both agents perform well.21 Compared to the case when eL2 = 0, tailoring is less “strong” now: The
same expected effort for the second mover can be implemented with a smaller gap between eL2 and
eH2 if e
L
2 is positive. Regarding expected revenues, this leads to a less pronounced negative effect.
The driving force for the sequential structure performing worse than the simultaneous structure
is, therefore, the wage scheme. Hence, irrespective of whether the principal implements a positive
effort for the second mover or not, one of the two effects reduces expected profits when agents move
sequentially compared to the simultaneous structure.
In contrast, when contributions are complements, the sequential structure does (strictly) better
than the simultaneous one when contributions are substitutes. The intuition is the following:
When agents move sequentially and contributions are complements, the principal still rewards the
21Note that as soon as the principal implements eL2 > 0, the wage scheme for the sequential structure also differs
compared to the one for the sequential structure with complements. This is similar to Winter (forthcoming), who
finds a change in the wage scheme when the production technology possesses either increasing or decreasing returns
to scale given a sequential structure.
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second agent only if both agents perform well. He cannot set incentives after a low quality con-
tribution in the first period. Hence, there is no change in the feasible wage scheme between both
information structures. Zero effort of the second mover after a poor performance of the first mover
here decreases implementation costs. Moreover, the aforementioned negative revenue effect is not
present here as revenue is only generated if both agents contribute high quality. The fact that the
second agent exerts zero effort after a low quality contribution in the first period does not matter
for revenues. Revenues may even be positively influenced if the effort of the second agent after a
high performance in the first period under the sequential structure is higher than the second agent’s
effort under the simultaneous structure depending on the effort of the first agent (2p(e1)p(eH2 )pi
versus 2p(eˆ1)p(eˆ2)pi). Overall, the sequential structure outperforms, therefore, the simultaneous
structure if contributions are complements.
2.7 Extension
Up to now, we considered special examples for contributions being perfect substitutes or perfect
complements. We now extend the preceding analysis to more general cases.
The value of the joint project is Y(Y1, Y2). If the quality of an agent’s contribution is more effective,
the higher the quality of the other agent’s contribution, i.e. Y(H,H)−Y(H,L) > Y(L,H)−Y(L,L),
the qualities of the agents’ contributions are complements. Accordingly, if Y(H,H) − Y(H,L) ≤
Y(L,H)− Y(L,L) the qualities of the agents’ contributions are substitutes.
We assume that it does not matter for the value of the project, which agent provides low or high
quality. Hence, there is exactly one intermediate value of the project Y(H,L) = Y(L,H) =M.22
Moreover, we assume that the values of the project satisfy H = Y(H,H) ≥M ≥ Y(L,L), and we
normalize the value of the project if both agents provide low quality to zero (L = Y(L,L) = 0).
These assumptions imply that qualities of the individual contributions are complements if H > 2M
and otherwise substitutes.
Note that in Section 2.3, we analyzed perfect complements with H = 1 and M = L = 0 and in
Section 2.5 perfect substitutes with H = 2, M = 1, L = 0.
We begin with the analysis of the general case of substitutes, i.e. H ≤ 2M, where H ≥M ≥ 0. It is
important to note that there is no change regarding the feasible wage scheme for both information
structures compared to the special case in Section 2.5. Only expected revenues are influenced. For
the analysis of expected revenues, we proceed exactly like in Section 2.6.2. This means, the principal
implements the same expected effort for agent 2 under both information structures and the same
effort for agent 1. When the principal implements (e?1, e
L?
2 , e
H?
2 ) under the sequential structure,
22Note that otherwise, it would be possible for the principal to infer from the projects value, which agent provided
low or high quality. Thus, the team production problem would resolve.
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expected revenues are pi[pHH(e?1, e
H?
2 )H + (pHL(e?1, eH?2 ) + pLH(e?1, eL?2 ))M]. For the simultaneous
structure, we only have to replace eL?2 and e
H?
2 by e
?
2 = p(e
?
1)e
H?
2 + (1 − p(e?1))eL?2 . Hence, we can
write the difference in expected revenues between the simultaneous and the sequential structure as
follows:
∆R = pi
[
p(e?1)(H−M)
(
p(e?2)− p(eH?2 )
)
+ (1− p(e?1))M
(
p(e?2)− p(eL?2 )
)]
. (2.8)
By Jensen’s Inequality, we know that p(e?2) ≥ p(e?1)p(eH?2 )+(1−p(e?1))p(eL?2 ) (with strict inequality
for strict concavity of p). Using this and simplifying, we get
∆R ≥ pi[p(e?1)(1− p(e?1))(2M−H)
(
p(eH?2 )− p(eL?2 )
)
]. (2.9)
Since 2M−H ≥ 0, the difference in expected revenues is non-negative (strictly positive for p strictly
concave and for 2M−H > 0), as long as eH?2 ≥ eL?2 . Hence, if it is optimal for the principal to
implement a (weakly) larger effort in state H, results are the same as for the special case analyzed
in Section 2.5: Any effort vector implemented under the sequential structure yields higher expected
profits when implemented in expectation under the simultaneous structure (compare Proposition
18). As we show in the appendix (see Proof G), it need, however, no longer be optimal to implement
a higher effort in state H. In case it is optimal to implement a higher effort in state L, it can be
that the sequential structure does better than the simultaneous one. The revenue effect works in
favor of the sequential structure, but the wage scheme effect (which is like in Section 2.5) works
still in favor of the simultaneous structure.
Consider now the general case of complements, i.e. H > 2M with M > 0. Here, not only the rev-
enue effect might change, but the optimal wage scheme changes for the sequential structure changes
as well (compared to the special case in Section 2.3). Since there are now three possible values of
the project, the optimal wage scheme looks exactly like for the case of substitutes. Remember that
the only difference between the case of complements and the one of substitutes when deriving the
optimal wage scheme was that the project could take two or three different values, respectively.
This wage scheme effect works against the sequential structure (as we have seen already when
analyzing substitutes in Section 2.5). Regarding expected revenues, there is also a crucial change
compared to the special case. In Section 2.3, we have seen that the difference in expected revenues
does not depend on the effort of the second mover in state L. This is no longer true for the general
case. The difference in expected revenues is now given by (2.8). We can again infer from inequality
(2.9) in which direction the revenue effect works. Since for complements H > 2M, the difference
in expected revenues becomes negative for eH?2 > e
L?
2 . Thus, if it is still optimal to implement a
higher effort for the second mover in the high state of the world, the revenue effect works in favor
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of the sequential structure.23 We show in the appendix (see Proof G) that this still holds given
Assumption C (i.e. Lemma 6 still applies for the case of complements). If the negative effect of the
change in the wage scheme is outweighed by the positive revenue effect, the sequential structure
can, therefore, lead to higher profits for the principal. But otherwise the simultaneous structure
becomes optimal even for the case of complements.
2.8 Discussion
Contrary to our result that intermediate information is rather disadvantageous when contributions
are substitutes, Winter (2005) finds that observability (i.e. the sequential structure) always yields
higher expected profits: when efforts are complements as well as when they are substitutes.24 What
drives the different result? Intuitively, if we take intermediate values of the project into account,
the second agent’s incentives decrease if the principal pays a positive wage for the intermediate
outcome. Since the principal does not know which agent provided high or low quality, he always
pays the wage if exactly one agent performed poorly. Therefore, the second mover gets for sure
a positive wage when the first agent provided high quality. In Winter, there is no difference in
the wage scheme between the different information structures when efforts are substitutes and
the project cannot take intermediate values. Hence, the negative effect on the sequential setting
stemming from the change in the wage scheme – that we observe – is not present. Furthermore,
also the revenue effect does not arise (only a successful project generates a payoff, there is no
intermediate value). Concerning the free-riding problem within teams, our results thus imply that
intermediate observation (or more transparency) does not necessarily work in favor of the principal
as it has been shown by Winter. This result is similar to Goldfain (2006). She presents numerical
results for an R&D model, which suggest that when agents’ efforts are strategic substitutes, the
performance of the team does not increase under the sequential structure.
Lizzeri et al. (2002) derive in a related setting that it is not optimal to provide an agent with
intermediate information. They consider a moral hazard model with a single agent, who works for
two periods, and either receives intermediate information about his performance (corresponding to
the sequential structure considered here) or does not receive it (corresponding to the simultaneous
structure). In contrast to our result, providing intermediate information can never be optimal in
their setting as there are no informational gains from it. Like in our paper, a comparable change
in the wage scheme is the driving force that turns intermediate information disadvantageous. The
23Remember that for the special case considered in Section 2.3, the second mover always exerted zero effort in the
low state of the world.
24Winter finds that when efforts are substitutes, the effect is less strong.
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same expected effort can be implemented at lower cost if no intermediate information is provided.25
A change in the feasible wage scheme between the settings, in which either intermediate information
is available or not, is also crucial for the results in Ludwig and Nafziger (2006). When the feasible
wage scheme does not necessarily change (i.e. the same wage scheme can be optimal as well), a
sequential structure is optimal (i.e. intermediate information is available), otherwise a simultaneous
structure can also be optimal.
Moreover, Schmitz (2005) finds similar effects than we do. He analyzes whether integration (i.e. one
agent is in charge for two production stages) or separation (i.e. two different agents are responsible
for stage one and two) is optimal in sequential production processes. Consider first the case that the
principal wants to implement zero effort after a poor performance in the first period (like in the case
of complementary contributions) and high effort after a high performance in the first period. Under
separation, each of the two agents receives a positive wage if performance in both stages is high.
Integration, however, is cheaper. As Schmitz shows, under integration it suffices to pay the agent
a wage to induce effort in the second stage. The agent works hard in the first period since by not
working hard he loses the chance to receive the positive wage. Hence, it is a cost-saving argument
that drives the result like we have seen for the case of complements. If the principal, however,
wants to implement high effort after a poor performance in the first period as well, the result in
Schmitz changes as it does with substitutes in our case: It becomes more expensive to induce a
single agent to work hard irrespective of the first-period outcome than it is under separation.
2.9 Conclusion
In this paper, we analyze whether it is profitable for the principal if he instructs his two agents
– who are responsible for a joint project – to work simultaneously or sequentially. If agents work
sequentially, the second mover (but not the principal) can observe the quality of the contribution
of the first mover. Hence, the second mover can condition his effort on the first mover’s outcome.
The value of the joint project depends on the qualities of the two agents’ contributions. These
contributions can be either complements or substitutes. When the agents’ contributions are perfect
complements, the project is of no value as soon as one agent provides low quality. Only if both
agents perform well, the joint project succeeds. In case the agents’ contributions are substitutes,
however, the joint project takes a strictly positive value also if only one agent provides high quality.
We find that when contributions are perfect substitutes, it is optimal to instruct the agents to work
simultaneously. When contributions are perfect complements, however, the sequential structure is
optimal. The reason for this change is that between the two information settings a change in the
feasible wage scheme can arise when contributions are substitutes: If agents act sequentially, the
25Lizzeri et al. (2002) abstract from revenue effects.
68
principal has to pay a positive wage to the agent 2 not only if the realized value of the project
is high but also if it has an intermediate value (if he wants to implement a positive effort for the
agent 2 in the low state of the world). When contributions are perfect complements, however, the
principal cannot set incentives in the low state of the world. Therefore, the second mover exerts no
effort, when the first mover performed poorly. This reduces wage payments for the principal, but
does not reduce his expected revenues. A zero effort after observing low quality of the first mover
does not reduce revenues when the project is only of some positive value if both agents perform
well. In this case, expected revenues are not influenced by the effort the second mover exerts in
the low state of the world.
The change in the feasible wage scheme when contributions are substitutes, however, only matters
if the principal implements a strictly positive effort for the second mover under the sequential
structure. It can be optimal for the principal to implement zero effort. Although there is no effect
on the feasible wage scheme in this case, there is a negative revenue effect. In contrast to the case
of complements, the effort the second mover exerts in the low state of the world influences expected
revenues: The joint project is of some positive value also if only one agent provides high quality.
Thus, allowing for different values of the project works against the principal under the sequential
structure. The finding that providing intermediate information is disadvantageous is new to the
literature in this context. Of course, if one adds informational gains that arise in the sequential
structure (e.g. dependent success probabilities), the sequential structure might gain an advantage
over the simultaneous structure. Then, depending upon which of the opposing effects is larger,
either the sequential or the simultaneous structure will be optimal.
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Chapter 3
My and Your Bias – What Do You
Know About Them?1
3.1 Introduction
Knowledge about other people’s attributes is important in many economic situations. Imagine you
hire a manager, give him a perfectly designed incentive contract, and after some time you wonder
why things go wrong in your firm. The manager may have invested in too risky projects, made
insensible acquisitions or hired wrong people. What went wrong – according to your incentive
contract he shouldn’t have done all these things! Well, maybe you did not know that your manager
is overconfident. We are interested in whether people know that biases like overconfidence exist in
the population.
Overconfidence can be defined and measured in different ways. On the one hand, one can define
overconfidence in own knowledge or ability or one can define it as being too optimistic regarding
the own performance (“optimistic overconfidence”), which does not necessarily depend on own
knowledge. An example of “optimistic overconfidence” is that people assess the likelihood that
they get divorced too optimistically. On the other hand, overconfidence can refer to absolute
abilities as well as to relative abilities, i.e. people make assessments either regarding their own
ability or regarding their ability compared to other people’s ability (like estimating their rank
or percentile in a distribution). Much of the evidence for overconfidence comes from calibration
studies by psychologists, in which subjects make probability judgements, e.g., that their answer to
a question is correct. People’s confidence often exceeds their actual accuracy (for a review of this
literature see Yates (1990)). Besides being poorly calibrated, people also state confidence intervals
that are too narrow.
The fact that individuals are overconfident – in the sense that they overestimate their absolute or
1This chapter is based on joint work with Julia Nafziger.
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relative abilities – is confirmed by economists (see e.g. Camerer and Lovallo (1999) or Hoelzl and
Rustichini (2005)), who also point out that the presence of overconfident individuals in economic
settings has far going implications. For example, if you know that your opponent or employee is
overconfident you should adjust your behavior in contests accordingly (Ando (2004) or Santos-Pinto
(2005b)), write different incentive contracts (Santos-Pinto (2005a) or De La Rosa (2005)), or choose
different strategies in Bertrand and Cournot Competition (Englmaier (2004) or Eichberger et al.
(2005)). Malmendier and Tate (2005a, 2005b) observe that managers are indeed overconfident
and that this characteristic is a disadvantage to the firm, whereas in Kyle and Wang (1997), for
example, overconfidence is unilaterally beneficial.
The cornerstone of all these models is that people know that other people have a bias. In some
models it is also important that people know whether they have a bias themselves and that they
know about the relation of these biases (and that all this is common knowledge). Suppose you do
not know that others are overconfident. Why should you behave differently in a contest if you
have no idea that your opponent is overconfident? Why would you write a non-standard incentive
contract if you have no idea that your manager is overconfident? Why do you hire overconfident
managers in case this is a disadvantage for your firm – don’t you know that they have a bias?
The aim of our experiment is to examine what people know about such biases: Are individuals
aware that others have a bias in assessing their (absolute) abilities? What do they think about
the relation of their and other people’s biases? Are there some hints that they know about their
own bias and correct for it?
Since overconfidence is a common phenomenon, we consider a bias that is one possible in-
terpretation of overconfidence: over-or underestimation of one’s absolute ability. Subjects assess
their number of correct answers to a set of questions, which means they assess their absolute
ability in this task. In contrast to calibration studies, we cannot claim that a subject is biased
when her self-assessment is wrong, she might just make a mistake. If a group of subjects, however,
tends to either over- or underestimate their abilities (i.e. their mistakes do not cancel out), we can
say that the group is biased.
In order to avoid to influence people in their reasoning (and thus, their choice) by asking them
the questions what they think about biases explicitly, we construct simple decision problems to
elicit beliefs. Moreover, we conduct another treatment to see whether choices differ, when subjects
face either these decision problems or the explicit questions. To analyze the effects of such framed
instructions (i.e. asking the subjects explicitly) compared to the neutral way (i.e. the decision
problems) is – besides the two questions above – another topic of our paper. So far, relatively little
research in the overconfidence field considers whether asking subjects directly (as psychologist do
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it) changes behavior. For an overview on framing effects in other fields see Rabin (1998). Asking
people directly whether others over- or underestimate or correctly estimate their abilities might
cause that people become aware of problems like over- or underestimation. Therefore, subjects
may adjust their beliefs or people may start to overrate the relevance of wrong estimates. This
may lead to “over-adjustment” of beliefs.
The design of our basic experiment is as follows. At first, subjects in the reference treatment (
R) answer seven general knowledge questions (multiple choice) – we refer to these subjects as
Rs in the following. Then, the Rs choose an action, where the optimal choice depends on R’s
belief about her number of correctly answered questions. Subjects in another treatment ( T ) are
informed about the questions (not the correct answers) the Rs had to answer and the ‘average
action’ the Rs have chosen. This average action reflects the Rs’ average assessment of their
number of correctly answered questions. Given this information, subjects in T have a choice
between three actions. The chosen action reveals whether subjects in T think the Rs are either
underconfident, rational or overconfident. Further, subjects in T choose a number reflecting their
belief about the true average number of correct answers of the Rs.
Besides this baseline treatment we explore several extensions. In the first one, subjects in T
answer the questions themselves and assess their own number of correct answers before evaluating
the Rs. This does not only give subjects a better feeling for the plausibility of the estimate of
others, but also enables us to compare the own bias of a subject and the belief about the bias of
others (the Rs): Do people, who are more biased themselves, also think that others are more
likely to be biased or is it just the other way round? In another extension we test (as mentioned
above) the impact of using a non-neutral language in the instructions. Furthermore, we consider
whether subjects could be forced to recognize that the Rs are biased. To analyze this issue, we
let the Rs answer very tricky questions instead of the hard ones, and subjects in T also see
the correct answers to the tricky questions before they judge the Rs. These tricky questions are
designed in a way to increase subject’s confidence that they answered correctly but are in fact
wrong with their answer (i.e. the correct answer is rather surprising). Lastly, we confront subjects
in T not with the average guess of the Rs, but with single Rs. By doing so, we can infer whether
subjects know that others make mistakes (these mistakes need not be systematic as they need to
be to form a bias), even though they do not know that others are biased. In this treatment, we
apply the strategy method to elicit the beliefs of subjects given any possible belief R can have.
Concerning relative biases, we add in several of the above treatments an additional decision
problem. Here, subjects evaluate the relation of their own bias or mistakes and the average bias
of the subjects in the reference treatment.
We observe that there are different types of subjects: Subjects who overestimate their number of
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correct answers as well as subjects who underestimate or correctly estimate it. The largest group
is – with more than 50 and up to 90 percent – the group that overestimates the own ability. Our
first result is that even if overestimation frequently occurs in the population (like previous studies
have shown), a majority of subjects does not know that others have (on average) a bias. This
result is striking as overestimation of one’s own ability seems to be such a prevalent phenomenon
in our experiment (and in the real world) that it should be self-evident that people are also aware
of it. The more familiar subjects are with a task, however, the more subjects learn that others are
on average biased. We cause this familiarity in our experiment by letting the subjects answer the
questions themselves, by framed instructions (asking the subjects explicitly as explained above) or
by letting them evaluate Rs who answered tricky questions and showing them the correct answers
to these questions.
We observe that asking subjects explicitly whether they think that others estimate their ability
correctly gives subjects a hint about the existence of erroneous self-assessments: in contrast to
the setting where subjects are confronted with the neutrally framed decision problem, more of
them recognize that others are biased. Moreover, subjects in the framed session are less biased –
indicating that the wording does not only make them recognize that others are biased, but also
that they are biased themselves (for which they then correct). Finally, when confronted with single
Rs, subjects recognize that those might make mistakes. Combining our observations indicates that
subjects think that Rs make unsystematic mistakes (which cancel out on average), but not that
these mistakes are systematic (implying that the Rs are really biased).
An important question is how subjects make their judgement of the Rs (or a single one). In
those treatments, where subjects answer the questions themselves, we see that they think that
others are similar to them: if subjects think, for example, 2 is a good guess for their own ability,
they also guess that 2 is the (average) number of correct answers of a single R (the group of
Rs). This result can be interpreted in the way that subjects show a “false consensus bias” (see
Mullen et al. (1985)): subjects’ estimates of others are biased in the direction of their own belief
about themselves. Even more interestingly, subjects think that similar2 Rs are very likely to be
correct with their choice. One possible interpretation of this finding is that a similar R is just a
projection of the own self, i.e. subjects think about themselves that they are correct.
The largest group of subjects thinks that they are themselves more likely to judge their ability
correctly than is the average population.3 This assessment of relative biases is consistent with
2“Similar” subjects in the sense that R has the same belief about the number of correct answers as the subject
in T has about herself. This can be seen in the treatment, where subjects are faced with single Rs and where we
applied the strategy method.
3Some might be surprised that the largest groups thinks that others are biased, while oneself is not, did we state
before that the majority of subjects does not know that others are biased. One should be careful here with “largest”
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observations that people are overconfident in the sense that they think they are better than the
average, where “better” in our case means to be less biased. Although this finding can be explained
by the “better-than-average” effect – or more precisely by a self-serving bias4 – it is surprising,
since “the others” represent an average here. For this average, mistakes should cancel out (in case
mistakes were just random), while for a single subject they do not.5 Furthermore, we relate this
“better-than-average” bias with the bias when assessing the own number of correct answers. The
result is that subjects, who are biased in the question task, also have a “better-than-average” bias.
The main question of our paper – what people know about about themselves and others – is also
prominent in other fields in economics and psychology like the hyperbolic discounting model, game
theory (where we especially mention beauty-contest experiments) and divorce statistics.
The hyperbolic discounting model was developed to explain time-inconsistent preferences (see, e.g.,
Laibson (1997) and O’Donoghue and Rabin (1999)). It is usually distinguished between people
who are sophisticated, which means that they know that they have a bias6, and people who are
(partially) naive, i.e. they are (partially) not aware of their bias. Empirical evidence suggests that
people are (partially) naive and not sophisticated (see, e.g., Della Vigna and Malmendier (2005)).
It seems to be an open topic for future research to examine further the degree of “partiality”.
Although, the overconfidence bias and the hyperbolic discounting bias have many conceptual
differences, we think that we contribute to this debate with our observations. Our results show
that people do not even partially know that others are biased and suggest that people are not
aware of their own bias.
The assumption that rationality of players is common knowledge is crucial for game theory and
has been tested, for example, in so called beauty-contest experiments (see, e.g., Nagel (1995),
Bosch-Domenech et al. (2002) or Ho et al. (1998)). In these experiments subjects play a game
that is solvable by iterated deletion of strictly dominated strategies. Here it is interesting to
observe how many iteration steps subjects are typically perform. The number of steps depends
and “majority”. A minority (35 percent) states that they are more likely to be correct than others, but this minority
still forms the largest group compared to those subjects who think that others are rational and they are biased
themselves (33 percent) or who think that others and they themselves are rational (32 percent).
4For a general discussion on self-serving biases see Rabin (1995).
5Svenson (1981) conducted the well-known study showing that people think they are better drivers than is an
average person. Here, it is not clear what the reference group and reference ability of agents is. In contrast to our
study, the average in Svenson is not likely to be better as there are no mistakes that could cancel out.
6They could not perfectly correct for their bias in these models because the player today and tomorrow are typically
modelled as two different players. With biases like overconfidence one typically assumes in case people “know their
bias” that they are uncertain about the exact size and direction of their bias and could hence not always perfectly
correct for it.
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on a subject’s own depth of thinking, what she knows about the depth of her opponents (“their
bias”), the relation between the two (“relative bias”) and that all of this is common knowledge.
From observing the choice of a subject, however, it cannot be fully disentangled for which reasons
this choice is made in beauty-contests: Is it her own limited depth of reasoning or that she thinks
the others do – on average – not think as many steps ahead as she does or that the others do not
know that she thinks so many steps ahead (and she either knows this or not)? Thus, we cannot
unambiguously conclude from beauty-contests what people think about other people’s reasoning
(or “bias”) or about the relation between one’s own and the others’ reasoning. As aforementioned,
we consider a much more simple decision problem without strategic interaction. We are able to
certainly identify individuals who are aware of other people’s bias and those who are not and what
people think about the relation between the own and other people’s bias.
A study by the psychologists Baker and Emery (1993) suggests that people may be better at
detecting “biases” of other people than biases of themselves. While individuals know quite
accurately the likelihood of divorces (about 50 percent of U.S. couples who marry), they have
extremely optimistic expectations assessing the likelihood that they get divorced themselves.
People think that a divorce is rather unlikely to happen to them. Although our subjects have to
go one step further in their reasoning, i.e. we ask subjects whether they think that others know
their likelihood of divorce correctly (translated to the divorce example), some of our results are
related. The finding by Baker and Emery indicates that many people think that they are “better”
than – or different from – the average. This is related to our result that subjects say that similar
subjects are unbiased, while other subjects might be biased. The phenomenon that people think
they are better than others also arises in the second part of our study, where we examine relative
biases. Here, people think that they are “better than the average” in the sense that they are less
biased. Again, one can explain this result by a self-serving bias.
In a study by Frederick (2005), subjects face questions that induce “intuitive mistakes”.
This means that the answer that comes first to one’s mind is wrong. Frederick does not aim at
analyzing what subjects think about others, but on the influence of cognitive ability on decision
making. Nevertheless, there is one similarity to our experiment. Subjects judge the difficulty
of the questions by estimating the proportion of others who answered them correctly. Those
who correctly answered the questions state that they are more difficult (as they are aware of
the possible “intuitive mistakes”) than do those who failed to answer correctly. This result is in
line with our result that more information helps subjects to realize that others are wrong. The
information in Frederick is, however, endogenous: it is only available to subjects who solved the
questions correctly. Concerning our tricky questions, subjects cannot realize the trickiness (or the
find correct answer) just by thinking a bit longer about the question.
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The issue that the type of questions that subjects answer matters for overconfidence has been
intensively investigated in the literature with different results. A well-known result is the
hard-easy effect. Lichtenstein and Fischhoff (1977), for instance, show that with easy questions
overconfidence vanishes and even turns into underconfidence. Gigerenzer (1993) claims that the
type of questions does not matter, but that it matters whether questions are randomly selected or
not. If they were selected randomly, overconfidence would vanish. Among others, Brenner et al.
(1996) show that this is not true. We do not want to add to this discussion. The tricky questions
that we use are just a means to be able to provide subjects with a strong signal (by showing them
the correct answers) that others might be wrong with their assessment.
The paper is structured as follows. In Section 3.2, we describe the experimental design for the
treatments that deal with the question whether people know that others have a bias (or make
mistakes). We first present the basic and the reference treatment, before we explain the extensions.
In Section 3.3, we derive and discuss the theoretical predictions and present the results in Section
3.4. Afterwards, in Section 3.5, we analyze the question whether subjects are aware that others
make mistakes. In Section 3.6, we consider the question what people think about their relative
bias - first presenting the design, then the predictions and finally the results. In the last section,
we conclude.
3.2 Experimental Design
The experiment was conducted at the University of Bonn. A total of 116 subjects participated
in six sessions (with 18 to 22 participants each) - one session for each treatment (T Average, T
AveragePlus, T Frame, T Individual) and one for each reference treatment (R Hard, R Tricky).
Each subject participated in only one of the treatments. Note that we refer to a subject, who
participated in one of the four T treatments, as “he” in the following and to one in the R treatments
as “she”. The experiment was programmed with the software z-Tree (Fischbacher (1999)). Subjects
have been recruited via the internet by using the software ORSEE (Online Recruitment System
for Economic Experiments) developed by Greiner (2004). The instructions7 have been read out
loudly before the experiment started and the subjects answered clarifying questions to make sure
that they understand the experimental procedure. The wording of all but one instructions (see
later) was kept neutral to avoid framing effects. We did not use terms like self-assessment, type,
overconfidence, etc. which we use in the following to describe the design. Subjects could earn
Tokens during the experiment, where 210 Tokens = 1 Euro. Average hourly earnings were 8 Euros.
7Instructions are in the appendix (translated from German).
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3.2.1 Treatment Design - The Basics (T Average and R Hard)
In our baseline treatment, T Average, 20 subjects have to state whether they think “others” are
on average overconfident, underconfident or rational. The “others” are 20 subjects (we call them
Rs or she in the following) from the reference treatment R Hard, who answered seven very hard
multiple choice questions from different fields of general knowledge. They were paid 190 Tokens
for each correct answer.8 After having answered these questions, R had to estimate her number
of correctly answered questions – we denote this estimate by q ∈ {0, 1 . . . 7} – without knowing
her true number of correctly answered questions t ∈ {0, 1 . . . 7}. The resulting payoff, pi(t, q), from
her estimate q depends on whether her guess is correct, i.e. equal to her true number of correctly
answered questions questions, or not correct:
pi(t, q) = 525− 495 1(t 6= q)
where 1(·) = 1 if and only if t 6= q and 0 otherwise. This means that R is punished if she over- or
underestimates her number of correctly answered questions t.9 As we will show later, her estimate
q should be equal to her belief about t (i.e. the t she considers as most probable). When answering
the questions, she knows that she has to make a decision later on, where her payoff depends on her
number of correctly answered questions. She does not know yet, however, the task and the relevant
payoff table. With this procedure, we avoid that Rs try to game the experiment by deliberately
giving wrong answers (e.g. by giving no answer at all) to be able to make the correct guess.10
We did not ask the Rs explicitly what they think how many questions they have answered correctly
for not influencing their choice. Instead we let them choose between eight actions and show them
the corresponding payoffs in a payoff table (see Table 3.1). From this payoff table one can easily
infer that it is optimal, for example, to choose “Action 3” if one thinks it is most probable that
one answered three questions correctly.
In the instructions for a subject in T Average (he), we explained him what the Rs had to do, how
they were paid for this and we also showed him the multiple choice questions (without indicating
the correct answers). In order to elicit whether he thinks she is over-, underconfident or rational
on average, we told him the average q (average estimate of number of correct answers) of the Rs
rounded to one decimal place, which is denoted by q¯ in the following. Similarly, we denote by t¯ the
average t (average true number of correct answers), however, he is not told t¯. Then, he has to state
8Subjects are free not to give an answer at all, which leads to a payoff of zero for this question.
9One might wonder why we did not punish more, the larger the deviation of an estimate q from t is. The answer
is that with risk averse subjects, one can then no longer be sure whether they choose the number q that equals t if
and only if they think their true number is t.
10As we pay subjects for each correctly answered question and for their estimate, this problem should be alleviated,
but we wanted to avoid such motivations completely. In fact, all subjects gave an answer to all questions.
78
Correct Answers (t)
0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7
Action 0 525 30 30 30 30 30 30 30
Action 1 30 525 30 30 30 30 30 30
Action 2 30 30 525 30 30 30 30 30
Action 3 30 30 30 525 30 30 30 30
Action 4 30 30 30 30 525 30 30 30
Action 5 30 30 30 30 30 525 30 30
Action6 30 30 30 30 30 30 525 30
Action 7 30 30 30 30 30 30 30 525
Table 3.1: Payoffs - How Many Questions Do You Think You Have Correct?
whether he thinks that t¯ is smaller than q¯ − 0.5 (which means thinking the Rs are overconfident),
that t¯ is between q¯ − 0.5 and q¯ + 0.5 (Rs are rational) or that t¯ is larger than q¯ + 0.5 (Rs are
underconfident). By adding/subtracting 0.5 we capture rounding effects and small mistakes which
remain on, even though the Rs are rational on average. A subject in T Average receives 1680
Tokens if he is correct, which means he states that the Rs are overconfident (underconfident or
rational, resp.) when they are indeed, otherwise he earns 315 Tokens. Note that we did not ask a
subject in T Average explicitly whether he thinks that the Rs are underconfident, overconfident or
rational, but gave him the choice between three actions left, middle and right. It could be inferred
from the payoff table (see Table 3.2) that it is optimal to choose, for example, action middle if one
thinks that the Rs estimated the number of questions correctly.
Moreover, a subject in T Average states how many questions he thinks the Rs answered on average
correctly, i.e. how large he thinks t¯ roughly is. For this statement, he chooses a number z out
of the set {0, 0.1, 0.2, . . . , 6.9, 7}. Of course, he could only choose a number smaller than q¯ − 0.5
if he stated before that the Rs are underconfident and correspondingly if he stated that they are
overconfident or rational, respectively. He receives 105 Tokens in case his guess z of the average
number of correct answers t¯ is almost perfect – which means that the distance between his guess z
and the true average t¯ is smaller than 0.5 – and 20 Tokens otherwise.
For the estimation of t¯ we implemented a similar procedure than before: We did not ask “How
large do you think is t¯?”, but let subjects choose a number and let them infer from the payoffs
what this choice means.
In the following sections, we describe all other treatments that extend the baseline treatment T
Average in various ways.
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Action
left middle right
t¯ < q¯ − 0.5 315 315 1680
q¯ − 0.5 ≥ t¯ ≤ q¯ + 0.5 315 1680 315
t¯ > q¯ + 0.5 1680 315 315
Table 3.2: Payoffs - Are The Others Biased?
3.2.2 Extension – Impact of Answering The Questions Oneself (T AveragePlus)
We are interested in the question whether a subject’s belief about the Rs being underconfident,
overconfident or rational is influenced, when he answers the questions himself and estimates his
own true number of correct answers. By completing these tasks he might get a better feeling for
the difficulty of the questions and whether the average guess of the Rs is realistic. Therefore, in the
treatment T AveragePlus, 17 subjects answered the same multiple choice questions, estimated their
number of correct answers and stated whether they think that others are under-, overconfident or
rational.11
3.2.3 Extension – Hard versus Tricky Questions (R Tricky and T Frame)
With another treatment, we want to test whether some form of feedback helps subjects to recognize
that others are biased. To test this, we first conducted the treatment R Tricky, which is identical
to R Hard, except that these new 20 Rs answered different multiple choice questions. Instead of
the hard ones, we selected “tricky” ones, i.e. questions that look very simple, but are in fact very
difficult: subjects are quite certain that they choose the right answer, but actually select the wrong
one.
Subjects in the treatment T Frame (where we use non-neutral wording in the instructions; see the
next subsection) answered both the hard and the tricky questions and performed all the tasks as
subjects in T AveragePlus. They had, however, not only to judge the Rs in R Hard but as well those
in R Tricky. In addition, they state how many questions they think the Rs (in R Hard and R Tricky,
respectively) have on average correct by choosing a number z for subjects in both R treatments.
Note that we want to highlight the trickiness of the questions to see whether subjects are forced by
this kind of information to recognize problems like overestimation. Therefore, we showed subjects
in T Frame the correct answers to the tricky questions before they assessed whether the Rs are
under-, overconfident or rational (but of course after they answered the questions). In order to
avoid hedging effects, we randomly selected for the payment one block of questions (either the hard
11These 17 subjects did, however, not state z, i.e. how many questions they think R answered on average correctly.
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or the tricky ones) and one block of decisions (corresponding to the hard or tricky questions) after
subjects finished all decisions.
3.2.4 Extension – Impact of Framing (T Frame)
Psychologists generally use a non-neutral language in their experiments. We want to see whether
such framing12 has some impact on our results. Subjects might think differently about a problem
when they read the word “overestimate” instead of “action right”. By reading the word “overesti-
mate” a subject might get an idea that overestimation is a problem (why else should he read this
word in the instructions?). To analyse the impact of the wording, we “framed” the instructions
in T Frame. The main differences are as follows: in T Frame we explicitly asked subjects “How
many questions do you think you have correct?”, while in all other treatments we let them choose
between eight actions.13 Furthermore, subjects had to state whether they think that the Rs under-
or overestimate the true number of correct answers or estimate it correctly. In the treatments with
neutral instructions, however, subjects choose between three corresponding actions left, right and
middle. Similarly, for the statement of the belief about the Rs’ average number of correct answers,
we explicitly asked in T Frame “How many questions do you think the others answered on average
correctly?”, while in the neutral treatments we let subjects choose a number z and they have to
infer the meaning from the payoffs.
3.2.5 Extension – Single Subject versus The Average (T Individual)
Does it make a difference whether the “others” represent the average of the Rs or a single R? As
we explain more precisely in the next section, in theory it does: For a single subject one cannot
distinguish by observing the guess q and the true number t of correct answers whether she makes
just an unsystematic mistake or is really biased if the numbers differ. By observing the average
numbers q¯ and t¯ of a group of subjects, however, one can conclude that these subjects are on
average biased if the averages differ.
From the treatments described above, in which subjects face the average of the Rs, we can infer
whether subjects think others are on average biased or not, but we cannot infer whether they
think others make unsystematic mistakes. Yet, we are also interested in whether subjects think
that Rs just make mistakes but are not biased, do not even make mistakes, or that they are biased
12The term framing should not be misleading here. We just mean by it that we use a non-neutral language which
hints at problems like a wrong self-assessment.
13Note that subjects in the R Treatments faced a different decision problem when estimating their number of
correct answers as they face a payoff table and have to infer the meaning. This decision problem was explained to
the subjects in T Frame and we made clear that it meant the same as the question “How many questions do you
think you have correct?”.
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R Hard R Tricky T Average T AveragePlus T Individual T Frame
Hard Questions
√ √ √ √
Tricky Questions
√ √
Estimate Own t
√ √ √ √ √
Others Biased?
√ √ √ √
Relative Bias?
√ √ √
Guess z of t¯ (t)
√ √ √
Info about q¯
√ √ √
Table 3.3: Overview of the Tasks in the Treatments and in which Treatment Subjects Receive Information about the
Rs’ Average Belief q¯. “Hard/Tricky Questions” means that subjects answer the hard/tricky questions.
(i.e. mistakes are systematic). Regarding the first case, for example, subjects would be aware that
a single subject might make mistakes, but that these cancel out for a group of subjects. Thus, the
group is unbiased.
To analyze the issue, we additionally conducted the treatment T Individual, in which subjects
state beliefs about single Rs and not the complete group. In T Individual, 20 subjects have to
perform all the tasks subjects in T AveragePlus have to. A difference to T AveragePlus is that
we implemented the strategy method in T Individual. Thus, subjects do not receive specific
information about a single R, but they state for every possible estimate q ∈ {0, 1, . . . , 7} of R
whether they think she is under-, overconfident or rational (strictly speaking: makes mistakes or
not – see Section 3.3.1). For the numbers 0 and 7 on the boundary, subjects only choose between
the two appropriate possibilities. In case he thinks R is under- or overconfident, he has to choose
a number z ∈ {0, 1, . . . 7}, z 6= q, that mirrors his belief about her true number of correct answers.
A subject in T Individual was not paid for all his decisions, but for his decision when facing a
particular estimate q of an R. For his payment, one R was randomly selected. Her q and t –
together with his decision when facing her estimate q – determined his payment. Again, we did
not ask all these questions directly, but confronted subjects with simple decision problems to infer
their beliefs.
In Table 3.3, we provide an overview of all the tasks subjects have to complete in each treatment.
We also indicate, in which treatment we inform subjects about the average estimate q¯ of the Rs. In
Table 3.4, we list the timing of the single tasks and when we inform subjects about q¯. Since not all
stages are present in all treatments, the corresponding timing of a treatment follows by skipping
the missing stages. In these tables, we show already the “relative bias” task that is explained in
more detail in Section 3.6.
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T = 1 T = 2 T = 3 T = 4 T = 5
Questions Estimate Own t Relative Bias? Info about q¯ Others Biased? & Guess z
Table 3.4: Timing
3.3 Predictions
3.3.1 Definitions and Assumptions
For the theoretical predictions of our experiment, we need some weak assumptions and definitions
about the players’ behavior. We assume that individuals are subjective expected utility maximiz-
ers, with a strictly increasing utility function, i.e. they prefer more money compared to less.14
Next, we define what we mean by an under- or overconfident individual – i.e. a biased individual
– or by a rational individual. Biased means that an agent’s self-assessment is wrong – he system-
atically under- or overestimates his number of correct answers and is thus under- or overconfident,
respectively. By systematically we mean that the mistakes an individual makes when estimating
her ability are not random, in the sense that they do not cancel out on average. A rational agent
in contrast makes on average no mistakes.15 Thus, we can identify whether a population of indi-
viduals is rational – if they were rational, then t¯ = q¯ (roughly) holds.16 If they were not rational,
then t¯ 6= q¯. In the latter case, we define the bias as b := t¯ − q¯ and say that a population with
b < 0 is overconfident (or overestimates its ability, i.e. the true number of correct answers) and one
with b > 0 is underconfident (or underestimates its ability). For a single individual, however, we
cannot infer from observing her t and q that she is biased or not, since she could have made only
an unsystematic mistake (b < 0: negative mistake, b > 0: positive mistake).
Note that in T Individual, we ask subjects whether they think that a single subject R is right with
her self-assessment. Thus, we can in general not conclude from T Individual whether subjects think
14This seems reasonable since here are no concerns for concepts like fairness. Note that we make no assumptions
regarding the curvature or differentiability of the utility function. Thus, we could – by an appropriate definition of
the reference point – also think of the utility function as a value function in the spirit of Kahneman and Tversky
(1979) to capture concepts like gain-loss utility.
15Statistical: A rational individual estimates that her type is E[t|ξ], when her true type is t with E[t|ξ] = t − ε
and ξ is the available information of the individual. Hence, E(ε) = 0, i.e. a rational individual makes on average no
mistakes. Assuming that across individuals (i ∈ I) the εi’s are uncorrelated random variables, one could apply the
weak law of large numbers to see that limI→∞ 1I
∑
i εi = E(ε) = 0. For a biased individual E(ε) = b 6= 0, i.e. on
average it makes mistakes.
16In the experiment, we allow for small deviations from t¯ = q¯ for a rational group.
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that a single R is biased or not, but only whether it makes (systematic or unsystematic) mistakes
or not.17
Our main interest is whether subjects think others are biased or not. Hence, in most treatments,
we consider averages over the beliefs q. Nevertheless, we want to know whether subjects think
others make mistakes and thus discuss most results of T Individual separately in Section 3.5.
3.3.2 Eliciting Beliefs
In the following, we look at individuals’ choices and explain how these mirror a subject’s beliefs.
In our experiment, all decision problems the individuals face have the same structure: A subject
has the choice between several alternatives (J = {2, 3, 4, 8, 70}). For example, a subject has eight
alternatives for the statement how many questions she thinks she answered correctly. If a subject
makes the “right” choice (e.g., she states the right number of correctly answered questions), she
receives a high payoff and if her choice is not correct, she receives a low payoff. Of course, an indi-
vidual might be uncertain which alternative is true, and hence forms beliefs about the probabilities
of the different alternatives being true. We show in the appendix that an individual chooses the
alternative on which she puts the largest probability to be the correct one (Proposition 19 in the
appendix).18
This proposition implies that subjects should state the number of questions they think they an-
swered most likely correctly. As explained above, the average values of stated and true number
should not differ much in case individuals are roughly rational and only make random mistakes.
When individuals tend to be biased in a certain direction (i.e. either over- or underconfidence),
however, these numbers differ even on average.
3.3.3 Hypotheses on the Beliefs About the Bias of the Average
Based on previous studies by psychologists and economists (see introduction), we predict the fol-
lowing.
Hypothesis 1 Subjects overestimate their abilities on average – more so with the tricky questions.
The fact that subjects overestimate their abilities and that the degree of overestimation depends
on the type of questions is a well known result from psychology. In the psychological literature on
17In Section 3.5 we also try to infer whether subjects think mistakes are systematic or not.
18So called “probability matching” (see e.g. Shanks et al. (2002)) could occur in our decision problem. Suppose
the majority of subjects chooses the action “the others are biased”. Then also if probability matching happens the
results should imply that subjects put the largest probability on this action (similar for the other tasks). Shanks et
al. show that this anomaly occurs less often in case financial incentives are provided. Thus, “probability matching”
should not be a severe problem for our experiment.
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overconfidence the so-called “hard-easy” effect arises: People have been found to be underconfident
for “easy” questions and overconfident for “hard” ones (see, e.g., Juslin (1994)). Our tricky
questions are designed in a way that provokes more negative mistakes: Subjects are more sure
that they selected the right answer but, in fact, this answer turns out to be wrong. This means
that confidence rises and the number of correct answers decreases compared to the hard questions.
This effect of such “surprising” questions is also addressed in Juslin (1994).
Whether one can say that subjects are more overconfident with the tricky questions depends on
the way one defines overconfidence. On the one hand, one can simply say that a population is
more biased (here: overconfident) if and only if the absolute value of their bias is larger – i.e.
t¯ − b¯ is smaller – the statement is correct. On the other hand, one can argue that subjects are
not more biased because they really are more biased, but because the tricky questions make them
more biased, i.e. subjects only seem more biased (see Brenner et al. (1996)). We do not deepen
this discussion as our main point is not the influence of the tricky questions on the degree of
overconfidence – instead, we want to see whether subjects can be induced by these questions to
recognize that Rs are overconfident. Whenever we say in this context that overestimation is more
pronounced with the tricky questions, we do not want to claim that these subjects have a stronger
bias.
Under the assumption of a symmetric distribution of mistakes, one could for instance use a
Wilcoxon Test (to test the hypothesis that the difference between q and t has median value zero
given the pairs (qi, ti) of individuals i) for testing whether subjects are rational or biased.
Proposition 19 (see appendix) also implies that whenever a subject believes that the Rs are
more likely to be either over-, underconfident or unbiased, he also states this when asked for his
assessment. Further, his guess of t¯ (the average of the true number of correct answers) should be
the number that he thinks mirrors t¯ most likely. Therefore, for agents who are uncertain between
positive and negative biases or between different sizes of biases (including positive, negative and
zero biases), we interpret their choice as reflecting what they think to be most likely true (and say
sometimes for simplicity “they think”, without the most likely). Obviously, we cannot distinguish
between agents who are certain or uncertain about their statement being true.
We predict that at least some subjects know that the population is biased. A priori, it is not clear
whether more subjects think that Rs are biased or more of them think that they are rational.
From experiments and field evidence about hyperbolic discounting we know that some individuals
are only “partially naive” and not fully naive (see e.g. Della Vigna and Malmendier (2006)).
Partially naive means that they know their own bias to some extent. In case people know that
they are biased themselves, there is some chance that they also know that others are biased. Note
that in our experiment a wrong guess could just be a mistake and not a bias, while hyperbolic
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discounters are always biased. Thus, subjects in our experiment might be aware that people make
mistakes (un-, or systematic), but many might expect mistakes to cancel out on average.
Concerning our different treatments we make the following prediction:
Hypothesis 2 The more information subjects receive about the problem (no information in T
Average, answering questions themselves in T AveragePlus, seeing the correct answers and framed
instructions in T Frame), the more subjects state that others are biased.
This hypothesis seems evident in the (theoretical) sense that subjects, who can use more informa-
tion, can update their beliefs and thus, make better decisions. Experimental studies on whether
subjects update information according to Bayes’ rule, however, rather provide evidence that
subjects are not “perfect Bayesians” (e.g. Kahneman and Tversky (1972) or Zizzo et al. (2000)).
Nevertheless, we think that in our experiment, more information works in the stated direction.
Subjects are forced to reason better how realistic it is that the Rs have on average q¯ questions
correct, once they answered the questions themselves and recognize that it is indeed very hard to
give so many correct answers. This effect is reinforced when they see the correct answers of the
tricky questions – here they could recognize that these tricky questions induce overestimation.
Effects of better reasoning on decisions are for instance explored by Croson (2000). She finds that
the frequency of equilibrium play in prisoner’s dilemma and public good games increases when first
subject’s beliefs about the actions of others are elicited before the game is played. It is a priori not
clear whether the effect of framing is stronger or weaker than the one of answering the questions
oneself. Nevertheless, we think that there is an effect – reading words like “overestimation” gives
subjects a hint that such things could occur. Hence, we predict that more subjects state that the
Rs are biased.
When thinking about others, individuals often tend to conclude from their own behavior or
own beliefs on others. This is the so-called false consensus effect, see e.g. Mullen et al. (1985).19
We expect this effect to be crucial, when subjects judge the others. Thus, we have the following
hypothesis.
Hypothesis 3 When making statements about the Rs (about their bias or about their average
number t¯ of correct answers), this statement tends in the direction of the own behavior (own bias
or guess of own number of correct answers).
19Note that doing this need not be suboptimal, especially when subjects have no further information on the identity
or characteristics of others. Therefore, the term “false” can be misleading.
86
t¯ q¯ Bias p
R Hard 2.3 3.4 -1.1 0.006
R Tricky 1.2 4.6 -3.4 0.000
T AveragePlus 2.1 3.5 -1.4 0.005
T Individual 1.7 2.7 -1.0 0.068
T Frame Hard 2.6 3.1 -0.5 0.207
T Frame Tricky 1.6 3.2 -1.6 0.001
Table 3.5: Reported and True Number of Correct Answers
3.4 Results
In the following, we first discuss the results on the own bias of subjects. This refers to the first part
of the experiment, the question task and the self-assessment, which is present in all treatments but
T Average. Note that in T Frame we pose both types of questions and subjects have to evaluate
both reference groups R Hard and R Tricky, respectively. When presenting the results, we therefore
split this treatment into T Frame Hard and T Frame Tricky, where each part refers to either the
hard or tricky questions and the corresponding decisions. Since overconfidence has already been
extensively investigated in the psychological literature, our discussion is very brief.
We then turn to our results on the new issues – the knowledge about other people’s bias and the
belief about the relation between own and other people’s biases.
3.4.1 The Own Bias (Hypothesis 1)
Table 3.5 shows the average type t¯ and the average estimate q¯ for each treatment, the difference
between the two (bias) and the p-values from a Wilcoxon Test. With the hard questions the bias
ranges from -0.5 to -1.4, with the tricky ones from -1.6 to -3.4. The p-values indicate significant
differences between t¯ and q¯ for all treatments except for T Individual and T Frame Hard. Although
not significant in T Individual, the average bias is -1 which is quite large.
Even if the average bias of the whole group indicates overestimation, different types of individuals
exist. Figure 3.1 illustrates the percentage of subjects that are under-, overconfident or rational
(make positive, negative or none mistakes) in the different treatments. The fraction of subjects,
who are overconfident (make negative mistakes), ranges from 53 to 90 percent in the different
treatments. As intended, with the tricky questions the percentage of those, who overestimate their
number of correct answers, is higher. Moreover, it is interesting to see that on average 75 percent
of subjects in R Tricky focused on one and the same answer for each question. With the hard
questions, in contrast, the answer that has been chosen most often for a question, has on average
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Figure 3.1: Percentage of Subjects Being (Not) Correct in the Treatments
only chosen by 44 percent of the subjects in R Hard. One could take this as a vague hint that
subject’s confidence in an answer also increased with the tricky questions. How does the type
of questions influence the true number of correct answers and the belief about it? As discussed
in Section 3.3.3, the size of the bias cannot necessarily be interpreted as stronger overconfidence.
Nevertheless, the effect of the type of questions on the true and believed number of correct answers
is important. It might be that subjects recognized that these questions are tricky and adjusted
their beliefs accordingly. As argued in Section 3.3.3, we find that in R Tricky the true numbers of
correct answers t are significantly smaller than in R Hard, whereas the estimated numbers q and
thus the mistakes are significantly larger in R Tricky (Mann-Whitney U test: p = 0.009, p = 0.001
and p = 0.000, respectively). This indicates that people in R Tricky seem not to recognize the
trickiness of the questions. Similarly, within the two parts in T Frame (hard and tricky questions),
true numbers of correct answers t′s are significantly larger and mistakes are significantly smaller
for the hard questions (Mann-Whitney U test: p = 0.026 and p = 0.03, respectively).
Moreover, we are interested in the effects of framing. We observe that the estimates q are larger
and that overestimation is much more pronounced in R Tricky compared to the framed treatment
T Frame Tricky. The q′s and also the mistakes of subjects are significantly different across these
treatments (Mann-Whitney U test: p = 0.001 and p = 0.002, respectively). This result is (to
our knowledge) new in this context. A possible explanation for it is what psychologists call self-
impression management: “[This concept] suggests that a person acts to show himself in a positive
light, even when he is the only observer of his own behavior.” (Murnighana et al. (2001)). Compar-
88
ing the neutral with the framed treatment, subjects in the neutral treatment do not have as strong
emotions when their decision turns out not to be optimal as subjects in the framed treatment who
are forced to think of terms like self-assessment. The latter subjects feel ashamed or more stupid
when they are wrong or they even do not want to appear themselves arrogant. Therefore, in the
framed treatment, subjects are reluctant to make overly optimistic guesses – instead they make
more realistic guesses such that overestimation is reduced.
3.4.2 What Do You Think about the Bias of Others? (Hypothesis 2)
In this subsection we analyze the subjects’ perception of the Rs’ bias.
Result 1 Without further information, a majority of the subjects thinks that others estimate their
ability correctly. The more familiar subjects are with the task or the more information they re-
ceive (answering the questions themselves, framed instructions, seeing the correct answers of the
questions), the less subjects think that others estimate their ability correctly.
This result is illustrated in Figure 3.2. The figure shows the percentage of subjects in the different
treatments believing that the Rs are underconfident, rational or overconfident. Except for the
second part in the framed treatment, where subjects saw the correct answers before evaluating the
Rs’ average estimate, a majority of subjects states that the Rs are rational. Being asked for their
choice in a questionnaire after the experiment, subjects say that they made this choice because they
either think the mistakes the Rs make cancel out on average or that the Rs have better information
about their own number of correct answers, or that the Rs are simply able to make the correct
choices.
Next, we explore the impact of a single piece of information. First, we ask about the effect of
answering the questions oneself. Does this induce more subjects to recognize that others are
biased? As aforementioned, answering the questions oneself gives subjects a better feeling for
the difficulty of the task. Hence, subjects get a better impression how realistic it is that the Rs
indeed answered q¯ questions correctly on average as these estimate. In Figure 3.2, we see that
the percentage of subjects, who think that the Rs are biased, is slightly higher in T AveragePlus
compared to T Average. We cannot reject, however, the hypothesis that there is no relation
between the number of subjects in the two treatments, who think that the Rs are rational or
biased, according to a Fisher’s exact test (p = 0.234 one-sided).
Framing and answering the questions together, in contrast, (i.e. comparing T Frame Hard and T
Average) has a significant effect (Fisher’s exact test: p = 0.038 one-sided). It increases (decreases)
the percentage of subjects who think the others are biased (unbiased). Nevertheless, no significant
difference arises, when only framing is added given that subjects answer the questions themselves:
Comparing T AveragePlus and T Frame yields no significant effect (p = 0.252). In Figure 3.2, we
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Figure 3.2: Beliefs About Others’ Self-Assessment
can see, however, that the percentage of subjects thinking that the Rs are biased is larger in T
Frame Hard than in T Average/T AveragePlus. This increase in the percentage of people thinking
that the Rs are biased might be caused by the frame – by reading words like “overestimate” and
“underestimate” subjects get forced to recognize that people’s self-assessment might be wrong.
Does it have an effect when subjects see the correct answers to the tricky questions? This kind of
feedback has a significant effect – provided with this information, almost all subjects believed that
the Rs are overconfident.20 Psychologists have shown (for an overview see Pulford and Colman
(1997)) that feedback in form of giving the correct answers has the greatest impact on a subject’s
own bias when feedback contradicts a subject’s belief most. Our result indicates that this also holds
for giving feedback when evaluating others and not oneself. This is interesting since here the ad-
justment has to proceed in two steps as subjects conclude from their own bias on the bias of others:
At first, subjects recognize that it is impossible for themselves to have as many questions correct
as the Rs think they have on average in R Tricky, i.e. q¯. In a second step, subjects conclude from
their own ability that it must also be impossible for the Rs to answer that many questions correctly.
What do the subjects guess is the average true number of correct answers t¯ of the Rs given the
feedback q¯ they receive about the others’ average belief about t¯? This means, we consider the
20Comparing T Frame Tricky to T Frame Hard/T AveragePlus/T Average, there are more (less) subjects who
think that the Rs are biased (rational) according to a Fisher’s exact test (p = 0.0015/0.0001/0.00 one-sided).
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Feedback q¯ Guess z p-value (Mann-Whitney U test)
T Average 3.4 3.2 0.002
T Frame Hard 3.4 3.4 0.138
T Frame Tricky 4.6 2.9 0.000
Table 3.6: Belief z about the Others’ Average Number of Correct Answers (t¯)
versus the Others’ Average Belief q¯ about Their Own Number of Correct Answers (t)
subjects’ estimate z given information q¯ of the reference treatments (this information thus differs
whether the hard or tricky questions are considered). The result is summarized in Table 3.6. The
figure shows the average estimate q¯ chosen by the Rs for the tricky and hard questions, respectively,
the estimates z and the p-values from a Mann-Whitney U test – testing whether z and q¯ are different
from each other.
For T Average, we see that although subjects think that the Rs are roughly correct when evaluating
their abilities, they think that the Rs are a little bit overconfident (q¯ > z). With the tricky
questions, where subjects recognized after seeing the correct answers that the Rs are overconfident,
they adjust their estimate z of t¯ downward to 2.9. Although this is significantly smaller than
q¯ = 4.6, the estimate is still higher than the true average t¯ = 1.2. Interestingly, the estimate
z is not that much smaller than 3.4, which was the subject’s guess for the hard questions in T
Frame. Thus, subjects recognize that the Rs overestimate their abilities, but are still not aware
that overestimation is such a severe problem.
3.4.3 Why Do You Think What You Think About the Bias of Others? (Hy-
pothesis 3)
In the last section, we already got some hints that subjects conclude from their own behavior on
the behavior of others. Now, we want to investigate the reasons for the subjects’ choices in more
detail.
First, we have a closer look at the relationship between the bias a subject in T AveragePlus has
himself and the belief he has about the bias of the Rs. The cumulative distribution functions of
the average value of the bias of subjects who either think that the Rs are correct, overestimate or
underestimate their ability is shown in Figure 3.3. The cumulative distribution function of those
subjects who think that the Rs are on average correct is always below the other two functions.
Hence, those subjects have less extreme (negative) biases. From the average biases, we see that in T
AveragePlus those who think the Rs are overconfident have on average a bias of -2, those who think
that the Rs are roughly unbiased have a bias of -0.7 and the rest has a bias of -3. The difference
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Figure 3.3: Own Bias given Belief About Others’ Self-Assessment
between the biases of subjects who say that others are biased and those who say they are rational
are according to a Mann-Whitney U test significant (p=0.033). Moreover, in T AveragePlus 85
percent of the subjects having a “small” bias (larger or equal to -1) think that others are rational,
while 60 percent of those who have a bias smaller than -1 (i.e. who overestimate more heavily) say
that others are biased. This result is striking since we cannot directly explain it by a false consensus
effect. Recall that subjects do not know how good their own self-assessment is. The result can,
however, be taken as evidence that subjects have some21 knowledge about the degree of their own
bias. Subjects may conclude from their bias onto the bias of others. For instance, a subject may
reason as follows: “I am rational and I know this, so the others are rational, too”. These findings
are summarized more generally in the following:
Result 2 Those who think that others make on average the correct choice, make on average better
choices themselves; while those who think that others are biased, make on average more biased
choices. Moreover, the other way around, most subjects that are unbiased also think that others are
unbiased.
This result is also striking in another aspect. It gives us some hint that the choice of subjects
is not driven by a “better than the average effect” (or self-serving bias), but by their implicit
21If we sometimes say a subjects “knows about his bias”, we mean the following: The subject knows that he is, e.g.,
overconfident to some extent, but he does not know the exact magnitude of this bias. Would he know the magnitude,
he could perfectly correct for the bias.
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self-knowledge as described above. What do we mean by “better than the average effect” in this
context? After subjects estimated their own number of correct answers to be q, they learn the
estimate q¯ of the Rs. Thus, subjects can see whether – according to their own and the Rs’ beliefs –
they are better or worse than the average. If they think that they are better than the average but
q ≤ q¯, they can simply state that the others are overconfident in order to sustain their self-image
of being better than the average, as this means the others are actually worse than q¯ and thus
maybe even worse than q. There is not a large difference, however, between the percentage of those
stating that others are overconfident or rational: q ≤ q¯ holds for 40 percent of the subjects stating
that others are rational and for 50 (33) percent of those, who say that others are overconfident
(underconfident). Hence, we find no clear evidence that subjects try to fool themselves to make
them better than the average by stating others are overconfident.
In T Frame Hard Result 2 is slightly different. Those saying that the Rs underestimate their
ability, have on average a bias of -1.2. Those saying that the Rs are roughly correct, have a bias of
-0.75. And those, who say that the Rs are overconfident, are in fact (on average) underconfident
with a bias of 0.5.22 In T Frame Hard subjects, who say that the Rs are overconfident, could be
aware (and this awareness could be caused by the frame) that overconfidence not only exists in
the population but also for themselves. Hence, they might adjust their choice accordingly, which
leads to a less severe bias (and even underconfidence). With those, who say that the Rs tend to be
underconfident, it is exactly the other way around (as well as in T AveragePlus). These subjects
have the most severe bias. Thinking that they are underconfident themselves might induce them
to choose an estimate q that is too high such that overconfidence arises.
How does the belief z about the (average) true number of correct answers t (t¯) of the Rs relate to
a subject’s own stated number of correct answers q? We can analyze this issue in the treatments
T Average, T Frame and T Individual. We find that subjects think that others have a similar
(average) number of correct answers than they have themselves and – assuming some implicit self-
knowledge when subjects make their choice – they think that the others are rational (or do not
make mistakes). Hence, we can also see the following result as a strengthening of our interpretation
of Result 2: Subjects may not only think that others have a similar bias, but also that they have
a similar (average) number of correct answers.
Result 3 Subjects think that others are similar to them, i.e. they have a belief z about the others’
average ability t¯ that is close to the belief q about their own ability. Moreover, they think that
22The estimate q of those subjects, who say that others are over- or underconfident, is significantly smaller than the
estimate q of those, who say that others are rational (according to a Mann-Whitney U test p = 0.004 and p = 0.011,
respectively).
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Figure 3.4: Average Belief z about the Others’ Ability given the Belief q about the Own Ability
similar subjects are likely to be correct when estimating their ability.
The first part of this result can be explained by the false consensus effect, which says that people
tend to overestimate the degree to which, for example, their own behavior or beliefs are shared by
other people (compare our prediction). Hence, by the false consensus effect people overestimate the
frequency with which their own estimate q is present in the population. Therefore, it is likely that
subjects in our experiment adjust their estimate z of t¯ in the direction of their own estimate q –
under the restriction that they think that the Rs are roughly rational. This is illustrated in Figure
3.4, which shows the average estimate z chosen by the subjects in T Frame given their belief q of
the own number of correct answers and the information the subjects receive (i.e. the Rs’ average
belief q¯ which is 3.4). It can be seen that subjects with lower q’s (up to 3) choose on average an
estimate z that is lower than 3.4, whereas subjects with higher beliefs about the own ability t (from
4 on) choose on average a higher z.
The first part of Result 3 is further supported by the following observations. The average difference
between a subject’s q and the chosen z is only -0.09 in T Frame Hard (and for the tricky questions
it is still only 0.41). According to a Wilcoxon Test there is no significant difference in the median
of the chosen number and the chosen action (p = 0.647 and p = 0.155). Furthermore, in T Frame
Hard the estimates q and z are correlated: The Spearman rank order correlation coefficient is
0.737 (with p = 0.0002).
The second part of the result can be derived from T Individual. Recall that a subject in T
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Individual states a belief z about an R’s true number of correct answers t for each possible belief
R can have about her t. This means that a subject in T Individual, which states a belief z that
equals R’s belief q, believes that this R is correct.
We compare a subject’s estimate z of R’s true number of correct answers t with this R’s estimate
q of the own number of correct answers given that R is similar. A similar R has exactly the
same belief q about her number of correct answers than the subject in T Individual has about
his number of correct answers. For example, an R who thinks she has three questions correct is
similar to a subject in T Individual that thinks he has three questions correct himself. Given
such a similar R, we consider the estimate z a subject in T Individual has about this R’s number
of correct answers. The average difference between the estimate z for a similar subject and this
similar subject’s belief q about his own number of correct answers is -0.05. The medians of these
numbers do not differ significantly (p = 0.476, Wilcoxon test). Moreover, the belief about a similar
individual and the Rs own belief are correlated (Spearman rank order correlation coefficient is
0.59 with p = 0.00323). This implies that a subject thinks that the similar subject is correct with
her self-assessment. Subjects even think that similar Rs are likely to be correct if these Rs hold
“extreme” beliefs, for which most other subjects say that this extreme belief must be mistaken.24
What can we learn from this? Baker and Emery (1993) showed that individuals know that the
average married person in their country gets divorced, but state at the same time that they
themselves will not get divorced. If we replace “getting divorced” by “being biased”, we get a
similar result in our experiment. In case subjects make their statement because they think similar
subjects are like them – not only with respect to their ability, but also with respect to their bias
(see Result 2 and the first part of Result 3) – we can conclude that subjects also think about
themselves that they are unbiased or do not make mistakes as they think that others are unbiased.
Note again that a similar R has the same belief about her number of correct answers than has the
subject in T Individual about himself. If this is true, it also implies that we can explain the second
part of Result 3 by a false consensus bias: Subjects conclude from their own beliefs on others. If
they think they are correct, then also a similar individual is correct.
As the estimates z are significantly different from the beliefs q′s of a single R for all her estimates
q besides 2,3 and 4 (p ≤ 0.002, Mann-Whitney U test), subjects in T Individual know that the Rs
make mistakes.
23If we exclude one subject (that always chose 0 for high q’s of the other person), the numbers are even more
similar to T Frame Hard.
24For Rs that are not similar and who have belief q ∈ {0, 4, 5, 6, 7}, the absolute values of the differences between
q and z are significantly larger than than they are for similar Rs (p ≤ 0.02). Dissimilar Rs with belief q ∈ {1, 2, 3},
however, are most often considered to be correct, too.
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Furthermore, we are interested in the question whether subjects make the same mistakes (or have
the same bias) when evaluating themselves and when evaluating the Rs. On the one hand, subjects
have better information about themselves than about the Rs and this should make it easier to
judge themselves. On the other hand, individuals often reject information about themselves, such
that they could see themselves in a good light (see, e.g., Be´nabou and Tirole (2002)). This should
make evaluating the Rs easier since a subject does not care about the implications of his choice
(which the Rs will never get to know) on R’s self-image.
In T Frame, we find no significant difference between the own bias and the bias in assessing the
average number of correct answers t¯ of the Rs by choosing z. On average, the own bias in T Frame
Hard is about 0.26 larger in absolute terms (it is more negative) than the bias in assessing t and in
T Frame Tricky the own bias is about 0.24 larger in absolute terms (it is more negative again). The
latter finding is surprising as with the tricky questions the subjects see the correct answers to the
questions after having assessed the own ability t, but before assessing t of the Rs. This additional
information seems not to improve the subjects’ assessment about the others.
Finally, we compare the own bias (mistake) and the bias in guessing the ability of a similar R in T
Individual.25 We find that the own bias is significantly larger – in the sense that overestimation is
more pronounced – according to a Wilcoxon test (p = 0.024). The average own bias is -1.8, whereas
the average bias when assessing a single R is -0.87.
3.5 T Individual
For T Individual one should be aware that one should replace “over-, underconfident or unbiased”,
by “negative, none or positive mistake”, as we explained in Section 3.3.1. Even for a rational
subject the true and stated number of correct answers can differ – the subject might simply make
(unsystematic) mistakes. In the following, we try to disentangle what subjects think about the bias
or mistake of single subjects.
3.5.1 Beliefs About the Bias/Mistake of Single Subjects
Consider a subject that assesses the Rs. He might think that “each R is rational” (and only makes
unsystematic mistakes). If he thinks each R is rational, this is consistent with the belief that the Rs
are unbiased on average. Yet, if he thinks (some) single Rs are biased this can still be consistent
with a belief that the whole population of Rs is on average unbiased: He might think that the
25As in R Hard no one has belief zero or one, we have to skip those subjects in T Individual who have a belief of
zero or one.
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biases cancel out for the population, i.e. “the population is rational”.26 Under some assumptions,
we can calculate, which choices of subjects in T Individual are consistent with a belief that Rs are
rational on average. We present two alternative ways to do this. The first alternative corresponds
to the possibility “each subject is rational”, the second one to “the population is rational” as just
explained.
Regarding the first alternative, we assume that if an individual is rational the distribution of the
mistake is uniform and symmetric around zero. This implies that the precision of Rs that state
extreme q’s is higher - for example, someone who says “I answered zero questions correctly” is always
right (since he e.g. did not mark any answer). Denote the possible beliefs of R about her number of
correct answers by {zero, . . . , seven}. The choices of the subject in T Individual are left, middle
and right, which mean that a subject thinks the other subject overestimates, correctly estimates or
underestimates her correct answers. Given a specific belief of R, which (rough) choices of a subject
in T Individual are consistent if he believes R is rational? We can infer that the following (rough)
choices27 are consistent given a belief {zero, . . . , seven}: for belief zero and one action right (i.e.
underestimation), for two, three, four and five action middle (i.e. correct estimation) and for six
and seven action left (i.e. overestimation). For example, an R, who states she has one question
correct, how many questions could it actually have correct? Under the assumption that mistakes
are uniformly and symmetrically distributed around zero, a subject that has actually one, two,
three or four questions correct could state that it has one correct (i.e. have the belief one). Then
the average of actually correct questions is 2.5 (remember that we assume different mistakes are
equally likely). This is by 1.5 larger than 1 what the subject guessed herself. Hence, one should
choose for such an R right (i.e. underestimation).
Concerning the second alternative, we assume that single subjects can be biased, but that their
(systematic) mistakes cancel out in the population (“the population is rational”). Thus, a subject
that states q = 0 can make a mistake. We assume that the absolute value of mistakes is at most
three and that all mistakes have the same probability. We can derive (similar to above) that the
prediction, when a subject in T Individual should choose left, middle or right, is exactly the same
as for the first alternative.28
Similarly, one can see, which choice of subjects in T Individual is consistent with his belief that Rs
are unbiased on average, when they are asked to guess the number of correct answers of R (making
26Note that a subject in T Individual does not know the distribution of types of the Rs, i.e. he does not know how
many Rs think they have one question correct etc. Therefore, we make assumptions on a subject’s belief about this
distribution in the following.
27These are “rough” choices in the sense that we calculate averages and round these to receive the choice.
28To be precise, only rough choices are the same, i.e. when we consider the rounded values. The unrounded values
differ.
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the same assumptions as above). Namely, if a subject believes that each R is rational but makes
mistakes, he should choose the following numbers for each of R’s beliefs {zero, . . . , seven}: zero:
2, one: 2.5, two: 2.5, three: 3.5, four: 3.5, five: 4.5, six: 4.5, and seven: 5.5. If a subject believes
that the population of Rs is rational but single Rs are biased, he should choose the following
numbers for each of R’s beliefs {zero, . . . , seven}: zero: 1.5, one: 2, two: 2.5, three: 3, four: 3,
five: 4.5, six: 5, and seven: 5.5.
Hence, given the assumption that subjects think the others are rational on average29, we can
compare how the two alternative approaches (assumptions see above) fit the experimental data:
Given subjects think that others are rational on average, is it rather the case that they think that
each individual is rational or that individuals might be biased but the population is, nevertheless,
rational?
3.5.2 Results on Knowledge About Mistakes
When analyzing T Individual in more detail, we are interested in the question whether subjects are
aware that others make mistakes and whether (and when) they think such mistakes are unsystematic
or systematic. In order to investigate these questions, we compare the two different approaches
explained in the preceding section: We assume that subjects either think that each R is rational
or that the population of Rs is rational. Regarding the belief in T Individual about the goodness
of the Rs’ guess, we can infer the following from the solid line in Figure 3.530: For low stated q’s
of R, subjects think that she has more likely a higher q than she stated, while Rs with high q’s are
expected to have more likely a lower q than stated. This means that especially Rs with extreme
beliefs are considered to be wrong. Remarkably, no subject states for all possible estimates q’s of
R that she makes the correct choice. For each value of the belief q, 50 – 95 percent of subjects
state that R is wrong. Thus, subjects know that Rs make mistakes when these assess their q.
Furthermore, we compare the average choice of subjects in T Individual with the predicted choice
that would be consistent with subjects in T Individual thinking that the Rs are rational. In Figure
3.5, we derive the predicted choice under the assumption that the population is rational and in
Figure 3.6, we derive it under the assumption that each single individual is rational and just make
mistakes. We see in both figures that the curves for the predicted and actual choice are close. The
second prediction fits, however, better for small qs.
Figures 3.7 and 3.8 again differ only in the predicted choices, but the actual considered choice is
the same (i.e. the solid line). We see from the solid line that for more extreme beliefs of R, the
29We only consider this case here as it turned out that a majority of subjects thinks that the Rs are rational on
average.
30The solid line is the same in Figure 3.6
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average distance between the estimate z about R and the stated belief q of this R is increasing.
Consistently with the choice above, subjects think that mistakes are more severe for Rs with
extreme beliefs: The higher q, the more overestimation is pronounced and similarly, the lower q,
the more underestimation is pronounced. We compare these actual choices to the predicted choice
that would be consistent with subjects thinking that the Rs are rational but make mistakes. We see
that the predicted curve in Figure 3.8 – where the assumption is that a subject thinks “each subject
is rational but makes mistakes” – and the true curve are quite close for stated beliefs smaller than 4.
In Figure 3.7 – where the assumption is that subjects think the population is rational – this is not
true. For higher beliefs, the true curve and the predicted one diverge (under both assumptions).
One possible interpretation of this is that subjects rather think that “pessimists” (those with low
qs) are rational and just making mistakes instead of being biased. Whereas for “optimists” (those
with high qs), we cannot infer which assumption fits observed behavior better.
3.6 Relative Bias
Finally, we want to analyze what subjects think about the relation of their own possible bias or
mistake when assessing the number of correct questions and the bias or mistake of the Rs.
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3.6.1 Experimental Design
An additional task is included in the following treatments: T AveragePlus, T Frame, T Individual.
In T Frame, we explicitly asked subjects whether they think that “I and others made the correct
choice” (or both are wrong/ others right/ I am right). If subjects are right with their statement, they
receive 400 Tokens, otherwise they receive 50 Tokens. In T AveragePlus and T Individual, subjects
choose between two alternatives (in T Individual, with the strategy method, they choose for each of
the eight possible estimates q of R between the two alternatives). Subjects in T AveragePlus made
this decision based on a payoff table (see Table 3.7). This payoff table shows that the payoffs of the
alternatives I and II for the four possible events, where q = t (q 6= t) refers to the self-assessment
of a subject in T AveragePlus and |q¯ − t¯| ≷ 0.5 refers to the average self-assessment of the Rs.
We see in Table 3.7 that payoffs of the two alternatives only differ for the second and third case,
i.e. for the event that the subject is correct himself while the Rs are wrong on average or when
the subject is wrong but the Rs are correct on average. In case that both are correct or both are
wrong the alternatives lead to identical payoffs. Combining this with the statement whether he
thinks that Rs are under-, overconfident or rational, one can see whether he thinks that both make
the right/wrong decision or only one is wrong while the other is right (we will explain this in more
detail below).
The decision of subjects in T Individual between the two alternatives is exactly the same as in T
AveragePlus besides a difference in the payoff table. In T Individual, |q¯ − t¯| ≷ 0.5 is replaced by
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Alternative I Alternative II
q = t and |q¯ − t¯| < 0.5 800 800
q = t and |q¯ − t¯| > 0.5 500 300
q 6= t and |q¯ − t¯| < 0.5 300 500
q 6= t and |q¯ − t¯| > 0.5 210 210
Table 3.7: Payoffs - Relative Biases
q = t and q 6= t, i.e. whether the self-assessment of single R is correct or wrong instead of the
average self-assessment.
3.6.2 Predictions
In this context, Proposition 19 (see appendix) is to be interpreted as follows. Define two states
of the world: state 1 is the state in which a subject guesses his number of right answers correctly
and the Rs are biased (|q¯ − t¯| > 0.5). State 2 is the state in which the subject guesses his number
of right answers not correctly and the Rs are (roughly) unbiased (|q¯ − t¯| < 0.5). According to
our Proposition, this subject should choose alternative I if he believes that state 1 occurs with
a strictly larger probability than state 2 and otherwise alternative II. Combining the choice of
alternative I or II with the statement that others are over-, underconfident or rational, we can
deduce what individuals in T AveragePlus think about their mistakes or biases and others’ biases.
If, for example, a subject says that others are biased and chooses alternative I, this means that
he thinks that he makes more likely the right decision himself, while the Rs do not, i.e. he is
rational (or does not make a mistake) but the Rs are biased. If he says others are rational and
chooses alternative I, this can be translated into the statement that the subject thinks that it is
more likely that both are unbiased (or he makes no mistake). Saying that others are biased and
choosing alternative II implies that a subject thinks that both, himself and the Rs are biased (he
may only make a mistake). And finally, saying that others are rational and choosing alternative II
suggests that the Rs are unbiased, while oneself might be more likely biased (or make more likely
a mistake).
In T Frame the inference about relative biases is easier as subjects immediately choose between
the four alternatives “both are right/wrong”, “only oneself is right”, “only the others are right”.
Given these four alternatives, our proposition implies that a subject chooses the alternative with
the statement, he believes most likely to occur.
As it is known from psychologists (see, e.g., Svenson (1981)), people tend to say that they are
better than the average in ability tasks. As mentioned earlier, one can explain this observation by
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a self-serving bias. The tasks in our experiment do not require to say who is better in answering
questions, but who is better in estimating the own ability or who is more rational. This is not the
same but similar. Hence, we expect that subjects tend to indicate that they are rational (or do not
make mistakes), while others are biased or that they at least state (by choosing alternative I) that
this is more likely than the converse. Even though a subject may think that he makes better choices
than a single R, this belief, however, seems surprising when he faces the complete group of Rs and
their average estimate. The reason is that for him – even though he is rational – mistakes do not
cancel out while for a rational average mistakes should (roughly) cancel out. Thus, we predict the
following:
Hypothesis 4 When facing a single R a majority of subjects tends to say that she is biased, while
oneself is not (does more likely (not) make a mistake). When facing the average of the Rs it is the
other way round.
Applying again the assumption that “each subject is rational”, it can further be seen that if a
subject believes that an R is rational, then for the Rs that indicate that they have q ∈ {2, 3, 4, 5}
questions correct, the average deviation between stated and true number of correct answers is 0.5,
while for the remaining q’s it is strictly larger than 1. Thus, if one thinks that oneself and R are
rational but make/s mistakes, then it could be plausible31 to state that it is more likely that oneself
is wrong and R is correct than is the converse (i.e. choosing alternative II) for q ∈ {2, 3, 4, 5} and
to state that it is more likely that oneself is correct and she is wrong than is the converse (i.e.
alternative I) for the remaining actions q.
3.6.3 Results (Hypothesis 4)
In this section, we present the results on the question what individuals think about the relation
between their own bias and others’ biases. Who is more likely to be biased or make mistakes?
Figure 3.9 shows the percentages of subjects in T AveragePlus and T Frame (Hard and Tricky)
thinking that oneself does not make a mistake and the Rs are biased, that oneself and the Rs are
correct, that oneself makes a mistake while the Rs are rational or that both are wrong (make a
mistake/have a bias).
In T AveragePlus, we observe that 65 percent of the subjects choose alternative I – i.e. they rather
think that they are correct themselves and the Rs are wrong – and 35 percent choose alternative II.
Combining this choice with their statement about the rationality of Rs, we get the percentages in
Figure 3.9. In the part of T Frame with the hard questions the percentage of those, who think that
their self-assessment is better, is lower. In both treatments roughly the same percentage of subjects
31One could not say what is implied here, since it depends on the belief about the size of the own mistake relative
to the other one.
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Figure 3.9: Relative Beliefs
thinks that they are rather wrong themselves. In T AveragePlus, however, 35 percent think that
the Rs are rather better, while in T Frame Hard 16 percent think that the Rs are better or that
both are biased/make mistakes, respectively. With the tricky questions, less subjects think that
both are correct (21%), slightly less think that they are better themselves (32%), and many more
think that both are wrong (32%). Thus, with the tricky questions, we find that the percentage of
those, who think that oneself (not neccessarily the Rs) is right, decreases.32 We summarize these
findings in the following result:
Result 4 The majority of subjects thinks that it is more likely that they do not make a mistake,
while the others are biased. This percentage decreases as subjects receive more information (i.e.
framing and seeing the correct answers).
This result is somehow surprising. If one thinks that all subjects (oneself and the others) are
rational, one should tend to choose alternative II since a single rational individual makes mistakes,
while for the average they cancel out. The choice of alternative I is only consistent with the beliefs
“I do not make mistakes at all” or “the average is very likely biased and I am unlikely to make a
mistake”. The first belief is surprising as it implies that subjects are not aware that they might make
32We can, however, not reject the hypothesis that there is no relation between the number of subjects who think
that oneself is correct or wrong according to Fisher’s exact tests (p > 0.05 one-sided). If we consider only those, who
think that the Rs are wrong, there are significantly less (more) who think that they are correct (wrong) themselves
than in T AveragePlus (Fisher’s exact test, p=0.034 one-sided).
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mistakes. Also the second belief is surprising as subjects seem to be aware that there is something
like a bias in the population, but are not aware that they are biased (or make a mistake).33 From
the analysis of T Individual we already know, that subjects are aware that others make mistakes.
Although subjects are aware of it, they do not think that they make mistakes themselves. We can
explain this again by a self-serving bias. Subjects think that they are different from the others or
better than these are.
Next, we consider how the own bias is related to the belief about the relative bias. When evaluating
the relative bias, subjects may be reluctant to say that they are better than others in their self-
assessment. This behavior would reveal overconfidence of the type “I think I am better than
the average”. It is hence interesting to see whether subjects, who have a bias when evaluating
absolute abilities (here: answering questions), also have a bias when assessing relative abilities
(here: evaluation of relative bias). In T AveragePlus, for those, who choose alternative I (i.e. they
rather think that they are correct themselves and the Rs are wrong), the difference between true
type and believed type is on average -2.18, while for those, who choose alternative II it is 0 (meaning
that they are unbiased).34 According to a Mann-Whitney U test, subjects who think that they are
more likely to be correct, are significantly more biased than those who think that rather the Rs
are correct whilst oneself is wrong (p = 0.007). Remarkably, all subjects who choose alternative I
– i.e. who rather think that they are correct themselves and the Rs are wrong – are overconfident
themselves.
The pattern in T Frame is similar. Those subjects, who think that they are right, while the Rs have
a bias, have the largest bias (average bias is -1 with the hard questions, -2 with the tricky ones).
Those, who say that they as well as the Rs are likely to be wrong, are either underconfident (with
the hard questions their bias is 1) or have the smallest bias with the tricky questions. This may
be due to the fact that subjects, who know that individuals are biased, try to behave accordingly
and adjust their guess of the number of correct answers downward. Those, who say that both are
correct, have roughly the same bias as those, who say that the Rs may make better guesses (-0.5
(-1.75) versus -0.67 (-1.7) for hard (tricky) questions).
Finally, we turn to the analysis of T Individual. The average choice of alternatives I or II of the
subjects for every single belief of an R is shown in Figure 3.10. Here we see again, that subjects
33They might think that the only possible state of the world is that both are wrong. Hence, they are indifferent
between the two alternatives. We think, however, that subjects put some (small) positive probability on the other
states of the world such that the choice of alternative I reveals that they think they are correct, while the others are
not.
34Since positive and negative biases cancel out, also the average absolute values of the biases are interesting. These
are 2.18 given alternative I and 1.33 given alternative II, i.e. they are still lower for alternative II.
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Figure 3.10: Average Choice of Alternatives in T Individual
tend to think that they are more likely to make the correct self-assessment themselves, i.e. they
tend to choose more often alternative I (confirming our Hypothesis). Moreover, for low beliefs of
an R about her type (i.e. pessimistic Rs), subjects in T Individual tend even more to alternative I
than for high beliefs of R (i.e. optimistic Rs). Thus, it seems that they trust an optimist more to
make the right decision than a pessimist. This observation is interesting since subjects think that
both, optimists as well as pessimists make mistakes as we have also seen in Section 3.5.2. This
means that although subjects realize that Rs with high qs might just appear to be a good type
(since they might be actually worse then they think), subjects still seem to believe that these “high
types” are somehow better than others.35
As we have mentioned before, if one thinks that oneself and R are rational (but make/s mistakes),
one should choose for q ∈ {2, 3, 4, 5} alternative II. We see in the figure that the proportion of
subjects that chooses alternative I is always larger than the proportion choosing alternative II. For
q ∈ {4, 5, 6, 7} the proportions are close. Thus, there is again a tendency that subjects think that
they are better (more rational) than others (here: better than single individuals in R Hard).
35A According to a Wilcoxon test the medians of the number of subjects choosing alternative I/alternative II when
q is lower than 4 or at least 4 significantly differ (p = 0.05, two-sided).
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3.7 Conclusion
Empirical studies show that overconfidence occurs in various settings: People overestimate their
driving abilities, students their scores in exams or their rank in the distribution, couples the likeli-
hood of not getting divorced, and portfolio managers their prediction abilities. In our experiment,
subjects estimated how many out of seven multiple choice questions they answered correctly. Our
observations confirm that overestimation of the own ability is a prominent phenomenon in the
population. As overconfidence is such a common characteristic of people’s behavior and is observed
so frequently in real life, it seems obvious that people are also aware of this bias. Remarkably, we
find that a majority of subjects does not think or know that others have a bias.
What are the consequences of this ignorance? If we think of economic interactions, it is often impor-
tant that agents are aware that others are biased in order to make optimal decisions. For instance,
an agent who is not aware that his opponent in a contest is biased or who does not know at least,
which belief the opponent has about his type, cannot adjust his effort optimally, as is assumed
in Ando (2004). Malmendier and Tate (2005a, 2005b) observe that managers are overconfident
and that this is disadvantageous for the firm. Thus, principals should be aware of overconfident
managers in order to be able to counteract possible decision defects. Santos-Pintos (2005a) show
that incentive contracts should be designed in a special way for overconfident agents. Given that a
majority of subjects tends to be overconfident, ignorance of this bias leads to suboptimal contracts
for a majority of agents.
Our results indicate that the more information subjects receive on the task the others have to com-
plete – i.e. the more familiar they are with the task – the more subjects learn that others are on
average biased regarding this task. Hence, more familiarity with the task others have to complete
might help subjects to recognize that others are biased. Therefore, it helps to make better decisions
when subjects face biased individuals. This highlights the importance of information and feedback
to make better economic decisions.
Moreover, we observe that when subjects are confronted with the question what they think about
the relation between their own and others’ biases, a majority states that they are more likely able
to estimate their ability correctly than is the population. This has, for example, implications for
decision making in firms: Suppose a principal has to decide whether to delegate to subordinates or
not. In real life, it is often observed that people do not want to delegate even though there is no
incentive or verifiability problem. Our results indicate that one explanation for this phenomenon is
that either the principal believes that other agents are not able to make the right decision as they
have a bias while he has no bias himself or that his bias is smaller.
We have also seen that individuals think that similar subjects are very likely not to make mistakes,
while they, nevertheless, know that mistakes occur. This indicates that subjects are not only un-
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aware of the bias in the population, but also of their own bias (or mistakes). Although we think
that this can be taken as some evidence, we think it is a topic for future research to investigate the
knowledge about own biases (like hyperbolic discounting or overconfidence) further.
108
Appendix
Proof of Proposition 3 (Existence of equilibrium).
For existence we have to verify that the expected payoffs of a low and a high type are non-negative
when bidding x∗iL and x
∗
iH , respectively. Otherwise it would be better to bid zero and make an expected
payoff of zero. The expected payoff of a low type is(
1
2
r +
x∗iL
x∗iL + x
∗
iH
(1− r)
)
VL − x∗iL
=
(
1
2
r +
VL
VL + VH
(1− r)− λ
)
VL (A.1)
and of a high type (
1
2
r +
x∗iH
x∗iL + x
∗
iH
(1− r)
)
VH − x∗iH
=
(
1
2
r +
VH
VL + VH
(1− r)− λ
)
VH . (A.2)
If the expected payoff of the low type is non-negative, then also the expected payoff of a high type is non-
negative. Therefore, it is sufficient to check whether (A.1) is non-negative. Plugging in λ and rearranging
yields (
1
4
r +
V 2L
(VL + VH)
2 (1− r)
)
VL
which is strictly larger than zero.
Proof of Proposition 6.
In order to prove existence, we have to verify that expected payoffs of both contestants are non-
negative for each type. Starting with the first mover, we calculate his expected payoff, Ψ1stt , in the interior
solution when his type is t = L,H.
Ψ1stt = Vt
(
r
αt√
Vt
+ (1− r)αk
Vk
)
− α2t with t 6= k
= α2t =
V 2t
4
(
r(V −
1
2
t − V −
1
2
k ) + V
− 12
k
)2
with t 6= k (A.3)
Hence, Ψ1stt is strictly larger than zero.
The expected payoff of the first mover in the two boundary cases, when he is the low type, is exactly the
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same as in (A.3). It remains to check whether the high type makes non-negative expected payoff in these
cases. We first consider the case, in which the first mover bids exactly VL.
Ψ1stH = VH
(
r
√
VL√
VH
+ (1− r)
)
− VL
=
√
VL +
√
VH + (1− r)
(√
VH −
√
VL
)
.
Obviously, Ψ1stH > 0 as r ∈ [0, 1] and VH ≥ VL.
In the second boundary case, the expected payoff of the first mover is
Ψ1stH = VH
(
r
r2
2
+ (1− r)
)
− r
2VH
4
=
(
r2
4
+ (1− r)
)
VH .
As r ∈ [0, 1], the first mover’s payoff is strictly positive.
Turning to the second mover, we first check his expected payoff Ψ2ndk , in the interior solution, when
his type is k = H,L and the first mover has with probability r the same type, t = k, and with probability
1− r a different type, t 6= k.
Ψ2ndk = Vk
(
r
(√
Vk − αk√
Vk
)
+ (1− r)
(√
Vk − αt√
Vk
))
− r
(√
Vkαk − α2k
)
− (1− r)
(√
Vkαt − α2t
)
where t 6= k.
This can be rewritten as
Ψ2ndk = r
(√
Vk − αk
)2
+ (1− r)
(√
Vk − αt
)2
, (A.4)
which is non-negative as r ∈ [0, 1].
In the boundary solutions, the expected payoff of the low type of the second mover is zero, as he
exerts zero effort. For the high type of the second mover, there are two cases:
In case the high type of the first mover bids VL, the high type of the second mover expects
Ψ2ndH = VH
(
r
√
VH −
√
VL√
VH
+ (1− r)
√
VH − αL√
VH
)
− r
√
VH
(√
VH −
√
VL
)
− (1− r)αL
(√
VH − αL
)
.
This can be rewritten as
Ψ2ndH = r
(√
VH −
√
VL
)2
+ (1− r)
(√
VH − αL
)2
,
which is non-negative as r ∈ [0, 1].
In case the high type of the first mover bids r
2VH
4 , the high type of the second mover expects
Ψ2ndH = VH
(
r(1− r
2
) + (1− r)(1− αLV −
1
2
H )
)
− r
(
rVH
2
(1− r
2
)
)
− (1− r)(αL(V
1
2
H − αL)).
Plugging in αL and rearranging yields
Ψ2ndH = −
VH
4
(
(1− r)
(
−4V 32H (V
1
2
H − rV
1
2
L )− 2rVLV
1
2
H (2V
1
2
H − V
1
2
L (1 + r))− rVL(VH + rVL)
)
−VH(VL + r3(VH − VL))
)
.
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This is non-negative as VH ≥ VL and r ∈ [0, 1].
Proof that the first mover makes a strictly positive bid in equilibrium:
Suppose type t = H,L of the first mover bids zero. Then his payoff is zero as the second mover bids  > 0
and wins the prize. If type t of the first mover, however, bids α2t , his expected payoff is strictly larger than
zero as shown before.
Proof that equilibrium bids of the high and low type of the first mover differ:
In order to show that the first mover’s bid signals his type, we have to show for VL 6= VH (for VL = VH there
is only one type and therefore the first mover’s bids coincide for “both” types, L and H) that αH 6= αL for
the interior solution. Suppose αH = αL. This is equivalent to
r
(
V
1
2
H − V
− 12
L VH
)
+ V −
1
2
L VH = r
(
V
1
2
L − V
− 12
L VH
)
+ V −
1
2
H VL.
This can be rewritten as
V
− 12
L V
− 12
H
(
V
3
2
H − V
3
2
L
)
+ V
1
2
H − V
1
2
L = 0.
The left hand side is obviously larger than zero for VL 6= VH which is a contradiction, hence αH 6= αL.
Regarding the two boundary cases, we know that the low first mover bids strictly less than VL and the high
type bids at least VL. It follows immediately, that low and high type never bid the same amount. Hence,
the bid of the first mover reveals his type.
In case that r ≤ r˜ and r < 2
√
VL√
VH
, the first order condition (1.16) does not yield the optimal bid of the
constrained maximization problem. Because of concavity of the objective function in the first mover’s bid,
the optimal bid is a corner solution. Hence, it is either VL or VH . If the high type of the first mover bids
VH , his payoff is zero as the second mover bids zero, and the first mover wins the prize. In contrast, if the
high type of the first mover bids VL, his expected payoff is strictly larger than zero as shown above. Hence,
we have x∗1H = VL in case r ≤ r˜ and r < 2
√
VL√
VH
.
Proof of Proposition 7.
(i) For the second mover we have to verify αt(
√
VL − αt) ≤ αt(
√
VH − αt) (where t = L,H) for the
interior solution. This obviously holds as VH ≥ VL (with equality for VH = VL). For the boundary solutions
the result is trivial as the second mover exerts zero effort, when he is a low type, and a non-negative effort,
when he is a high type, which follows from the derivation of equilibrium bids.
For the first mover, we have to verify αL ≤ αH . This is equivalent to
r(
1√
VL
− 1√
VH
) (VL + VH) ≤ VH√
VL
− VL√
VH
.
Rearranging yields
r
1√
VH
√
VL
(
√
VH −
√
VL) (VL + VH) ≤ 1√
VH
√
VL
(V
3
2
H − V
3
2
L ).
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This holds with equality if VL = VH . For VL < VH , we can simplify this to
r (VL + VH) ≤ (VH +
√
VH
√
VL + VL)
which always holds.
For the boundary solutions we have to check VL ≥ α2L, which is equivalent to
2 ≥
√
VL
(
r
(
1√
VL
− 1√
VH
)
+
1√
VH
)
.
This can be simplified to
1 ≥
(√
VL√
VH
− 1
)
(1− r) ,
which is always fulfilled (for r = 1 with equality).
Since r
2VH
4 ≥ VL for the relevant range (as r > 2
√
VL√
VH
), it holds that r
2VH
4 > α
2
L (as α
2
L < VL). Hence, the
first mover exerts more effort when he is a high type.
(ii) To show that the first mover exerts (a) more effort than the second mover when he is a high
type and (b) less when he is a low type it suffices to check that he makes more (less) effort than the high
(low) type of the second mover (as we know from part (i) that the high type makes a higher effort than the
low type).
(a) x∗1H ≥ x∗H2H is equivalent to 2αH ≥
√
VH for the interior solution. This is equivalent to (1−r)(
√
VH√
VL
−1) ≥ 0
which is fulfilled (for VL = VH and r = 1 with equality). As x∗H2H ≥ x∗H2L , it follows x∗1H ≥ x∗H2L .
For the first boundary case, we have to verify VL ≥
√
V L(
√
V H −
√
V L), which is equivalent to
2
√
V L ≥
√
V H . This need not hold since it is possible that 2
√
V L ≤
√
V H for the first boundary case. Note
that the high type of the first mover exerts a positive amount of effort, hence more than the low type of the
second mover.
For the second boundary case, we have to verify r
2VH
4 ≥ rVH2 (1 − r2 ), which is equivalent to r2 ≥ r. As
r ∈ (0, 1), this is never fulfilled. Thus, the high type of the first mover exerts less effort than the high type
of the second mover in this case. Nevertheless, the high type of the first mover exerts a positive amount of
effort, hence more than the low type of the second mover.
(b) x∗1L ≤ x∗L2L is equivalent to 2αL ≤
√
VL for the interior solution. This is equivalent to (1 − r)V
1
2
L ≤
(1− r)V 12H , which holds with equality for VL = VH and for r = 1. For VL < VH and r < 1 the left hand side
is strictly smaller than the right hand side. As x∗L2H ≥ x∗L2L, it follows x∗1L ≤ x∗L2H .
Note that we do not have to check the boundary cases when the first mover is a low type as there is no
difference to the interior solution for the low type and hence, there is also no difference for the second mover
who observes this action.
Proof E.
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For the interior solution, the first mover’s expected payoff when he has type t = L,H is given by
α2t and the follower’s expected payoff when the follower has type k = H,L is given by (
√
V k − αt)2
when the first mover has type t = L,H (compare (A.4). In order to show that the first mover receives a
higher expected payoff than the second mover when he is a high type, we have to verify that 2αH >
√
V k
for k = H,L. As VH ≥ VL, it suffices to check 2αH >
√
V H . substituting α and rearranging yields
√
V H
(
(1− r)(1−
√
V H√
V L
)
)
≤ 0, which holds (with strict inequality for VL < VH and r < 1). In order to
show that the first mover receives a lower expected payoff than the second mover when he is a low type, we
have to verify that 2αL <
√
V k for k = H,L. As VH ≥ VL, it suffices to check 2αL >
√
V L. substituting α
and rearranging yields
√
V L
(
(1− r)(1−
√
V L√
V H
)
≥ 0, which holds (with strict inequality for VL < VH).
Proof of Proposition 8.
In order to show that equilibrium bids are non-decreasing in the correlation coefficient ρ, we first
show that bids are non-decreasing in r.
Low type of the first mover, interior (hence, also boundary) solution:
∂x∗1L
∂r = αLVL
(
1√
VL
− 1√
VH
)
≥ 0 since VL ≤ VH and αL ≥ 0.
High type of the first mover, interior solution: ∂x
∗
1H
∂r = αHVH
(
1√
VH
− 1√
VL
)
≤ 0 since VL ≤ VH
and αH ≥ 0.
High type of the first mover, boundary solution:
(i) ∂x
∗
1H
∂r =
rVH
2 ≥ 0 and (ii) ∂x
∗
1H
∂r = 0.
Low type of the second mover, interior solution if the first mover is a low type:
∂x∗L2L
∂r =
∂αL
∂r (
√
V L − 2αL) = V
3
2
L
2 (V
− 12
L − V
− 12
H )(1− r)(1− V
1
2
L V
− 12
H ) ≥ 0.
Low type of the second mover, interior solution if the first mover is a high type:
∂x∗H2L
∂r =
∂αH
∂r (
√
V L − 2αH) = VHV
− 12
L
2 (V
− 12
H − V
− 12
L )(V
1
2
L − V
1
2
H )((1− r)V
1
2
H + V
1
2
L ) ≥ 0.
In the boundary solutions, the low type of the second mover exerts zero effort, hence his bid does not
change when ρ rises.
High type of the second mover, interior solution if the first mover is a low type:
∂x∗L2H
∂r =
∂αL
∂r (
√
V H − 2αL) = VLV
− 12
H
2 (V
− 12
L − V
− 12
H )(V
1
2
H − V
1
2
L )((1− r)V
1
2
L + V
1
2
H ) > 0.
High type of the second mover, interior solution if the first mover is a high type:
∂x∗H2H
∂r =
∂αH
∂r (
√
V H − 2αH) = V
3
2
H
2 (V
− 12
H − V
− 12
L )(1− r)(1− V
1
2
H V
− 12
L ) ≥ 0.
High type of the second mover, boundary solution:
(i) ∂x
∗H
2H
∂r =
VH
2 (1− r) ≥ 0 and (ii)∂x
∗H
2H
∂r = 0.
Note that we can immediately conclude from the sign of the derivatives of the contestants’ bids with respect
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to r whether the bids are increasing or decreasing in ρ as r = 12 (ρ + 1): The signs of the derivatives with
respect to r and to ρ are identical. Hence, we have established the proposition.
Proof of Proposition 9.
For the case of public information see Morgan (2003). Thus, it remains to verify the case of private
information.
The ex ante expected effort sum in the sequential contest with private information (restricting to the
interior solution) is
ξprivseq : =
1
2
[
α2L + α
2
H + rαL
(√
VL − αL
)
+ (1− r)αH
(√
VL − αH
)
+rαH
(√
VH − αH
)
+ (1− r)αL
(√
VH − αL
)]
.
Simplifying yields
ξprivseq =
1
2
[
r(αH − αL)
(√
VH −
√
VH
)
+ αL
√
VH + αH
√
VL
]
.
Substituting αL = VL2
(
r( 1√
VL
− 1√
VH
) + 1√
VH
)
and αH = VH2
(
r( 1√
VH
− 1√
VL
) + 1√
VL
)
and rearranging
yields
ξprivseq =
1
4
[
VL + VH + r(1− r)
(
2
(
V
1
2
L V
1
2
H − (VL + VH)
)
+ V −
1
2
L V
− 12
H
(
V 2L + V
2
H
))]
. (A.5)
The ex ante expected effort sum in the simultaneous contest with private information is
ξprivsim : = λ(VL + VH)
=
1
4(VL + VH)
[
r(VL − VH)2 + 4VHVL
]
.
Routine transformations yield that ξprivseq ≥ ξprivsim is equivalent to
(1− r)
[
(VL − VH)2 + r(VL + VH)(2
√
VLVH − 2VL − 2VH + 1√
VLVH
(V 2L + V
2
H))
]
≥ 0.
This holds with equality for r = 1. The term
2
√
VLVH − 2VL − 2VH + 1√
VLVH
(V 2L + V
2
H)
can be written as
1√
VLVH
(VL + VH)
(√
VH −
√
VL
)2
,
which is non-negative. Thus, we have for r 6= 1 that ξprivseq ≥ ξprivsim (with equality for VL = VH).
Proof of Proposition 10.
The ex ante expected payoff, Ψ, of a contestant in the simultaneous contest with private informa-
tion is the sum of his expected payoff when he is a low and a high type respectively, each with probability
one half:
Ψ =
1
2
(
VL
(
xiL
xiL + xjL
r +
xiL
xiL + xjH
(1− r)
)
− xiL + VH
(
xiH
xiH + xjH
r +
xiH
xiH + xjL
(1− r)
)
− xiH
)
.
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Plugging in equilibrium bids and simplifying yields
Ψ =
1
2
[
V 2L − VHVL + V 2H
VL + VH
− 3
4
r
(VL − VH)2
VL + VH
]
. (A.6)
The ex ante expected payoff of the first mover in the sequential contest with private information is the sum
of his expected payoff when he is a low and a high type respectively, i.e. Ψ1stH and Ψ
1st
L as given in (A.3),
each with probability one half:
Ψ1st =
1
2
(α2L + α
2
H).
Plugging in αL and αH yields
1
8VLVH
[
(V 2l + V
2
H)(V
1
2
L − V
1
2
H )
2
(
r2 − 2r(V 2L + VLVH + V 2H + V
1
2
L V
1
2
H (VH + VL))
)
+ V 3L + V
3
H
]
(A.7)
The ex ante expected payoff of the second mover is the sum of his expected payoff when he is a low and a
high type respectively, i.e. Ψ2ndL and Ψ
2nd
H as given in (A.4), each with probability one half:
Ψ2nd =
1
2
[(√
VL − αH
)2
+
(√
VH − αL
)2
+
r
((√
VL − αL
)2
−
(√
VL − αH
)2
+
(√
VH − αH
)2
−
(√
VH − αL
)2)]
=
1
2
[(√
VL − αH
)2
+
(√
VH − αL
)2
+ 2r (αH − αL)2
(√
VL −
√
VH
)2]
. (A.8)
(i) Routine transformations yield that
Ψ1st ≥ Ψ is equivalent to z + ry + r2x ≥ 0
where
z =
(
V
1
2
L − V
1
2
H
)2 (
V
1
2
L + V
1
2
H
)2 (
V 2H − VHVL + V 2L
)
y = −
(
V
1
2
L − V
1
2
H
)2 [
VLVH(VL + VH) +
(
V
3
2
H − V
3
2
L
)2
+ 2V
1
2
L V
1
2
H
(
V 2L + V
2
H
)
+ V 3H + V
3
L
]
x =
(
V
1
2
L − V
1
2
H
)2 (
V 2H + V
2
L
)
(VH + VL) .
Obviously, x ≥ 0 and z ≥ 0 both with strict inequality for VL < VH . Moreover, y ≤ 0 (with strict inequality
for VL < VH). Note that for VL = VH we have z = w = x = 0 and hence expected payoffs of the first
mover are identical to his payoffs under the simultaneous structure. For the rest of the proof, we restrict to
VH > VL, which implies x > 0, z > 0 and y < 0.
Consider the function fˆ(r) = z + ry + r2x for r ∈ [0, 1]. fˆ(r) ≥ 0 is equivalent to Ψ1st ≥ Ψ. As x > 0, and
hence, fˆ(0) > 0, we have (by continuity) for “sufficiently small”r that Ψ1st ≥ Ψ. fˆ is decreasing in r for
r ≤ −y2x =: rˆ∗ and increasing for r > rˆ∗. Depending on the sign of fˆ(1), whether rˆ∗ is larger or smaller than
one, and the roots of fˆ , we can determine the regions of r for which Ψ1st ≥ Ψ.
First, we check whether rˆ∗ > 1:
This is equivalent to −y > 2x. Plugging in y and x and simplifying yields (for VH > VL)
2V
5
2
L V
1
2
H + 2V
1
2
L V
5
2
H − 2V
3
2
L V
3
2
H − V 2LVH − VLV 2H > 0.
We can write this as
V
1
2
L V
1
2
H (V
1
2
L − V
1
2
H )
2
[
(VL + V
1
2
L V
1
2
H + VH) +
(
V
1
2
L + V
1
2
H
)2]
> 0,
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which is obviously satisfied as VH > VL. Hence, rˆ∗ > 1.
Next, we check whether fˆ(1) = x+ y + z:
It is straightforward to verify x + y + z = 0, hence fˆ(1) = 0. This means that r = 1 is one of the roots of
fˆ . As rˆ∗ > 1, fˆ decreasing in r for r ≤ rˆ∗, and fˆ(1) = 0, it must be that the second root (rˆ2) of fˆ is larger
than rˆ∗ > 1. It follows that for all r ∈ [0, 1] we have r2x + ry + z ≥ 0 and hence, Ψ1st ≥ Ψ (with equality
for r = 1 and VL = VH as shown before).
(ii) For the second mover, we receive (by plugging in αL and αH) that
Ψ2nd ≥ Ψ is equivalent to a+ rb+ r2c ≥ 0
where
a : =
1
4VHVL
[
4V 2HV
2
L − 3
(
V 3HVL + V
3
LVH
)
+ V 4H + V
4
L
]
,
b : = − (
√
VL −
√
VH)2
4VHVL
[
2
(
V 3H + V
3
L
)
+ VHVL (VH + VL) + 6
√
VL
√
VH
(
VHVL + V 2H + V
2
L
)]
c : =
(
1√
VL
− 1√
VH
)2 (VH + VL)
4
[
V
3
2
H
(√
VH + 4
√
VL
)
+ V
3
2
L
(√
VL + 4
√
VH
)]
.
Obviously, b ≤ 0 and c ≥ 0 (with equality if VL = VH). We can rewrite a as follows:
a =
1
4VHVL
(VH − VL)
[
V 3H − V 3L − 2VHVL (VH − VL)
]
=
1
4VHVL
(VH − VL)2
(
V 2H − VHVL + V 2L
)
.
Hence, a is larger than or equal to 14VHVL (VH − VL)
4, which is non-negative (and strictly positive if VH > VL).
Thus, a ≥ 0.
Note that for VL = VH we have a = b = c = 0 and hence Ψ2nd = Ψ. For the rest of the proof, we restrict to
VH > VL.
Consider f˜(r) = a + rb + r2c for r ∈ [0, 1]. Note that f˜(r) ≥ 0 (≤) is equivalent to Ψ2nd ≥ Ψ (≤). Hence,
since a is positive, we have (by continuity) for “sufficiently small” r that f˜(r) ≥ 0 and therefore Ψ2nd ≥ Ψ.
f˜ is decreasing in r for r ≤ − b2c =: r˜∗ and increasing for r > r˜∗.
Depending on the sign of f˜(1), whether r˜∗ > 1 or r˜∗ ≤ 1, and the roots of f˜ , we can determine the regions
of r for which Ψ2nd ≥ Ψ.
First, we check whether r˜∗ ≤ 1:
This is equivalent to −b ≤ 2c. Plugging in b and c and simplifying yields (for VH > VL)
VLVH
(
V
1
2
L + V
1
2
H
)2
+ 2V
1
2
L V
1
2
H (V
2
L + V
2
H) ≥ 0.
Note that this is always fulfilled with strict inequality. Hence, r˜∗ < 1.
Next, we check whether f˜(1) = a+ b+ c ≥ 0:
It is straightforward to verify a+ b+ c = 0. Hence, f˜(1) = 0. This means that r = 1 is one of the roots of f˜ .
As r˜∗ < 1, f˜ decreasing in r for r ≤ r˜∗, and f˜(1) = 0, it must be that the second root (r˜2) of f˜ is smaller
than r˜∗ ≤ 1. Moreover, it follows that r˜2 is the critical value of r, i.e. r˜c, such that we have Ψ2nd ≥ Ψ for
r ≤ r˜c = r2 (as f˜(r) ≥ 0 for r ≤ r˜c = r˜2).
The roots of f˜(r) are given by r˜1,2 = 12c
[−b±√b2 − 4ac] .
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We know that the first root is equal to one. As 12c
[−b+√b2 − 4ac] > 12c [b−√b2 − 4ac], we have that
r˜1 = 12c
[
b+
√
b2 − 4as] = 1, and hence r˜c = r˜2 = 12c [b−√b2 − 4ac]. By substitution of a, b and c, and
simplifying we can derive
r˜c = r˜2 =
(
V
3
2
L − V
3
2
H
)2
+ 2V
1
2
H V
1
2
L (V
2
H + V
2
L )
(VL + VH)
(
V 2H + 4V
1
2
H V
1
2
L (VH + VL) + V
2
L
) . (A.9)
Summarizing the results, it follows that for VL = VH and for perfect positive correlation (i.e. r = 1 or
equivalently ρ = 1) expected payoffs of the second mover are identical under the simultaneous and sequential
structure. For VL < VH and for r < 1 the sequential structure leads to higher expected payoffs if and only
if r ≤ r˜c.
Since r = 12 (ρ + 1), we can rewrite the results in terms of ρ. For ρ < 1 and VL < VH we receive from
condition (A.9) that expected payoffs are higher under the sequential structure if
ρ ≤
2
((
V
3
2
L − V
3
2
H
)2
+ 2V
1
2
H V
1
2
L (V
2
H + V
2
L )
)
(VL + VH)
(
V 2H + 4V
1
2
H V
1
2
L (VH + VL) + V
2
L
) − 1
This is equivalent to
ρ ≤
(
V
3
2
L − V
3
2
H
)2
− VHVL(VH + VL)− 10V
3
2
H V
3
2
L
(VL + VH)
(
V 2H + 4V
1
2
H V
1
2
L (VH + VL) + V
2
L
) =: ρ˜c.
Comparing the denominator and numerator of ρ˜c, it is easy to see that ρ˜c is strictly smaller than one.
Moreover, it can be easily verified that ρ˜c > −1 is equivalent to 2(V 32H − V
3
2
L )
2 + 4V
1
2
L V
1
2
H (V
2
H + V
2
L ) > 0,
which is satisfied as VL < VH .
Proof of Proposition 11.
The ex ante expected payoff sum of the contestants in the simultaneous contest with private infor-
mation is
W sim :=
V 2L − VHVL + V 2H
VL + VH
− 3
4
r
(VL − VH)2
VL + VH
.
The ex ante expected payoff sum in the sequential contest with private information is given by the sum of
payoffs of the first and second mover, Ψ1st and Ψ2nd, respectively:
W seq := Ψ1st +Ψ2nd,
where the ex ante expected payoff of the first mover is (as given in (A.7))
Ψ1st =
1
2
(α2L + α
2
H)
=
1
8VLVH
[
(V 2l + V
2
H)(V
1
2
L − V
1
2
H )
2
(
r2 − 2r(V 2L + VLVH + V 2H + V
3
2
L V
1
2
H + V
3
2
H V
1
2
L )
)
+ V 3L + V
3
H
]
.
The ex ante expected payoff of the second mover is (as given in (A.8))
Ψ2nd =
1
2
[(√
VL − αH
)2
+
(√
VH − αL
)2
+
r
((√
VL − αL
)2
−
(√
VL − αH
)2
+
(√
VH − αH
)2
−
(√
VH − αL
)2)]
=
1
2
[(√
VL − αH
)2
+
(√
VH − αL
)2
+ 2r (αH − αL)2
(√
VL −
√
VH
)2]
.
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The rest of the proof works like the proof of Proposition 10.
By standard transformations we can show that
W seq ≥W sim
is equivalent to
u− rv + r2w ≥ 0
where
u : =
1
VLVH
(V 2L − VLVH + V 2H) (VL − VH)2 ,
v : =
1
VLVH
[(
V 2L − V 2H
)2
+
(
V 3H − V 3L
)
(VH − VL) + 4VLVH
(
V
3
2
L − V
3
2
H
)(
V
1
2
H − V
1
2
L
)]
,
w : = 2 (VL + VH)
1
VLVH
(√
VL −
√
VH
)2(V 2L
2
+
V 2H
2
+
√
VL
√
VH (VL + VH)
)
.
Obviously, u ≥ 0 and w ≥ 0 (strictly for VL < VH). Moreover, we can write v as
v =
1
VLVH
[(
V 2L − V 2H
)2
+
(
V
3
2
H − V
3
2
L
)(
V
1
2
H − V
1
2
L
)3 (
VH + 3V
1
2
L V
1
2
H + VL
)]
,
which is larger than or equal to zero as VH ≥ VL > 0 (with equality for VH = VL).
Note that for VL = VH the ex ante expected payoffs under the simultaneous and sequential structure are
identical as u = v = w = 0. We restrict to VH > VL for the rest of the proof.
Consider the function f(r) = u− rv + r2w for r ∈ [0, 1]. f(r) ≥ 0 is equivalent to W seq ≥ W sim. As u > 0
for VH > VL and hence, f(0) > 0, we have (by continuity) W seq ≥ W sim for “sufficiently small”r. f is
decreasing in r for r ≤ v2w =: r∗ and increasing for r > r∗. We can determine the regions of r for which
W seq ≥W sim if we know the roots of f , the sign of f(1), and whether r∗ ≤ 1 or r∗ > 1.
First, we check whether r∗ ≤ 1:
This is equivalent to v ≤ 2w. Plugging in v and w and simplifying yields
10V 2LV
2
H − V 3LVH − VLV 3H − 4V
5
2
L V
3
2
H − 4V
3
2
L V
5
2
H ≤ 0.
We can write this as
VLVH
[
−(VL − VH)2 − 4V
1
2
L V
1
2
H
(
V
1
2
L − V
1
2
H
)2]
≤ 0,
which is obviously fulfilled with strict inequality for VH > VL. Hence, r∗ < 1.
Next, we check whether f(1) = u− v + w ≥ 0:
It is straightforward to verify u − v + w = 0. Hence, f(1) = 0 and r = 1 is one of the roots of f . This
means that for perfect positive correlation overall expected payoffs are identical under the simultaneous and
sequential contest.
As r∗ ≤ 1 and f is decreasing in r for r ≤ r∗ and f(1) = 0, it must be that the second root (r2) of f is smaller
than r∗ ≤ 1. Moreover, it follows that r2 is the critical value of r, i.e. rc, such that we have W seq ≥ W sim
for r ≤ rc = r2 (as f(r) ≥ 0 for r ≤ rc = r2).
The roots of f(r) are given by r1,2 = 12w
[
v ±√v2 − 4uw] . We know that the first root is equal to one.
As 12w
[
v +
√
v2 − 4uw] > 12w [v −√v2 − 4uw], we have that r1 = 12w [v +√v2 − 4uw] = 1, and hence
rc = r2 = 12w
[
v −√v2 − 4uw]. By substitution of w, u and v, and simplifying we can derive
rc = r2 =
V 3L + V
3
H + 2V
1
2
H V
1
2
L (V
2
H − VLVH + V 2L )
V 3L + V
3
H + V
1
2
H V
1
2
L (VL + VH)
(
2(VH + VL) + V
1
2
H V
1
2
L )
) . (A.10)
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Summarizing the results, it follows that for VL = VH and for perfect positive correlation (i.e. r = 1 or
equivalently ρ = 1) overall expected payoffs are identical under the simultaneous and sequential structure.
For VL < VH and for r < 1 the sequential structure leads to higher expected payoffs if and only if r ≤ rc.
Since r = 12 (ρ + 1), we can rewrite the results in terms of ρ. For ρ < 1 and VL < VH , we receive from
condition (A.10) that overall expected payoffs are higher under the sequential structure if
ρ ≤ 2(V
3
L + V
3
H + 2V
1
2
H V
1
2
L (V
2
H − VLVH + V 2L ))
V 3L + V
3
H + V
1
2
H V
1
2
L (VL + VH)
(
2(VH + VL) + V
1
2
H V
1
2
L
) − 1
This is equivalent to
ρ ≤ V
3
L + V
3
H + 2V
1
2
H V
1
2
L (VH − VL)2 − VLVH(VL + VH)− 4V
3
2
L V
3
2
H
V 3L + V
3
H + V
1
2
H V
1
2
L (VL + VH)
(
2(VH + VL) + V
1
2
H V
1
2
L
) =: ρc.
Comparing the denominator and numerator of ρc, it is easy to see that ρc is strictly smaller than one and
larger than minus one.
Proof of Lemma 1.
The ex ante expected payoff of the first mover in the interior solution of the equilibrium of the
sequential contest with private information is
Ψ1st =
1
2
(α2L + α
2
H)
as given in equation (A.7). The ex ante expected payoff of the second mover is (as given in equation (A.8))
Ψ2nd =
1
2
[(√
VL − αH
)2
+
(√
VH − αL
)2
+
r
((√
VL − αL
)2
−
(√
VL − αH
)2
+
(√
VH − αH
)2
−
(√
VH − αL
)2)]
=
1
2
[(√
VL − αH
)2
+
(√
VH − αL
)2
+ 2r (αH − αL)2
(√
VL −
√
VH
)2]
.
Routine transformations yield that
Ψ1st ≥ Ψ2nd
is equivalent to
α2L + α
2
H ≥
(√
VL − αH
)2
+
(√
VH − αL
)
+ 2r (αH − αL)2
(√
VL −
√
VH
)2
.
Rearranging leads to
r
(√
VLαL +
√
VHαH
)
+ (1− r)
(√
VLαH +
√
VHαL
)
≥ VH + VL
2
.
Substituting αL and αH and simplifying, it is straightforward to verify that for VL = VH or r = 0 or r = 1
(i.e. each other’s types are known to the contestants) ex ante expected payoffs of the first and second mover
are identical. For r ∈ (0, 1) and VL > VH we have that Ψ1st ≥ Ψ2nd is equivalent to
V
3
2
H − V
3
2
L + V
1
2
H VL − V
1
2
L VH ≥ 0.
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This can also be written as (
V
1
2
H − V
1
2
L
)
(VH + VL) ≥ 0,
which is satisfied with strict inequality as VL > VH . Hence, for VL > VH and r ∈ (0, 1), the ex ante expected
payoff of the first mover is strictly higher than of the second mover in the interior solution.
Proof of Proposition 14.
The ex ante expected effort sum in the sequential contest with public information is
ξpubseq : =
1
2
r
(
VL
2
+
VH
2
)
+
1
2
(1− r)
(
VL
2
+
VH
2
)
=
VL
4
+
VH
4
,
and in the sequential contest with private information it is (for the interior solution) as given in (A.5)
ξprivseq =
1
4
[
VH + VL + r(1− r)
(
2
(
V
1
2
H V
1
2
L − VL − VH
)
+ V −
1
2
L V
− 12
H
(
V 2H + V
2
L
))]
.
It follows that ξprivseq ≥ ξpubseq is equivalent to
r(1− r)
[
2
(
V
1
2
H V
1
2
L − VL − VH
)
+ V −
1
2
L V
− 12
H
(
V 2H + V
2
L
)] ≥ 0 (A.11)
It can be seen from (A.11) that for r = 0 and r = 1 the ex ante expected effort sum is identical under both
information settings. This is intuitive since in these cases there is public information about the valuations.
For r ∈ (0, 1) we can simplify (A.11) to
V
− 12
L V
− 12
H (VH + VL)
2 − 2 (VL + VH) ≥ 0
and further to (
V
1
2
H − V
1
2
L
)2
≥ 0,
which is fulfilled (with equality for VL = VH). Hence, we have shown ξprivseq ≥ ξpubseq .
Proof of Proposition 15.
As we have already seen in Section 1.3, the ex ante expected payoff for the first mover, Ψ1st/pub,
and the second mover, Ψ2nd/pub, in the sequential contest with public information is identical. The expected
payoffs are given by
Ψ1st/pub = Ψ2nd/pub =
1
2
[
r
(
VL
4
+
VH
4
)
+ (1− r)
(
V 2L
4VH
+
V 2H
4VL
)]
.
The ex ante expected payoff of the first mover in the sequential contest with private information is Ψ1st as
in (A.7) and for the second mover it is Ψ2nd as in (A.8). By rearranging and simplifying, we can show for
r ∈ (0, 1) that Ψ1st/pub ≥ Ψ1st is equivalent to(
V
1
2
H − V
1
2
L
)2 (
V 2H + V
2
L
) ≥ 0, which always holds.
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For r = 1 and r = 0, we have Ψ1st/pub = Ψ1st – which is intuitive as in these cases agents know each other’s
valuations. Thus, the first mover prefers public information from an ex ante point of view given that a
sequential contest is played.
Ψ2nd/pub ≥ Ψ2nd is equivalent to
0 ≤ r
[
−7
4
(VH + VL) +
3
4
(
V 2HV
−1
L + V
2
LV
−1
H
)
+
1
2
(
V
3
2
H V
− 12
L + V
3
2
L V
− 12
H
)
+ 2V
1
2
L V
1
2
H
]
−r2
(
V
− 12
L − V
− 12
H
)2 [
V
1
2
L V
1
2
H (VH + VL) +
1
4
(
V 2H + V
2
L
)]
. (A.12)
For r = 0 we have Ψ2nd/pub = Ψ2nd.
For r 6= 0 we can divide (A.12) by r. Then, the right-hand side of the inequality is decreasing in r as
−
(
V
− 12
L − V
− 12
H
)2 [
V
1
2
L V
1
2
H (VH + VL) +
1
4
(
V 2H + V
2
L
)]
is non-positive. This implies that if (A.12) holds for
r = 1, we have Ψ2nd/pub ≥ Ψ2nd. For r = 1 and VH > VL (for VH = VL we get Ψ2nd/pub = Ψ2nd), we can
simplify (A.12) to
1
2
[(
V
3
2
H + V
3
2
L
)
+
(
VHV
1
2
L + VLV
1
2
H
)
+ V 2HV
− 12
L +
1
2
V 2LV
− 12
H
](
V
− 12
L − V
− 12
H
)
+
1
4
V −1H V
3
2
L
(
V
1
2
L + V
1
2
H
)
≥ 0,
which is always satisfied. Hence, Ψ2nd/pub ≥ Ψ2nd.
Proof of Proposition 16.
In the simultaneous contest with public information, homogeneous types exert the same effort. Thus, the
effort difference in this case is equal to zero. When types are heterogeneous, the high type exerts a higher
effort and the effort difference is
∆xpubsim :=
VHVL (VH − VL)
(VH + VL)
2 .
In the sequential contest with public information, homogeneous types exert identical efforts as well, i.e. the
effort difference is zero again. Hence, for homogeneous types there is no gap in both settings.
When types are heterogeneous in the sequential contest under public information, the effort difference is
∆xpubseq := |x∗1 − x∗2| =

x∗1H − x∗2L = VH2
(
VH−VL
VL
)
when 1st mover is a high type
x∗2L − x∗1H = VL2
(
VH−VL
VH
)
when 1st mover is a low type.
It can easily be seen that the gap is larger, when the 1st mover is a high type as VHVL ≥ VLVH .36 Therefore, if
∆xpubseq ≥ ∆xpubsim when the 1st mover is a low type, it also holds when the 1st mover is a high type.
It remains to show that ∆xpubseq ≥ ∆xpubsim holds when the 1st mover is a low type. Trivially, for VH = VL we
obtain ∆xpubseq = ∆x
pub
sim since then types are homogeneous. For VH > VL, ∆x
pub
seq ≥ ∆xpubsim is equivalent to
(VH + VL)
2 ≥ 2V 2H .
36Compare Section 1.5.1.
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This can be written as
V 2L + VH (2VL − VH) ≥ 0,
which holds as (2VL − VH) ≥ 0 for the interior solution. Hence, we have shown that a risk neutral designer,
who aims at a close race, prefers a simultaneous contests given public information.
In the simultaneous contest with private information, homogeneous types exert the same effort.
Thus, the effort difference is equal to zero. Given heterogeneous types, the effort difference is
∆xprivsim : = x
∗
iH − x∗iL
= (VH − VL)
(
r
4
+ (1− r) VHVL
(VH + VL)
2
)
= r
(VH − VL)3
4 (VH + VL)
2 +
VHVL (VH − VL)
(VH + VL)
2 .
Using (3.7), it follows that
∆xprivsim = ∆x
pub
sim + r
(VH − VL)3
4 (VH + VL)
2 .
Hence, ∆xprivsim ≥ ∆xpubsim (with strict inequality if VH > VL and r > 0). This gives us the result that a risk
neutral designer, who aims at a close race, prefers public information to a private information given that a
simultaneous contest is played.
In the sequential contest with private information, homogeneous types do not exert the same effort,
unless VH = VL or r = 0. This means that there is a gap between efforts of the first and second mover.
Thus, the effort difference for homogeneous types is larger than in the simultaneous contest with private
information and in the sequential contest with public information. Using the results from Proposition 7,
where we show that the first mover makes a higher (lower) bid than the second mover when he is the high
(low) type, we can derive the following gaps in the contestants’ bids:
∆xhomseq :=

x∗1H − x∗H2H = αH
(
2αH −
√
VH
)
when contestants are high types
x∗L2L − x∗1L = αL
(√
VL − 2αL
)
when contestants are low types.
For heterogeneous types, the effort difference is
∆xhetseq :=

x∗1H − x∗H2L = αH
(
2αH −
√
VL
)
when the 1st mover is a high type
x∗L2H − x∗1L = αL
(√
VH − 2αL
)
when the 1st mover is a low type.
Hence, the ex ante expected gap in case of private information is given by
∆˜xprivseq : =
1
2
r
(
x∗1H − x∗H2H + x∗L2L − x∗1L
)
+
1
2
(1− r) (x∗1H − x∗H2L + x∗L2H − x∗1L)
=
1
2
[
2(α2H − α2L)− αHV
1
2
L + αLV
1
2
H + r(αH + αL)
(
V
1
2
L − V
1
2
H
)]
.
Plugging in α and rearranging yields
∆˜xprivseq = (1− r)VH − VL4VHVL
[
(1− r)(V 2H + V 2L ) + rV
1
2
H V
1
2
L (VH + VL)
]
.
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The ex ante expected gap in case of public information is
∆˜xpubseq : =
1
2
r · 0 + 1
2
(1− r)
(
VH
2
(
VH − VL
VL
)
+
VL
2
(
VH − VL
VH
))
=
1
4VHVL
(1− r)(VH − VL)
(
V 2H + V
2
L
)
.
Comparing the ex ante expected gaps under public and private information, we see that for VL = VH as
well as for r = 0 and r = 1 they are equally large. This is intuitive as in these cases there is in fact public
information. Let now V<VH and r ∈ (0, 1). It is straightforward to verify that ∆˜xprivseq < ∆˜xpubseq is equivalent
to
r2
(
V
− 12
H − V
− 12
L
)2 [
V
1
2
H V
1
2
L (VH − VL) + V 2H − V 2L
]
+ r
(
V
− 12
H − V
− 12
L
) [
2V
3
2
L + VHV
1
2
L + VLV
1
2
H
]
< 0.
This can be rewritten as (
V
1
2
H − V
1
2
L
)(
V
3
2
L − V
3
2
H
)
< 0,
which is obviously true. Thus, ∆˜xprivseq ≤ ∆˜xpubseq is always satisfied (with equality for r = 0, r = 1 and
VH = VL). This implies that given a sequential contest is played, the designer prefers private information
from an ex ante perspective if he wants to have a close race.
The last step of the proof is to show that in the private information setting for heterogeneous types, the
designer prefers the simultaneous contest, when he aims at a close race. In order to show this, we consider
the expected effort difference ∆˜xprivseq in the sequential contest and show that this difference is larger than
in the simultaneous contest, i.e.
∆˜xprivseq ≥ 12(1− r)2∆x
priv
sim +
1
2
r · 0 =: ∆˜xprivsim (A.13)
using the result that the effort difference for homogeneous types is zero in the simultaneous contest. Evidently,
for VL = VH and also for r = 1 the expected gaps are identical. Suppose now VL < VH and r < 1. Then,
(A.13) is equivalent to
(VH + VL)2
[
(1− r)(V 2H + V 2L ) + rV
1
2
H V
1
2
L (VH + VL)
]
≥ rVHVL(VH − VL)2 + 4V 2LV 2H .
We can rewrite this as
2VHVL(VH − VL) + (1− r)(V 4H + V 4L + 2V 3LVH) + r
(
V 2H(V
1
2
H − V
1
2
L )
2 + V 2HV
1
2
L (2V
1
2
L − V
1
2
H )
+V 2LV
1
2
H (V
1
2
H − V
1
2
L ) + V
3
L + 2V
2
LVH
)
≥ 0. (A.14)
Note that for the interior solution r ≥ r˜ = 2VL−VH√
VH(
√
VL−
√
VH)
has to be satisfied. This can only be
satisfied if r˜ ≤ 1, which is equivalent to 4VL ≥ VH . Hence, for 4VL < VH we cannot have an interior
solution. This implies that V
1
2
H ≤ 2V
1
2
L holds for the interior solution. Using this observation and
VL ≤ VH , it can be seen that (A.14) is satisfied and thus, ∆˜xprivseq ≥ ∆˜xprivsim . Hence, given private infor-
mation, the designer prefers simultaneous contests from an ex ante perspective when his aim is a close race.
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Proof of Lemma 2.
The participation constraint for agent i if the principal wants to implement the effort vector (eˆi, eˆ−i) is
pHH(eˆi, eˆ−i)wHi + (1− pHH(eˆi, eˆ−i))wLi − c(eˆi) ≥ 0.
If the agent provides zero effort, he can ensure an expected payoff of zero. Moreover, the incentive constraint
is the maximizer of the agent’s expected payoff, hence, the agent cannot earn a negative expected payoff.
Note that a sufficient condition for the agent’s problem (the incentive constraint) to be concave in ei is
wHi ≥ wLi as the probability of success function is concave and the cost function convex in ei. For the
optimal wage scheme, wHi ≥ wLi – as we show below. Thus, a global maximum of the agent’s problem exists.
The principal’s problem is a linear optimization problem, where the feasible set is convex and the objective
function is continuous and linear in wYci .
As already mentioned in the text, setting wLi > 0 decreases incentives compared to setting w
L
i = 0 as
∂pHL(eˆi,eˆ−i)
∂ei
< 0 (which can be seen from the incentive constraints). Thus, eˆi has to be smaller, too. This
cannot be profit maximizing for the principal since effort is smaller and the principal pays the agent more
by setting wLi > 0, which reduces his profit. Therefore, w
L
i = 0.
It remains to solve for the optimal wage if the project succeeds, wHi , to implement efforts (eˆ1, eˆ2), which we
can derive from the incentive constraints. Using wLi = 0, we can write the incentive constraints (IC
simc
i ) as
∂pHH(eˆi, eˆ−i)
∂ei
wHi = c
′(eˆi) ∀i. (A.15)
This first order condition yields a global maximum since the second order conditions
∂2pHH(eˆi, eˆ−i)
∂e2i
wHi − c′′(eˆi) < 0 ∀i (A.16)
are satisfied for the optimal wage scheme as the cost function is strictly convex, pHH(ei, e−i) is concave in
ei by assumption, and wHi ≥ 0 must hold true by the limited liability constraint. Assuming for the moment
that the limited liability constraints are met, the optimal wage for agent i to implement an effort level of
eˆi when both agents perform well (given an effort level eˆ−i) has to satisfy wHi =
c′(eˆi)
pHHei
(eˆi,eˆ−i)
as stated in
Lemma 2. Note that this wage is non-negative and strictly larger than zero for ei > 0. Hence, the limited
liability constraints are satisfied and wHi ≥ wLi = 0.
Note that the principal pays the wage for a project with high value with probability pHH(eˆi, eˆ−i) to agent
i. Thus, expected implementation costs for effort eˆi are Wsimci = p
HH(eˆi,eˆ−i)
pHHei
(eˆi,eˆ−i)
c′(eˆi) =
p(eˆi)
p′(eˆi)
c′(eˆi).
Proof A.
In order to show that our results do not change if the second mover can also observe the effort of the first
mover, it suffices to consider the incentive constraints of the second mover (which we give later in Section
2.3.2):
After seeing H : eH2 ∈ argmax
e2∈I
Pr[H|H, eˆ1, e2]wH2 + Pr[L|H, eˆ1, e2]wL2 − c(e2),
After seeing L : eL2 ∈ argmax
e2∈I
wL2 − c(e2).
Obviously, the effort of the first mover does not enter the incentive constraint of the second mover when he
observes low quality. Hence, only the incentive constraint after having observed a high quality contribution
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can be affected when effort is observable. Plugging in the conditional probabilities according to (2.2), we
can write the incentive constraint as follows:
After seeing H : eH2 ∈ argmax
e2∈I
p(e2)wH2 + (1− p(e2))wL2 − c(e2).
Thus, this incentive constraint is also independent of the effort of the first mover. This implies immediately
that our results do not change when the second mover can also observe the effort of the first mover.
Proof of Lemma 4.
Like for the case of complements, the principal’s problem is a linear optimization problem, where the feasible
set is convex and the objective function is continuous and linear in wYsi . By a similar argument than for the
case of complements, we can drop the participation constraints and focus only on the incentive and limited
liability constraints. The incentive constraint (ICsimsi ) for agent i is:
eˆi ∈ argmaxei∈I pHH(ei, eˆ−i, )wHi + pHL(ei, eˆ−i)wMi + pLH(ei, eˆ−i)wMi
+pLL(ei, eˆ−i)wLi − c(ei),
where we denote Nash equilibrium effort levels by eˆi. We can rewrite this problem as∑
Y−i
∑
Yi
∂pYiY−i(eˆi, eˆ−i)
∂ei
wYsi − c′(eˆi) = 0. (A.17)
Like we have seen in the proof of Lemma 2 for the case that contributions are complements, wLi > 0 cannot
be optimal by the same argument: it decreases incentives and reduces profits. Thus, wLi = 0. By the
same argument, it cannot be optimal to set wMi > 0 if
∂(pLHi (eˆi,eˆ−i)+p
HL
i (eˆi,eˆ−i))
∂ei
≤ 0 (condition A). Thus,
wMi = 0 under condition A.
If the wages in case that at least one agent contributes low quality are zero, we can derive the wage when
both agents perform well from the incentive constraint in (A.17). If condition A is, however, not satisfied,
i.e. ∂(p
LH
i (eˆi,eˆ−i)+p
HL
i (eˆi,eˆ−i))
∂ei
> 0, we have to consider the problem of the principal.
Let first condition A be satisfied. Using wMi = wLi = 0, the problem of the agent simplifies to
∂pHH(eˆi, eˆ−i)
∂ei
wHi − c′(eˆi) = 0. (A.18)
The second order conditions
∂2pHH(ei, e−i)
∂e2i
wHi − c′′(ei) < 0 (A.19)
are satisfied as the cost function is strictly convex, pHH(ei, e−i) is concave in ei, and wHi ≥ 0 by the limited
liability constraint. Hence, (A.18) yields a global maximum: The wage for agent i to implement effort eˆi
(given the other agent’s effort e−i) has to be wHi =
c′(eˆi)
pHHei
(eˆi,eˆ−i)
. Note that wHi is non-negative (strictly
positive for eˆi > 0). Thus, the limited liability constraints are met.
If condition A does not hold, i.e. ∂(pLHi (eˆi,eˆ−i)+pHLi (eˆi,eˆ−i))∂ei > 0 (condition B), we cannot (immedi-
ately) conclude that wMi = 0, but have to consider the problem of the principal. The problem of the
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principal under condition B is
max
wHi ,w
M
i
−
∑
i
pHH(eˆi, eˆ−i)wHi −
∑
i
[pHL(eˆi, eˆ−i) + pLH(eˆi, eˆ−i)]wMi
s.t eˆi ∈ argmaxei∈I pHH(ei, eˆ−i, )wHi + (pHL(ei, eˆ−i) + pLH(ei, eˆ−i))wMi − c(ei) ∀i,
s.t wYsi ≥ 0 ∀Ys(Yi, Y−i), ∀i
Denoting by δ the Lagrange multiplier, the first order conditions with respect to wages are
wHi : −pHH(ei, eˆ−i) + δ
(
∂pHH(ei, eˆ−i)
∂ei
)
≤ 0, wHi
∂L
∂wHi
= 0,
wMi : −[pHL(ei, eˆ−i) + pLH(eˆi, eˆ−i)] + δ
(
∂(pHL(ei, eˆ−i) + pLH(eˆi, eˆ−i))
∂ei
)
≤ 0, wMi
∂L
∂wMi
= 0.
It follows from these first order conditions that if
pHH(ei, eˆ−i)
pHHei (ei, eˆ−i)
<
pHL(ei, eˆ−i) + pLH(ei, eˆ−i)
pHLei (ei, eˆ−i) + p
LH
ei (ei, eˆ−i)
, (A.20)
then wHi > 0 and w
M
i = 0.
37 We refer to condition (A.20) as condition W .
If condition W is not satisfied, but (A.20) holds instead with equality, then all wHi – wMi combinations that
satisfy the incentive constraint (A.17) are optimal. If the inequality in (A.20) is reversed, then wHi = 0 and
wMi > 0.
Using independence of individual success probabilities, condition B simplifies to p′(ei)(1 − 2p(eˆ−i)) > 0
and condition W to p(ei)p′(ei) <
p(ei)(1−2p(eˆ−i))+p(eˆ−i)
p′(ei)(1−2p(eˆ−i)) .
38 Since p′(ei)(1 − 2p(eˆ−i)) > 0, we can further simplify
condition W to p(eˆ−i) > 0.
Hence, for p(eˆ−i) > 0, we have that
pHH(ei,eˆ−i)
pHHei
(ei,eˆ−i)
≥ pHL(ei,eˆ−i)+pLH(ei,eˆ−i)
pHLei
(ei,eˆ−i)+pLHei (ei,eˆ−i)
cannot be satisfied. Thus, we have
wHi > 0 and w
M
i = 0 (like under condition A). Moreover, we can derive wHi – exactly like under condition
A – from the agent’s incentive constraint (A.18) and hence, wHi = c
′(eˆi)
pHHei
(eˆi,eˆ−i)
.
Proof B.
Exactly like for the case of complements, we can show that the incentive constraints of the second mover
(see Section 2.5.2) are independent of the first mover’s effort by plugging in the conditional probabilities:
After seeing H : eH2 ∈ argmax
e2∈I
p(e2)wH2 + (1− p(e2))wM2 − c(e2),
After seeing L : eL2 ∈ argmax
e2∈I
(1− p(e2))wM2 − c(e2).
Again, it immediately follows, that observability of the first mover’s effort does not change our results.
Proof of Lemma 5.
As argued in the text, the wage for the second mover when both agents fail is equal to zero (compare the
37We assume here that pHHei (ei, eˆ−i) > 0 and p
HL
ei (ei, eˆ−i) + p
LH
ei (ei, eˆ−i) > 0 such that (A.20) is always defined.
We see below that this holds under condition B.
38Note that condition B implies p′(ei) > 0 and hence condition W is always defined.
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argument in Section 2.3.2.). We can rewrite the incentive constraint of the second mover after observing a
poor performance of the first mover as
pLHe2 (eˆ1, e
L
2 )
1− p(eˆ1) w
M
2 − c′(eL2 ) = 0. (A.21)
As mentioned in the text, the second order condition is satisfied for the optimal wage scheme since the cost
function is strictly convex, pLH(eˆ1, e2) is concave in e2, and given that the limited liability constraint is
satisfied (what we assume for the moment and show in the following that it is indeed true). Hence, the first
oder condition in (A.21) yields the optimal wage
wM2 =
c′(eL2 )
pLHe2 (eˆ1, e
L
2 )
(1− p(eˆ1)) = c
′(eL2 )
p′(eL2 )
.
This wage is non-negative and strictly positive for eH2 > 0. Thus, the limited liability constraint is satisfied.
We can write the incentive constraint of the second mover after observing a high performance of the first
mover as follows:
p′(eL2 )
[
wH2 − wM2
]− c′(eL2 ).
Note that the second order conditions are satisfied if wH2 ≥ wM2 , which is satisfied in equilibrium as we show
below. Hence, we can derive from the first order condition the optimal wage for the case that the project
has a high value. Plugging in wM2 into the other first order condition in state H and solving for w
H
2 yields
wH2 =
c′(eH2 )
p′(eH2 )
+
c′(eL2 )
p′(eL2 )
.
Obviously, wH2 ≥ wM2 as wH2 = c
′(eH2 )
p′(eH2 )
+ wM2 . Since w
M
2 ≥ 0, also wH2 ≥ 0, which satisfies the limited
liability constraint.
By an analogue argument as given for the simultaneous structure (see Proof of Lemma 5) and for the
sequential structure when contributions are complements (see Section 2.3.2), the first mover’s wages are
wH1 =
c′(eˆ1)
pHHe1 (eˆ1,e
H
2 )
, wM1 = w
L
1 = 0. Similar to the observation when contributions are complements, however,
as mentioned earlier in Section 2.3.2, equilibrium efforts of the first mover need not be identical under both
structures when eH2 differs from eˆ2.
Condition Z.
Consider the sequential structure when contributions are substitutes. Given the optimal wage scheme, the
problem of the principal is to maximize his expected profits with respect to efforts:39
max
e1∈I,eH2 ∈I,eL2∈I
[(
2p(e1)p(eH2 ) + p(e1)(1− p(eH2 )) + p(eL2 )(1− p(e1))
)
pi − p(e1)p(eH2 )
c′(e1)
p′(e1)p(eH2 )
−p(e1)p(eH2 )
(
c′(eH2 )
p′(eH2 )
+
c′(eL2 )
p′(eL2 )
)
− [(1− p(e1))p(eL2 ) + p(e1)(1− p(eL2 ))] c′(eL2 )p′(eL2 )
]
Summarizing yields
max
e1∈I,eH2 ∈I,eL2∈I
[(
p(e1)p(eH2 ) + p(e1) + p(e
L
2 )(1− p(e1))
)
pi − p(e1) c
′(e1)
p′(e1)
−p(e1)p(eH2 )
c′(eH2 )
p′(eH2 )
− [(1− p(e1))p(eL2 ) + p(e1)] c′(eL2 )p′(eL2 )
]
(A.22)
39Note that wM2 is paid in case the first mover provides high quality and the second mover low quality as well as
when the first one performs poorly and the second one performs well.
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Suppose now that the principal implements eL2 = 0. Denote by e
◦
1 and e
H◦
2 the profit-maximizing efforts for
this case. Note that e◦1 and e
H◦
2 need not be profit-maximizing for the case that e
L
2 > 0. We calculate the
difference in expected profits when either eL2 > 0 or e
L
2 = 0. For both cases, we evaluate expected profits
at e◦1 and e
H◦
2 , which are optimal for e
L
2 = 0, but not necessarily for e
L
2 > 0. If this difference in expected
profits is, nevertheless, positive, it is also positive for the optimal efforts e1 and eH2 given e
L
2 > 0. Hence, if
the difference is positive, eL2 > 0 is optimal. The difference in expected profits is
40
(1− p(e◦1))
(
p(eL2 )− p(0)
)
pi − [(1− p(e◦1))p(eL2 ) + p(e◦1)] c′(eL2 )p′(eL2 ) .
Thus, the difference in expected profits is larger than zero under the following condition (Condition Z):
pi >
c′(eL2 )
p′(eL2 )
[
p(e◦1) + (1− p(e◦1))p(eL2 )
(1− p(e◦1))
(
p(eL2 )− p(0)
)] .
Hence, if pi is sufficiently large it is optimal to implement a strictly positive effort for the second mover after
a poor performance of the first mover.
Proof of Lemma 6.
Suppose the principal wants to implement an effort level of e?1 for the first mover and an expected effort of
e?2 = p(e
?
1)e
H?
2 + (1 − p(e?1))eL?2 for the second mover. Given the optimal wage scheme, the problem of the
principal becomes (compare (A.22))
max
eL?2 ∈I
[(
p(e?1)p(e
H?
2 ) + p(e
?
1) + p(e
L?
2 )(1− p(e?1))
)
pi − p(e?1)
c′(e?1)
p′(e?1)
−p(e?1)p(eH?2 )
c′(eH?2 )
p′(eH2 )
− [(1− p(e?1))p(eL?2 ) + p(e?1)] c′(eL?2 )p′(eL2 )
]
s.t. e?2 = p(e
?
1)e
H?
2 + (1− p(e?1))eL?2 .
The first order condition to this problem is
[
(1− p(e?1))
(
p′(eL?2 )− p′(eH?2 )
)]
pi + (1− p(e?1))
[
c′(eH?2 )− c′(eL?2 )
]
−(1− p(e?1))p(eH?2 )
[−p′(eH?2 )c′′(eH?2 ) + c′(eH?2 )p′′(eH?2 )
p′(eH?2 )2
]
− p(e?1)
[
p′(eL?2 )c
′′(eL?2 )− c′(eL?2 )p′′(eL?2 )
p′(eL?2 )2
]
−(1− p(e?1))p(eL?2 )
[
p′(eL?2 )c
′′(eL?2 )− c′(eL?2 )p′′(eL?2 )
p′(eL?2 )2
]
= 0.
The first order condition is also sufficient (since p is strictly increasing and concave and c is strictly convex)
if Assumption C is satisfied. This is evident from the maximization problem if we note that under our
assumptions on p and c it follows from Assumption C that p(e) c′(e)p′(e) is strictly convex. To see this implication
of Assumption C, let f(e) := c′(e)p′(e) and g(e) := p(e) c
′(e)
p′(e) = p(e)f(e). Hence, g
′(e) = p′(e)f(e) + p(e)f ′(e)
is strictly positive by the assumptions on p and c. These imply, in particular, f(e) ≥ 0 and f ′(e) =
p′(e)c′′(e)−p′′(e)c′(e)
p′(e)2 > 0. Consider now the second derivative of g:
g′′(e) = p′′(e)f(e) + 2p′(e)f ′(e) + p(e)f ′′(e).
40Note that c′(0) = 0.
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Under Assumption C (i.e. f ′′(e) ≥ 0)), for this derivative being positive, it suffices to show that
p′′(e)f(e) + 2p′(e)f ′(e) > 0. p′′(e)f(e) + 2p′(e)f ′(e) is equal to 2p
′(e)c′′(e)−p′′(e)c′(e)
p′(e) , which is strictly larger
than zero. Hence, we have by Assumption C that g′′(e) > 0. This establishes that the first order condition
is also sufficient.
Rewriting the first order condition by using k(e) := p(e)
[
p′(e)c′′(e)−c′(e)p′′(e)
p′(e)2
]
yields
(1− p(e?1))
[(
p′(eL?2 )− p′(eH?2 )
)
pi +
(
c′(eH?2 )− c′(eL?2 )
)− (k(eL?2 )− k(eH?2 ))] = p(e?1)k(eL?2 ). (A.23)
Note that k(e) = p(e)f ′(e) > 0, which implies that the right hand side of (A.23) is strictly positive.
Moreover, under Assumption C it follows that k′(e) = p′(e)f ′(e) + p(e)f ′′(e) > 0.
Suppose now that eL?2 = e
H?
2 . The first order condition then simplifies to
0 = p(e?1)k(e
L?
2 ).
This condition can, however, never be satisfied as the right hand side is strictly larger than zero. Hence, it
cannot be optimal to set eL?2 = e
H?
2 .
In order to show that it is optimal to set eL?2 < e
H?
2 , suppose first e
L?
2 > e
H?
2 . e
L?
2 > e
H?
2 im-
plies that the left hand side of (A.23) is strictly negative as p′(eL?2 ) − p′(eH?2 ) becomes non-negative,
c′(eH?2 ) − c′(eL?2 ) becomes strictly negative, and k(eL?2 ) − k(eH?2 ) becomes strictly positive. Since the right
hand side of (A.23) is strictly positive, the first order condition cannot be satisfied for eL?2 > e
H?
2 . Hence,
eL?2 < e
H?
2 must hold true.
Proof of Lemma 7.
The difference in expected revenues between the simultaneous and the sequential structure is
∆R =
[
p(e?2)−
(
p(e?1)p(e
H?
2 )) + (1− p(e?1))p(eL?2 )
)]
pi
since e?1 is implemented for agent 1 under both structures. Suppose now that p is concave and the principal
implements e?2 = p(e
?
1)e
H?
2 + (1− p(e?1))eL?2 under the simultaneous structure. Then, by Jensen’s Inequality
p(e?2) = p(p(e
?
1)e
H?
2 + (1 − p(e?1)eL?2 ) ≤ p(e?1)p(eH?2 ) + (1 − p(e?1))p(eL?2 ) (with strict inequality for strict
concavity and eL?2 6= eH?2 ).
Proof C.
Expected implementation costs for both agents under the simultaneous structure and for the first mover
under the sequential structure (compare (2.5) and (2.6)) are convex if and only if p(e)p′(e)c
′(e) is convex in
effort. Moreover, the convexity of p(e)p′(e)c
′(e) is a sufficient condition for expected implementation costs for
the second mover under the sequential structure (compare (2.7)) to be convex.
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Within the Proof of Lemma 6 we show that Assumption C) implies that p(e)p′(e)c′(e) is strictly convex. Hence,
under Assumption C, expected implementation costs are convex in effort.
Proof of Lemma 9.
The difference in expected implementation costs for the second agent between the simultaneous and sequential
structure is
∆SM : = W sims2 −W seqs2
=
p(e?2)
p′(e?2)
c′(e?2)− p(e?1)
p(eH?2 )
p′(eH?2 )
c′(eH?2 )− (1− p(e?1))
p(eL?2 )
p′(eL?2 )
c′(eL?2 )−
p(e?1)
p′(eL?2 )
c′(eL?2 ).
Note that the term p(e
?
1)
p′(eL?2 )
c′(eL?2 ) in ∆SM increases expected implementation costs of the sequential structure
relative to the simultaneous one. Dropping this term, we have
∆SM+ :=
p(e?2)
p′(e?2)
c′(e?2)−
[
p(e?1)
p(eH?2 )
p′(eH?2 )
c′(eH?2 ) + (1− p(e?1))
p(eL?2 )
p′(eL?2 )
c′(eL?2 )
]
.
Let Assumption C be satisfied. Under Assumption C, p(e2)p′(e2)c′(e2) =: f(e2) is strictly convex (see Proof C).
Suppose the principal implements for the first agent the same effort under both structures (i.e. e?1) and
for the second agent, he implements the same effort (in expectation), i.e. e?2 = p(e
?
1)e
H?
2 + (1 − p(e?1))eL?2 .
Then, by Jensen’s Inequality, f(e?2) = f(p(e
?
1)e
H?
2 + (1 − p(e?1))eL?2 ) ≤ p(e?1)f(eH?2 ) + (1 − p(e?1))f(eL?2 ).41
Thus, ∆SM+ ≤ 0 and therefore, ∆SM ≤ 0.
Further on assuming that Assumption C is satisfied, the above result holds with strict inequality if
eH?2 6= eL?2 , which establishes part (i) of the lemma.
For part (ii) of the lemma, note that ∆SM+ < ∆SM if eL?2 >. Since ∆SM
+ ≤ 0 when f is convex, it
follows that ∆SM > 0.
Proof G.
We want to check whether Lemma 6 still holds true for the general case of substitutes and complements.
This means whether it is optimal for the principal to implement a higher for the second mover in the high
state of the world than in the low state. We should first note what changes for the general case compared
to the special case considered in the proof of Lemma 6. As the optimal wage scheme does not change, the
only difference is captured by expected revenues. This implies that we just need to plug in the new expected
revenue function and otherwise can stick to the procedure of the proof of Lemma 6. Expected revenues
under the sequential structure are now
pi[pHH(e?1, e
H?
2 )H+ (pHL(e?1, eH?2 ) + pLH(e?1, eL?2 ))M].
We can rewrite expected revenues as follows
pi[p(e?1)p(e
H?
2 )(H−M) + (p(e?1) + p(eL?2 ) + p(e?1)p(eL?2 ))M].
41Note that for this result weak convexity of f is sufficient.
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Hence, the first order condition of the principals maximization problem, which we derived in the proof of
Lemma 6 (see equation (A.23)), becomes
(1− p(e?1))
[
pi[
(
p′(eH?2 ) + p
′(eL?2 )
)M−Hp′(eH?2 )]]+ (A.24)
(1− p(e?1))
[(
c′(eH?2 )− c′(eL?2 )
)− (k(eL?2 )− k(eH?2 ))] = p(e?1)k(eL?2 ),
where k(e) = p(e)
[
p′(e)c′′(e)−c′(e)p′′(e)
p′(e)2
]
.
Similar to the proof of Lemma 6, we can again conclude that the first order condition is sufficient given
Assumption C: Since only expected revenues differ here, we just check whether it is still true that the second
derivative of expected revenues with respect to eL?2 subject to e
?
2 = p(e
?
1)e
H?
2 + (1 − p(e?1))eL?2 is negative.
This derivative is
pi(1− p(e?1))[Mp′′(eL?2 ) +
1− p(e?1)
p(e?1)
(H−M)p′′(eH?2 )],
which is smaller than zero since p is concave and H ≥ M. Hence, given Assumption C, the first order
condition is again sufficient.
Can it be optimal to implement eL?2 = e
H?
2 ? If we plug in e
L?
2 = e
H?
2 into equation (A.24), we have
pip(e?1)p(e
L?
2 )(2M−H)) = p(e?1)k(eL?2 ).
Since k(e) > 0, the right hand side is strictly positive. 2M − H is negative for complements, thus the
left hand side is negative. Hence, the first order condition can never be satisfied. This means that for
complements eL?2 = e
H?
2 cannot be optimal. For substitutes, however, 2M−H ≥ 0. Thus, it can be optimal
to set eL?2 = e
H?
2 if 2M−H > 0, otherwise it cannot be optimal.
Is it optimal to implement eL?2 < e
H?
2 ? Consider the first order condition (A.24) and suppose first that the
principal implements eL?2 > e
H?
2 . Given e
L?
2 > e
H?
2 , we have[(
c′(eH?2 )− c′(eL?2 )
)− (k(eL?2 )− k(eH?2 ))] < 0
(compare proof of Lemma 6). Moreover, p′(eL?2 ) ≤ p′(eH?2 ). This implies that
pi[
(
p′(eH?2 ) + p
′(eL?2 )
)M−Hp′(eH?2 )] ≤ pi[(p′(eH?2 )) (2M−H)].
For complements, pi[
(
p′(eH?2 )
)
(2M−H)] < 0. Hence, the left hand side of (A.24) is negative for complements.
Thus, for complements Lemma 6 still applies, i.e. eL?2 < e
H?
2 is optimal given that Assumption C holds.
Similarly, we can conclude for substitutes that eL?2 < e
H?
2 is optimal given that Assumption C holds if
2M−H = 0. For 2M−H > 0, however, we cannot exclude any case as pi[(p′(eH?2 ) + p′(eL?2 ))M−Hp′(eH?2 )] >
0 holds true for eL?2 < e
H?
2 but can also hold true for e
L?
2 > e
H?
2 . Thus, for the general case of substitutes
eL?2 ≥ eH?2 as well as eL?2 < eH?2 can be optimal. This means Lemma 6 only applies for substitutes if
2M−H = 0 (which we earlier denoted by perfect substitutes).
Proof: Subjects Play a Pure Strategy
Before we prove that subjects play (in general) a pure strategy, we first want to define beliefs
and strategies of a subject. We let µj be the individual’s belief that alternative j is true, where
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j ∈ {0, . . . J}, J ∈ {2, 3, 4, 8, 70} with ∑Jj µj = 1. Next, we define a strategy of an individual. A
pure strategy of an individual is an action or alternative a subject can choose, i.e. a pure strategy
is j ∈ J = {0, . . . J}. Given an individual’s pure strategy set J , an individual’s mixed strategy,
σ : J → [0, 1], assigns to each pure strategy j a probability σj ≥ 0 with which j will be played,
where
∑
j σj = 1. Further, we denote by c the high payoff (i.e. 525, 1680, 105, 400 or 500 Tokens)
and by c−κ the low one (i.e. 20, 30, 315, 50 or 300 Tokens). We assume, without loss of generality,
that µ1 ≥ µ2 ≥ · · · ≥ µJ .
Then one can show the following:
Proposition 19 Unless µ1 = µ2, an individual plays a pure strategy. More precisely, the individual
sets σ1 = 1 if µ1 > µj ∀j 6= 1. If µ1 = · · · = µn > µn+1 ≥ · · · ≥ µJ with J ≥ n ≥ 2, then any σ
with σ1 + · · ·+ σn = 1 can be optimal.
This result implies that a mixed strategy is not optimal as long as an individual that is uncertain
about the right action attaches a higher probability to one possible action than to all other actions.
Since all the decision problems in our experiment have this structure – subjects have the choice
between {1, . . . , J} alternatives with J ∈ {2, 4, 3, 8}, we can apply this proposition to all of them.
If subjects make the “right” choice (the right guess for the interval, the right guess for the relative
bias or the right guess for the number of correctly answered questions), they receive a high payoff,
say c, and if the choice is not correct, they receive c− κ.
Proof of Proposition 19.
The subjectively expected utility of an individual from strategy σ is
µ1[σ1u(c) + σ2u(c− κ) + · · ·+ σJu(c− κ)] + µ2[σ1u(c− κ) + σ2u(c) + · · ·+ σJu(c− κ)]
+ · · ·+ µJ [σ1u(c− κ) + σ2u(c− κ) . . . σJu(c)].
Rearranging yields
u(c)
∑
j
µjσj + u(c− κ) [σ1(
∑
j 6=1
µj) + σ2(
∑
j 6=2
µj) + · · ·+ σJ(
∑
j 6=J
µj)]︸ ︷︷ ︸
=
∑
j σj(
∑
i6=j µi)
. (A.25)
Suppose now that subjects never put the same probability on alternatives. Without loss of generality
µ1 > µ2 > · · · > µJ . The expected utility under a strategy that sets σ1 = 1 would be
u(c)µ1 + u(c− κ)
∑
j 6=1
µj . (A.26)
Compare this to a strategy σ′ that puts some positive weight on other alternatives (i.e. σ′1 < 1). This means,
we subtract (A.25) from (A.26), where we, however, replace all σj by σ′j in the latter. This yields
u(c) [(1− σ′1)µ1 −
∑
j 6=1
µjσ
′
j ]︸ ︷︷ ︸
(A)
+u(c− κ) [
∑
j 6=1
µj −
∑
j
σ′j(
∑
i 6=j
µi)]︸ ︷︷ ︸
(B)
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As long as this difference is positive, the strategy that sets σ1 = 1 is optimal. Consider term (A) using that
σ′2 = 1−
∑
j 6=2 σ
′
j :
(1− σ′1)µ1 −
∑
j 6=1
µjσ
′
j = (1− σ′1)(µ1 − µ2) + µ2(
∑
j>2
σ′j)−
∑
j>2
µjσ
′
j = (1− σ′1)(µ1 − µ2) +
∑
j>2
(µ2 − µj)σ′j .
This is strictly larger than zero since µ1 > µ2 > · · · > µJ . The smallest value it can take is zero if and only
if µ1 = µ2 = · · · = µJ . Consider now term (B):∑
j 6=1
µj −
∑
j
σ′j(
∑
i 6=j
µi) = (1− σ′1)
∑
j 6=1
µj −
∑
j 6=1
σ′j (
∑
i 6=j
µi︸ ︷︷ ︸
1−µj
) = (1− σ′1)(µ2 − µ1) +
∑
j>2
σ′j(µj − µ2).
This term is (strictly) negative (the term equals zero if µ1 = µ2 = · · · = µJ), but the absolute value is the
same for the term (A) and (B). Since the first is weighted by u(c) > u(c− κ), subjectively expected utility
from the strategy setting σ1 = 1 is larger than from σ′ and hence, this is the optimal strategy.
It is easy to see that this result also holds true for µ1 > µ2 ≥ · · · ≥ µJ , since σ′1 < 1. If, however,
µ1 = · · · = µn > µn+1 ≥ · · · ≥ µJ with J ≥ n ≥ 2, then any σ with σ1 + · · · + σn = 1 can be optimal. To
see this, note that term (A) simplifies to ∑
j>n
(µ2 − µj)σ′j
and (B) to ∑
j>n
σ′j(µj − µ2)
as µ1 = µn. Consider a strategy σ′ that sets σ′j = 0 for all j > n (i.e. all j for which µ2 − µj > 0) and∑
j≤n σ
′
j = 1. Then term (A) and term (B) would be both equal to zero under this strategy σ
′. Hence, the
strategy setting σ1 = 1 yields the same expected payoff than σ′. Thus, any strategy that sets σ1+· · ·+σn = 1
can be optimal.
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Instructions (translated from German) 
 
Instructions R Hard – Part 1  
 
In this scientific experiment you can earn money with your decisions. During the experiment your 
payoffs are given in tokens.  
After the experiment this amount of tokens will be converted into euros according to the exchange rate  
of 1 euro for 210 tokens and paid cash to you. 
 
Course of the Experiment: 
 
The experiment consists of two stages. In stage 1 you answer 7 multiple-choice questions. In stage 2 
you make a decision. The payoff for this decision depends among other things on the number of 
multiple-choice questions you answered correctly. You get the instructions for stage 2 after having 
answered the 7 questions.  
 
Stage 1:  
 
• 7 multiple-choice questions are posed. For each question you get 4 possible answers to 
choose from. At a time, only one of these possible answers is correct.  
You choose your answer to a question by clicking on the circle in front of the corresponding 
answer and then clicking “OK”. As soon as you click OK, you cannot change your answer 
any more and the next question appears.  
 
• You have at most 45 seconds to give your answer to each of the questions. During these 45 
seconds you can give your answer at any time. The time that is left for a question is shown on 
the screen. When time has run out, the computer automatically shows the following question. 
• Please note: If you do not click on one answer or not click OK before the time has run 
out, this means the same as if you give a wrong answer. 
• Once you have answered all questions, the computer determines how many questions you 
have answered correctly. You receive the information how many correct answers you 
have after the experiment, i.e. after stage 2.  
 
Payoff for stage 1:  
 
      For each correct answer you receive 190 tokens and for each wrong one you receive 10 tokens. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Instructions R Hard – Part 2  
 
Stage 2:  
In stage 2 you choose one out of eight possible actions 0, 1, 2, 3, 4, 5, 6, 7.  This is done by entering 
one of these numbers in the corresponding cell on the computer screen and you confirm your choice 
by clicking on “OK”.   
Payoff stage 2:  
The following table shows the payoffs in tokens, which you receive depending on you choice and how 
many questions you answered correctly in stage 1. You are not told until after the experiment how 
many questions you answered correctly.  
 
Number of correct questions  
0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
Action 0 525 30 30 30 30 30 30 30 
Action 1 30 525 30 30 30 30 30 30 
Action 2 30 30 525 30 30 30 30 30 
Action 3 30 30 30 525 30 30 30 30 
Action 4 30 30 30 30 525 30 30 30 
Action 5 30 30 30 30 30 525 30 30 
Action 6 30 30 30 30 30 30 525 30 
 
A 
c 
t 
i 
o 
n 
Action 7 30 30 30 30 30 30 30 525 
        
Calculation of your total payoff: 
 
• Your total payoff from the experiment is given by the number of all your correctly 
answered questions multiplied by 190 tokens and the number of wrong answers 
multiplied by 10 tokens (your payoff in stage 1) and  the payoff from your chosen action 
(your payoff in stage 2). In addition you receive a payment of 525 tokens. 
• This total payoff is converted into euros according to the exchange rate 1 Euro = 210 
tokens. 
 
 
Instructions R Tricky  
 
The instructions for R Tricky are identical to R Hard. The difference is that subjects answer 
the tricky instead of the hard questions. 
 
Hard Questions: 
 
When did the Holy Roman Empire of the German Nation stop existing? 
- 1618 
- 1918 
- 1815 
- 1806 (+) 
 
Which frequency has home power in middle Europe? 
- 220 volt 
- 110 volt 
- 60 hertz 
- 50 hertz (+) 
 
Who wrote „Iphigenie auf Aulis“? 
- Goethe  
- Euripides (+) 
- Schiller 
- Sophokles 
 
How many symphonies wrote Joseph Haydn? 
- 104 (+) 
- 41 
- 21 
- 9 
 
Which is no chemical element? 
- selenium 
- calcium 
- arsenic 
- americium 
 
How do you call the dark spots of the moon? 
- Mare (+) 
- Mire 
- Mure 
- More 
 
Which boxers fought against each other at „Rumble in the Jungle“? 
- Joe Frazier and George Foreman 
- George Foreman and Muhammed Ali (+) 
- Evander Holyfield and Mike Tyson 
- Muhammed Ali and Joe Frazier 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Tricky questions: 
 
The most expensive picture, which was bought at a German auction is from: 
- Gerhardt Richter 
- Ottmar Alt 
- Pablo Picasso 
- Max Beckmann (+) 
 
Which metropolis region has the most inhabitants? 
- Ranstad (Netherlands) (+) 
- Johannesburg (South Africa) 
- Dallas (USA) 
- Zurich (Switzerland) 
 
Which of these mountains is the highest? 
- Olymp 
- Sinai 
- Zugspitze 
- Etna (+) 
 
Which sportsman earns the most money (sum of prize money, sponsoring, 
promotion, fan articles etc.) 
- Michael Schumacher 
- Tiger Woods (+) 
- Davis Beckham 
- Lance Armstrong 
 
Which mature animal (male) weighs most on average? 
- tiger 
- domestic pig 
- polar bear 
- giraffe (+) 
 
Who has had his title for the longest period?  
- Helmut Kohl: chancellor 
- Johannes Paul II: pope 
- Bill Gates: Microsoft founder 
- Franz Beckenbauer: „emperor“ (+) 
 
Which food has the most kilocalories per 100g? 
- crispbread (+) 
- apple 
- camembert with 45% fat 
- cured eel 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Instructions T Average 
 
Course of the experiment:  
 
You make a decision between three actions and and a decision about a number. In order to make this 
decisions, you receive some information on another experiment (Experiment I), which has been 
conducted a week before.  
 
  
Description of Experiment I 
 
Experiment I had 20 participants. The experiment consisted of two stages.  
 
Stage 1 
• In the first stage, the participants answered 7 multiple-choice questions. For each of the 
questions there have been 4 possible answers. At a time, only one of these possible answers 
was correct. For each of the questions, the participants had at most 45 seconds to give their 
answer. When time had run out, the computer automatically showed the next question. In case 
no answer had been clicked on during this time, this was equivalent to giving a wrong answer. 
• The questions are attached to these instructions and you can look at them later on.  
Stage 2 
• In the second stage the participants have chosen one out of eight possible actions 0, 1, 2, 
3, 4, 5, 6, 7.   
• The payoffs (in tokens) for every possible combination of the “number of correctly 
answered questions” and the “chosen action” have been determined according to the 
payoff table below. The participants of Experiment I had this table in stage 2 in order to 
make their decision.  
 
Number of correct questions  
0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
Action 0 525 30 30 30 30 30 30 30 
Action 1 30 525 30 30 30 30 30 30 
Action 2 30 30 525 30 30 30 30 30 
Action 3 30 30 30 525 30 30 30 30 
Action 4 30 30 30 30 525 30 30 30 
Action 5 30 30 30 30 30 525 30 30 
Action 6 30 30 30 30 30 30 525 30 
 
A 
c 
t 
i 
o 
n 
Action 7 30 30 30 30 30 30 30 525 
 
  
Further relevant information 
• The participants knew in stage 1 (when answering the 7 questions) that they make a 
decision in stage 2 and that the payoff depends on the number of correctly answered 
questions. The payoff table and detailed instructions for stage 2 have not been handed to 
the participants until the beginning of stage 2.  
• The number of correct questions has been determined for each participant by the 
computer. At the end of the experiment, the participants received 190 tokens for each 
correct answer and 10 tokens for each wrong one. Each participant has not been told 
the number of correctly answered questions and the payoff until he/she has chosen 
his/her action in stage 2.  
• At the end of the experiment, the payoff of the participants from answering the questions 
and from their decision, as well as an additional payment of 525 tokens has been 
converted into euros according to the exchange rate 210 tokens = 1 euro and paid cash to 
the participants. 
 
Description of today’s Experiment 
 
Relevant results from Experiment I:
Based on the answers and the decisions of the participants of Experiment I, two averages have been 
calculated after the experiment: 
1. The average number of correct answers “R” of all participants: 
The average is calculated as follows: the number of correct answers of all participants is added 
and then divided by the number of participants (20). The resulting value is rounded on one 
decimal place. Thus, the average can take values from 0 to 7 in steps of 0.1.    
2. The average action “A” chosen by the participants: 
The average is calculated as follows:  each participant chooses an action whereat the actions 
are assigned numbers from 0 to 7 (see table). The numbers of the chosen action of each 
participant are added and then divided by the number of participants (20). The resulting value 
is rounded on one decimal place. Thus, the average action can also take values from 0 to 7 in 
steps of 0.1.    
      
Your decision: 
Before you make your decision, you are told the value of the average action (A) chosen by the 
participants of Experiment I. 
• You choose between three actions: action 1, action 2 und action 3. You select action 1, 2 
or 3 by clicking on the corresponding action on the computer screen. In the following the 
actions are explained more detailed. 
• After you have chosen one of the actions, you choose a number as described in the 
following: 
o If you have chosen action 1, you can choose a number which is larger than or 
equal to A - 0.5 and smaller than A + 0.5. 
o If you have chosen action 2, you can choose a number which is larger than A + 
0.5 and smaller than or equal to 7. 
o If you have chosen action 3, you can choose a number which is larger than or 
equal to 0 and smaller than A - 0.5.  
 
A= average action of the participants of Experiment I 
 
• You can give the number in steps of 0.1. You chose a number by entering the number you 
want to choose in the corresponding cell on the screen.  
• When you have made all decisions, please confirm your choice by clicking on “OK”.  
 
Your payoff consists of the following two components:  
 
Payoff component 1: 
 
Actions  
Action 1 Action 2 Action 3 
R is smaller than  
A-0.5 
315 315 1680 
R is larger/equal A -
0.5  and 
smaller/equal A+0.5  
1680 315 315 
Value of the 
Average number of 
correct questions 
  (R) 
R is larger than 
A+0.5 
315 1680 315 
 
A= Value of the average action of the participants of Experiment I 
 
R= Value of the average number of correct questions in Experiment I 
 
Payoff component 2: 
If the distance (explanation see below) between the number you have chosen and the average number 
of correct questions R is smaller than or equal to 0.5 and your payoff from component 1 is 1680 
tokens, then you receive in addition 105 tokens, if the distance is larger than 0.5 or your payoff from 
component 1 is 315 tokens, you receive 20 tokens.  
 
       Explanation „Distance“: 
       Consider two numbers X and Y. The distance between these two numbers is  
       X-Y if X is larger than Y and Y-X if X is smaller than Y. 
 
 
Total payoff: 
Your total payoff ist he sum of your payoffs from component 1 and 2 and an additional payment of 
625 tokens. 
Instructions T AveragePlus – Part 1  
 
 
Course of the experiment: 
 
The experiment consists of 4 stages. In stage 1 you answer 7 multiple-choice questions. In stage 2 you 
make a decision. The payoff for this decision depends among other things on the number of 
multiple-choice questions you answered correctly. After stage 2 you receive some information on 
another experiment (Experiment I). In Experiment I stage 1 and 2 have been played as well. Having 
received this information, you make a decision between two alternatives in stage 3. The payoff you get 
from the choice of an alternative depends on Experiment I and your decision in stage 2. In stage 4 you 
make a decision between three alternatives, whereat your payoff from the choice of an alternative 
depends on Experiment I. You get the instructions for stage 2, 3 and 4 after having answered the 7 
questions.  
 
 
Stage 1: 
 
Exactly like in R Hard.  
 
 
 
Instructions T Average+  – Part 2  
 
Stage 2: 
 
Exactly like in R Hard.  
 
 
Relevant Information on Experiment I: 
 
In Experiment I there have been 20 participants. The experiment consisted of exactly the same 2 
stages as just described: Answering 7 multiple-choice questions in stage 1 and choice between actions 
0, 1, 2, 3, 4, 5, 6, 7 in stage 2. 
At the end of Experiment I, payoffs of the participants from answering the questions and from the 
decisions as well as an additional payment of 525 tokens have been converted into euros according to 
the exchange rate 1 Euro per 210 tokens and paid cash to the participants. 
Based on the answers and the decisions of the participants of Experiment I, two averages have been 
calculated after the experiment: 
 
 The average number of correct answers “R” of all participants: 
 
The average is calculated as follows: the number of correct answers of all participants is added 
and then divided by the number of participants (20). The resulting value is rounded on one 
decimal place. Thus, the average can take values from 0 to 7 in steps of 0.1.                
  The average action “A” chosen by the participants: 
 
The average is calculated as follows: each participant chooses an action whereat the actions 
are assigned numbers from 0 to 7 (see table). The numbers of the action of each participant 
are added and then divided by the number of participants (20). The resulting value is rounded 
on one decimal place. Thus, the average action can take values from 0 to 7 in steps of 0.1.    
Before you make your decision in stage 3 and 4, you are told the value of the average action (A) 
chosen by the participants of Experiment I.          
 
Stage 3: 
 
Decision stage 3: 
In stage 3 you can choose between the following two alternatives. The choice is done by clicking on 
the alternative on the screen and confirming the choice with “OK”. 
Payoff stage 3: 
Your payoff in stage 3 depending on the distance between R and A, your payoff in stage 2 (which you 
are not told until the end of the experiment) and your choice between the two alternatives is:  
 
 Alternative 1 Alternative 2 
Your payoff in stage 2 is 525 and 
the distance between R and A is 
smaller than or equal to 0.5 
800 800 
Your payoff in stage 2 is 525 and 
the distance between R and A is 
larger than 0.5 
500 300 
Your payoff in stage 2 is 30 and  
the distance between R and A is 
smaller than or equal to 0.5 
300 500 
Your payoff in stage 2 is 30 and  
the distance between R and A is 
larger than 0.5 
210 210 
 
Explanation „Distance“: 
       Consider the two numbers R and A. The distance between these two numbers is  
       R-A if R is larger than A and A-R if R is smaller than A. 
 
 
Stage 4: 
 
Decision stage 4: 
You choose between three alternatives: Left, Middle and Right by clicking on the corresponding 
alternative on the computer screen. Please confirm your choice by clicking on “OK”.  
 
 Payoff stage 4: 
 
Alternatives  
Middle Right Left 
R is smaller than  
A-0.5 
315 315 1680 
R is larger/equal A -
0.5  and 
smaller/equal A+0.5  
1680 315 315 
Value of the 
Average number of 
correct questions 
  (R) 
R is larger than  
A+0.5 
315 1680 315 
 
A= Value of the average action of the participants of Experiment I 
 
R= Value of the average number of correct questions in Experiment I 
 
 
Calulation of your total payoff: 
 
Your total payoff in the experiment is given by the sum of: 
• The number of all your correctly answered questions multiplied by 190 tokens and the 
number of wrong answers multiplied by 10 tokens (your payoff in stage 1).  
• Your payoff in stage 2.  
• Your payoff in stage 3. 
• Your payoff in stage 4. 
• In addition you receive a payment of 725 tokens. 
 
This total payoff is converted into euros according to the exchange rate 1 Euro = 210 tokens. 
 
Instructions T Frame – Part I  
 
Course of the experiment: 
 
The experiment consists of two parts: In part I you answer two blocks of questions A and B each 
with 7 multiple-choice questions. In part II you make 8 decisions. The first four decisions (1A-4A) 
refer to question block A, the next four decisions (1B-4B) to question block B.  
 
The payoff from decision 1A (1B) depends among other things on your number of correctly 
answered multiple-choice questions in block A (B). Afterwards you receive some information 
on another experiment (Experiment I, II resp.). In Experiment I (II) question block A (B) have 
been answered and decision 1A (1B) have been made, too. Having received the information, 
you make decision 2A (2B). The payoff for decision 2A (2B) depends on Experiment I (II) 
and on your decision 1A (1B). Subsequently, you make decision 3A (3B) and 4A (4B), 
whereat your payoffs depend on Experiment I (II).  
Stage 1: 
Exactly like in R Hard except that subjects answer two different blocks of 7 multiple-choice questions 
(the hard and the tricky questions). Subjects are paid like in R Hard but only for one block of 
questions that is randomly selected.  
 
 
 
Instructions T Frame – Part II  
 
Decision 1A: 
Decision 1A:  
You state how many of the 7 questions in question block A you think you have answered correctly. 
For this, you enter a whole number between 0 and 7 in the corresponding cell and then click on „OK“. 
Payoff decision 1A:  
If your statement coincides with the actual number of correctly answered questions in block A („Your 
estimation is correct“), you receive 525 tokens, i fit does not coincide (“Your estimation is not 
correct”), you receive 30 tokens.  
 
Relevant information on Experiment I and II: 
In Experiment I and II respectively there have been 20 participants. These experiments consisted of 
answering the questions of block A in Experiment I and block B in Experiment II and each time a 
statement, how many questions have been answered correctly. For this statement, the participants have 
chosen between eight actions 0, 1, 2, 3, 4, 5, 6, 7. In case the actual number of correctly answered 
questions coincides with the number of the action, a participant received 525 tokens, if there was no 
coincidence he/she received 30 tokens.  
At the end of Experiment I (II) payoffs of the participants from answering the questions and from the 
decisions as well as an additional payment of 525 tokens have been converted into euros according to 
the exchange rate 1 Euro per 210 tokens and paid cash to the participants. 
 
Based on the answers and the decisions of the participants of Experiment I and II respectively, two 
averages for each experiment have been calculated after the experiment: 
 The average number of correct answers “R” of all participants: 
The average is calculated as follows: the number of correct answers of all participants is added 
and then divided by the number of participants (20).  
 The average estimation “E” of the participants: 
The average is calculated as follows: the chosen statements about the number of correctly 
answered questions of each participant are added and then divided by the number of 
participants (20).  
Both averages E and R of Experiment I and II  are rounded on one decimal place. Thus, the averages 
can take values from 0 up to 7 in steps of 0.1.                
 
Decisions 2A, 3A and 4A: 
Before you make decisions 2A, 3A and 4A, you are told the value of the average estimation (E) of 
the participants of Experiment I.          
Decision 2A: 
You decide how good your estimation of the number of correct questions is and how good the average 
estimation (E) of the participants of Experiment I is. There are four alternatives: 
•  “Both estimations are good”: your estimation is correct (see above) and the distance 
(explanation see below) between the average estimation (E) and the average number of correct 
questions (R) in Experiment I is smaller than or equal to 0.5.  
• “My own estimation is better”: your estimation is correct and the distance between E and R in 
Experiment I is larger than 0.5.  
•  „Average estimation is better“: your estimation is not correct and the distance between E and R 
in Experiment I is smaller than or equal to 0.5.  
• “Both estimations are bad”: your estimation is not correct and the distance between E and R in 
Experiment I is larger than 0.5.  
 
Payoff decision 2A: 
If you select the alternative that is actually true, you receive 400 tokens, otherwise you receive 50 
tokens. 
 
Explanation „distance“: 
       Consider the two numbers R and E. The distance between these two numbers is R-E if R is larger 
       than E and is E-R if R iss maller than E.  
 
Decision 3A: 
You state how well you think the participants in Experiment I assess themselves: 
• The participants overestimate their actual number of correctly answered questions on average. 
This means that the average number of correct (R) in Experiment I is by more than 0.5 smaller 
than the average estimation (E). 
• The participants estimate their actual number of correctly answered questions on average almost 
correct. This means that the average number of correct (R) in Experiment I is larger than or equal 
to E-0.5 and smaller than or equal to E+0.5. 
• The participants underestimate their actual number of correctly answered questions on average. 
This means that the average number of correct (R) in Experiment I is by more than 0.5 larger than 
the average estimation (E). 
You choose between the three alternatives (overestimate, correct, underestimate) by clicking on the 
corresponding alternative and confirming with OK.  
Payoff decision 3A: 
When the alternative you have chosen is actually true, then you receive 1680 tokens, when it is not 
true, you receive 315 tokens. 
 
Decision 4A: 
You state, what you think how large the average number of correctly answered questions (R) of 
the participants in Experiment I is. This is done by entering a number between 0 and 7 in steps of 0.1 
in the corresponding cell. 
Take notice of the following conditions:  
o If you have chosen “correct” in decision 3A, you can choose a Number that is larger than 
or equal to E - 0.5 and smaller than or equal to E + 0.5. 
o If you have chosen “underestimate” in decision 3A, you can choose a Number that is larger 
than E + 0.5 and smaller than or equal to 7. 
o If you have chosen “overestimate” in decision 3A, you can choose a Number that is larger 
than or equal to 0 and smaller than E - 0.5.  
 
Payoff decision 4A: 
If the distance between the number you have chosen and the average number of correct questions (R) 
is smaller than or equal to 0.5 and you selected in decision 3A the alternative that is actually true, then 
receive  105 tokens, otherwise you receive 20 tokens. 
 
Decision 1B-4B 
After decisions 1A-4A decisions 1B-4B regarding block B follow. 
Here, the following decisions are equivalent 1A-1B, 2A-2B, 3A-3B, 4A-4B besides that they refer 
now to block B and Experiment II.  
After decision 2B you are told the correct answers to the questions of block B. Afterwards you 
make decision 3B and 4B. 
 
Calculation of your total payoff: 
Your total payoff from the experiment is the sum of: 
• The number of your correctly answered questions in the block of questions randomly 
selected by the computer multiplied 190 tokens and the number of wrong answers in this 
block multiplied by 10 tokens.  
• Your payoff from decisions 1A-4A or 1B-4B: For the payment the computer again 
randomly selects whether decisions 1A-4A or 1B-4B are paid. 
• In addition you receive a payment of 420 tokens. 
 
This total payoff is converted into euros according to the exchange rate 1 Euro = 210 tokens. 
Instructions T Individual – Part 1  
 
Course of the Experiment: 
 
The experiment consists of 4 stages. In stage 1 you answer 7 multiple-choice questions. In stage 2 you 
make a decision. The payoff for this decision depends among other things on the number of 
multiple-choice questions you answered correctly. After stage 2 you receive some information on 
another experiment (Experiment I). In Experiment I stage 1 and 2 have been played as well. Having 
received this information, you make eight times a decision between two alternatives in stage 3. The 
payoff you get from the choice of an alternative depends on Experiment I and your decisions in stage 
2. In stage 4 you make eight times a decision between three alternatives, whereat your payoff from the 
choice of an alternative depends on Experiment I. You get the instructions for stage 2, 3 and 4 after 
having answered the 7 questions.  
Stage 1: 
 
Exactly like stage 1 in R Hard. 
 
 
Instructions T Individual – Part 2  
 
Stage 2: 
Decision stage 2:  
In stage 2 you choose one out of eight possible actions 0, 1, 2, 3, 4, 5, 6, 7.  This is done by entering 
one of these numbers in the corresponding cell on the computer screen and you confirm your choice 
by clicking on “OK”.  
Payoff stage 2:  
The following table shows the payoffs in tokens, which you receive depending on you choice and how 
many questions you answered correctly in stage 1. You are not told until after the experiment how 
many questions you answered correctly.  
 
Number of correct questions  
0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
Action 0 525 30 30 30 30 30 30 30 
Action 1 30 525 30 30 30 30 30 30 
Action 2 30 30 525 30 30 30 30 30 
Action 3 30 30 30 525 30 30 30 30 
Action 4 30 30 30 30 525 30 30 30 
Action 5 30 30 30 30 30 525 30 30 
Action 6 30 30 30 30 30 30 525 30 
 
A 
c 
t 
i 
o 
n 
Action 7 30 30 30 30 30 30 30 525 
        
Relevant Information on Experiment I: 
 
In Experiment I there have been 20 participants. The experiment consisted of exactly the same 2 
stages as just described: Answering 7 multiple-choice questions in stage 1 and choice between actions 
0, 1, 2, 3, 4, 5, 6, 7 in stage 2. 
At the end of Experiment I, payoffs of the participants from answering the questions and from the 
decisions as well as an additional payment of 525 tokens have been converted into euros according to 
the exchange rate 1 Euro per 210 tokens and paid cash to the participants. 
Based on the answers and the decisions of the participants of Experiment I, two values have been 
identified after the experiment: 
1. The number of correct answers “R” of a participant. 
2. The action “A” chosen by a participant. The value A of an action is a number between 0 and 
7 next to an action (see table).   
You are randomly assigned to one participant of Experiment I. When you make your decisions, you do 
not know which participant it is. Therefore, you make your decisions in stage 3 and 4 for all possible 
values of A, i.e. 0,1,2,3,4,5,6,7. For none of these values of A you get to know the value of R.  
Stage 3: 
Decision stage 3: 
In stage 3 you choose for every possible A (0,1,2,3,4,5,6,7) between two alternatives – i.e. you make 
eight times a  decision between the two alternatives. The choice is done by clicking on the alternative 
on the screen and confirming the choice with “OK” when you finished all eight decisions.  
Payoff stage 3: 
The following table shows your payoff in stage 3 depending on the values of R and A of the 
participant of Experiment I that is assigned to you, your payoff in stage 2 (which you are not told 
until the end of the experiment) and your choice between the two alternatives:  
 
 Alternative 1 Alternative 2 
Your payoff in stage 2 is 525 and R 
equals A  
800 800 
Your payoff in stage 2 is 525 and R 
is larger or smaller than A but not 
equal to A. 
500 300 
Your payoff in stage 2 is 30 and  R 
equals A. 
300 500 
Your payoff in stage 2 is 30 and  R 
is larger or smaller than A but not 
equal to A. 
210 210 
 
Stage 4: 
Your decision: 
• You make for each possible A (0,1,2,3,4,5,6,7) a decision between three alternatives – i.e. you 
make eight times a decision between three alternatives: Left, Middle and Right by clicking on 
the corresponding alternative on the computer screen. Please confirm your choice by clicking on 
“OK”.  
• Then, you choose a number for each possible A (i.e. you choose eight times a number): 
o When you chose Left, you choose a whole number between 0 and A-1 
o When you chose Right, you choose a whole number between A+1 and 7 
o When you chose Middle, you choose exactly the number A 
A table that shows you all possible numbers you can choose in stage 4 for each possible choice of 
alternatives in stage 4 and all values of A is attached to the instructions.  
• After you have made all sixteen decisions, please confirm your choice by clicking on “OK”.  
 
Payoff stage 4: 
1. You receive 105 tokens, when the number you have chosen coincides with the value R of the 
participant that is assigned to you. If there is no coincidence, you receive 20 tokens. 
2. Based on your decision and the values R and A of the participant that is assigned to you, you 
receive the following payoff:  
 
 
Alternatives  
Middle Right Left 
R is smaller than    A 315 315 1680 
R equal to A  1680 315 315 
Number of 
correct questions 
 (R) of the selected 
 participant  R is larger than A 315 1680 315 
 
A= Action chosen by a participant of Experiment I 
 
 
R= Number of correct questions of a participant in Experiment I  
 
 
Calulation of your total payoff: 
 
Your total payoff in the experiment is given by the sum of: 
• The number of all your correctly answered questions multiplied by 190 tokens and the 
number of wrong answers multiplied by 10 tokens (your payoff in stage 1).  
• Your payoff in stage 2.  
• Your payoff in stage 3. 
• Your payoff in stage 4. 
• In addition you receive a payment of 400 tokens. 
 
This total payoff is converted into euros according to the exchange rate 1 Euro = 210 tokens. 
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